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Abstract 
 
Constitutional approaches have been frequently employed in recent international 
legal literature. This unavoidably triggers the question of the quality of international 
law as a constitutionalized legal system. This thesis attempts to answer such a 
question by determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
constitutionalized international legal system and whether or not, at present, such 
minimum requirements have been fulfilled. The main difficulty in the articulation of 
these conditions is the semantic problem regarding the contours and content of 
constitutionalism caused by the transfer of this highly contested concept to the 
international context. In order to understand the destination context, a cosmopolitan 
paradigm will be consulted to provide explanations for the state-centred character of 
international law as part of the world’s multi-level governance. The thesis argues that 
the conditions for a constitutionalized international legal system must be articulated 
based on the viability of the proposed legal structure and its capacity to fulfil the 
underlying aims of international constitutionalism. The viability criterion demands 
compatibility with the pluralist structure of international society. The capacity 
criterion requires that the proposed legal structure can fulfil the underlying aim of 
international constitutionalism, which is, due to its complementary relationship with 
domestic constitutional sites, to create international self-governance with a limited 
mandate for peace and fundamental human rights. Thus, it is proposed that, in order 
to qualify as a constitutional legal system, international law must first be sufficiently 
equipped with secondary rules which will provide efficacy for international law to 
exist as a legal system. Secondly, there must also exist a hierarchy conferring a 
constitutional status on certain international primary rules protecting peace and 
fundamental human rights. Finally, international constitutionalization requires the 
institutionalization of international constituted power. The examination of whether or 
not each condition has been met in the current international legal structure is 
undertaken in order to determine the constitutional quality of international law, 
paying particular attention to the role of jus cogens rules and the United Nations in 
the process of international constitutionalization. It is argued that with the existence 
	   iv	  
of the three elements, international law has already been constitutionalized to a large 
extent. However, there remain some deficiencies especially with regard to the 
legitimacy of the exercise of power on matters of peace and security by the Security 
Council, which require further constitutionalization. 




Constitutional approaches have been frequently employed in recent international 
legal literature. This unavoidably triggers the question of the quality of international 
law as a constitutional legal system. This thesis attempts to answer such a question 
by determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for a constitutionalized 
international legal system and whether or not, at present, such minimum 
requirements have been fulfilled. The thesis argues that the conditions for a 
constitutionalized international legal system must be articulated based on the 
viability of the proposed legal structure and its capacity to fulfil the underlying aims 
of international constitutionalism. The viability criterion demands compatibility with 
the pluralist structure of international society. The capacity criterion requires that the 
proposed legal structure can fulfil the underlying aim of international 
constitutionalism, which is, due to its complementary relationship with domestic 
constitutional sites, to create international self-governance with a limited mandate for 
peace and fundamental human rights. Thus, it is proposed that, in order to qualify as 
a constitutional legal system, international law must first be sufficiently equipped 
with meta rules which will provide efficacy for international law to exist as a legal 
system. Secondly, there must also exist a hierarchy conferring a constitutional status 
on certain international rules protecting peace and fundamental human rights. 
Finally, international constitutionalization requires the institutionalization of 
international constituted power. The examination of whether or not each condition 
has been met in the current international legal structure is undertaken in order to 
determine the constitutional quality of international law, paying particular attention 
to the role of jus cogens rules and the United Nations in the process of international 
constitutionalization. It is argued that with the existence of the three elements, 
international law has already been constitutionalized to a large extent. However, 
there remain some deficiencies especially with regard to the legitimacy of the 
exercise of power on matters of peace and security by the Security Council, which 
require further constitutionalization. 
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Chapter I:  Introduction 
 
I. Setting the Background: Why International Constitutionalism? 
 
Although the constitutionalist approach has been long invoked in international legal 
scholarship,1 being described as the ‘necessary law of nations’ by older scholars,2 its 
discussion has stirred up early in the 21st century.3 The reason for this might lie in the 
belief that international constitutionalism can serve as a cure for the problems of both 
domestic and international legal systems.  
 
Starting at the domestic level, two shortcomings of domestic constitutional systems 
can be perceived as a factor that necessitates international constitutionalism. Firstly, 
state constitutions do not include those from outside their territory or of other 
nationality into their constituent power-holder, thus ignoring the interests of 
outsiders who might be affected by constitutional rules and other domestic 
legislation.4 In this sense, international constitutionalism can play a complementary 
role in establishing minimum standards of protection for the basic rights of its 
constituent power-holder, i.e. all humans, notwithstanding the territorial issue. 
Secondly, the globalization phenomenon has concealed and emphasized the lack of 
totality of domestic constitutional governance and state sovereignty which can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Verdross explains his concept of the 'constitution of the international legal community' in 
the foreword to his 1926 book 'Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft' ('The 
Constitution of the International Legal Community') Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Alfred Verdross as 
a Founding Father of International Constitutionalism’ (2012) 4 Goettingen Journal of 
International Law 385; Lauterpacht argued that human beings exist at ‘the very centre of the 
constitution of the world' Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights 
(Stevens & Sons 1950) 570; In his 1961 Article, Opsahl discusses the issue of divergence in 
the uses of the term 'international constitutional law', Torkel Opsahl, 'An ‘International 
Constitutional Law’?’ (1961) 10 ICLQ 760. 
2 Philip Allot, ‘The Concept of International Law’ (1999) 10 EJIL 31, 37. 
3 Jan Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’, The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 
2009) 1; Christine EJ Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal 
Perspective (MNP 2011) 1. 
4 See discussions in Andreas L Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’ in 
Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, 
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seen in the limits of state constitutions in terms of capability to deal with both 
international activities and deterritorialized problems as a product of globalization.5 
This necessitates international governance for transnational activities and the 
behaviour of non-state international actors, which play increasingly important roles.6 
With respect to this issue, international constitutionalism is thought to carry the hope 
of creating governance for activities beyond the scope of state constitutionalism and 
in the legitimizing and control of the exercise of political power at the international 
level, both by states and non-state actors, so as to compensate for the limitations of 
state constitutions.7 
 
At the international level, as illustrated before, globalization has led to an increase in 
the number of international rules and international organizations to facilitate and 
regulate international activities and deal with deterritorialized problems. However, 
international rules, which are largely created according to the wills of states, as well 
as the power of international organizations, especially that of the Security Council8, 
also need to be properly controlled and legitimatized, which might be achieved via a 
constitutional approach at the international level. 9 Added to this, the development of 
international governance can be ‘constructively engaged’ in light of international 
constitutionalism as an analytical tool. 10  Further, on the positive side, the 
fragmentation of international law represents ‘the rapid expansion of international 
legal activity into various new fields and the diversification of its objects and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See the discussion in Anne Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and 
Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures’ (2006) 19 LJIL 579; 
Schwöbel (n 3) 91. 
6 See the discussion in Peters (n 5); Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman, ‘A Functional 
Approach to International Constitutionalization’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman 
(eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance 
(CUP 2009) 5–6. 
7 See the approach of international constitutionalism as compensatory constitutionalism in 
Peters (n 5). 
8 Hereinafter, the ‘SC’. 
9  See e.g. Peters (n 5); Dunoff and Trachtman (n 6) 5–6; Neil Walker, ‘Taking 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies 519, 519. 
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techniques’. 11  The fragmentation of international law results in ‘regulatory 
competition’ and provides  ‘labator[ies] for development of a new legal instrument’, 
which have contributed to improvements in existing international law and its 
enforcement.12 However, the fragmented nature of international law raises serious 
concerns pertaining to the disunity and uncertainty of international law created by 
conflicts of norms, jurisdictions and judicial decisions which could be exacerbated 
by the proliferation of specialized regimes. 13  Constitutionalist approaches are 
believed to be a proper response to the defects resulting from the fragmentation of 
international law as they promise the creation of unity and systemic elements within 
international law by providing hierarchical structures and centralized institutions, or 
at least a means of coordination.14 Thus, international constitutionalism carries the 
hope that there exist certain systemic elements in international law to relieve the 
concerns caused by the perception of international law as ‘merely the aggregate of 
isolated and often contradictory movements’.15  
 
Accordingly, international constitutionalism does not only focus on the defects of 
international law but also aims to compensate for the shortcomings of domestic 
constitutional systems. The potential of international constitutionalism offers at least 
a promising theoretical framework to tackle the defects in both the international legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission (Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi), Fragmentation Of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising From The Diversification And Expansion of International Law, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.682. (hereinafter, ILC Report on Fragmentation of International Law), para 
14. 
12 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of 
Inter-Connected Islands’ (2004) 25 Mich JIL 903, 904. 
13  See e.g. the discussions on fragmentation of international law in ILC Report on 
Fragmentation of International Law; Gerhard Hafner, ‘Pros And Cons Ensuing from 
Fragmentation of International Law’ (2004) 25 Mich JIL 849; Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi 
Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ (2002) 15 LJIL 553; 
Mario Prost and Paul Kingsley Clark, ‘Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of 
International Law: How Much Does the Multiplication of International Organizations Really 
Matter?’ (2006) 5 Chinese Journal of International Law 341; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘The 
Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the 
International Court of Justice’ (1999) 31 Journal of International Law and Politics 791. 
14  Klabbers (n 3) 18; Jan Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’ (2004) 1 International 
Organizations Law Review 31, 49; See the discussion in Dunoff and Trachtman (n 6) 6–9. 
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realm and the domestic legal system. However, resorting to the notion of 
international constitutionalism automatically triggers the question of whether 
international law currently exists as a constitutionalized legal system or is just an 
attempt to explain or add normative value to recent developments in international 
law without real constitutional substance,16 or if this might be just a situation where 
certain rules of international rules possess a constitutional character, although these 
are inadequate to turn the whole international legal realm into a constitutionalized 
legal system.17   
 
II. Research Question and Methodology 
 
Although there exists a body of academic literature discussing international 
constitutionalism, the academic discussions get stuck in semantic issues regarding 
the content and contours of international constitutionalism as scholars discuss 
different things whilst giving them the same label of ‘constitutional’.  It is the aim of 
this thesis to tackle the semantic issue of international constitutionalism and to 
systematically determine the constitutional quality of international law.  
Accordingly, the research question of this thesis is whether or not international law 
can at present be perceived as a constitutional legal system and in order to answer 
this question, two tasks will be tackled. Firstly, a theoretical proposition on the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of an international 
constitutional legal system will be articulated. Secondly, the proposition articulated 
in the first task will be applied to assess the quality of international law as a 
constitutional legal system. Also, where the shortcomings of the current international 
legal structure are identified, suggestions on how further to constitutionalize 
international law will be made. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See the discussion of the use of constitutional language in international law in Wouter 
Werner, ‘The Never-Ending Closure: Constitutionalism and International Law’ in Nicholas 
Tsagourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives 
(CUP 2007); Rainer Wahl, ‘In Defence of “Constitution”’ in Dobner Petra and Martin 
Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism (OUP 2010). 
17 See Grimm as an example of global constitutionalism skeptic taking this stand. Dieter 
Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and Its Prospects in a Changed World’ in 
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In the articulation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for an international 
constitutional legal system, the cosmopolitan paradigm will be consulted to provide a 
cognitive framework to do so. A cosmopolitan paradigm offers an explanation for 
the state-centred and mainly decentralized structure of international law.18  An 
international constitutional legal structure based on a cosmopolitan paradigm will 
offer a viable option, unlike those based on statist constitutionalism which 
necessitate a world state or world sovereign. Further, the importance of states as 
recognized by international law at the international level leads to the structure of the 
world’s two levels of governance – on the one hand, an international constitutional 
legal system, on the other, domestic constitutional legal systems – which should 
complement each other to create a self-governing world of the free and equal. It will 
be argued in this thesis that the underlying aim of constitutionalism is to create self-
governance of the free and equal which should not be compromised during the 
transfer of the concept of constitutionalism to the international setting. Both the 
constitutionalization of international law and that of domestic law should be seen as 
integrated parts of one and the same on-going human attempt to constitutionalize 
human society. 
 
Based on the idea of complementarity between an international constitutional legal 
system and domestic constitutional legal systems, the role of the international 
constitutional legal system shall have a limited mandate for the creation of peace and 
the protection of fundamental human rights, aka international rights and 
cosmopolitan rights in Kant’s terms. That is to say, the role of international 
constitutionalism is to provide international peaceful conditions in which the 
domestic constitutionalism of each state can fully develop and minimum standards of 
human rights individuals can enjoy without territorial limitations.19 When domestic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See a pluralist state-centred structure of international law as a preferable choice to a 
world-state structure in creating a cosmopolitan world in Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’ 
in HS Reiss and HB Nisbet (eds), Kant: Political Writings (2nd edn, CUP 1991) 113. 
19 See the three definite articles, aka the cosmopolitan conditions of Kant for creating 
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constitutionalism in each state is more developed, this will contribute to a stronger 
link between international constituted power-holders and international constituent 
power-holders, aka humankind, which is connected by the notion of the state as the 
representative of its people who are part of international constituent power-holders, 
as well as the development of a sense of the cosmopolitan citizen involving relevant 
actors, both state and non-state. As for other matters, apart from peace and 
fundamental human rights, it should be left to the discretion of states to designate the 
content of relevant rules in the forms of domestic law as well as state-will-based 
international law, since democratic legitimacy can develop fully within domestic 
constitutional legal systems. The complementarity of these two levels of governance 
will lead to a world as a self-governing society, with a pluralist structure of multiple 
self-governing states existing side by side, held together by an international 
constitutional legal system. Therefore, another characteristic of international society 
is its being part of the world’s two levels of governance.  
 
With respect to the methodology of sketching out the current legal structure of 
international law in the second task, affirmation of the existence of secondary rules 
which organize the legal structure, via the acceptance of legal officials,20 will be 
employed as a theoretical tool to paint a picture of the current structure of 
international law. Hart’s theory of a legal system as a union of primary and 
secondary rules offers the proper theoretical tool in the context of this research 
question, as it offers an elaborate account of how a primitive society develops into a 
more legally developed society with a legal system,21 and certain developments of 
secondary rules can also help to identify the legal structures which might be required 
by different theories of international constitutionalism.  
 
III. Outline of the Chapters  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, The Concept of Law (Joseph Raz and Penelope A. Bulloch 
eds, 3rd edn, Clarendon Press 2012) 116–117. 
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In Chapter II, articulation of the conditions necessary and sufficient for an 
international constitutional legal system will be addressed. First of all, the meanings 
and interplay of three interconnected key terms – international constitutionalism, the 
constitutionalization of international law and a constitution of the international 
community – will be elaborated to reveal the interrelationship among these three 
terms: international constitutionalism as an idea, the constitutionalization of 
international law as a process of the actualization of constitutionalism and a 
constitution of the international community as a product of the constitutionalization 
of international law. Based on such interplay, it will be proposed that one logical way 
to determine the constitutional quality of international law is to examine whether or 
not the current international legal structure, which has been shaped by constitutional 
rules as a product of the constitutionalizing process of the idea of constitutionalism, 
can fulfil the ideas entailed in international constitutionalism. Thus, although 
constitutionalism has a number of dimensions, namely, sociocultural, normative and 
institutional, the normative aspect22 of constitutionalism is the focus of this thesis. In 
the normative aspect, it will be argued, in a very inclusive and very weak sense, that 
the constitutionalization of international law can be understood as the 
systematization of international law. Nevertheless, the different ideas on the content 
of constitutionalism that one holds will impact on how international law shall be 
systematized.  Thus, the process of constitutionalization of international law starts 
from the systematization and will develop further to meet more necessary conditions 
required in specific idea of international constitutionalism. 
 
Based on the board understanding of the constitutionalization of international law as 
the systematization of international law, three propositions can be extracted from 
various propositions for international constitutionalism, on how international law 
should be structured or systematized can be found in the current literature. Three 
such models, a secondary-rule constitutional legal structure, a hierarchical 
constitutional legal structure and a statist constitutional legal structure, will be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  See e.g. the discussion of the social, institutional and normative dimensions of 
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discussed. Subsequently, it will be argued that key points for the transfer of the idea 
of constitutionalism are an understanding of both the original context and the 
destination context, as well as an understanding of what are the core aims of the idea. 
Thus, the reconceptualization of constitutionalism in the international sphere must 
not entail conditions which are too attached to the particularities of domestic 
societies. Otherwise, it will rule out the viability of the idea of constitutionalism in 
the international sphere. Also, the core goal of international constitutionalism must 
not be compromised. This will serve as a criterion of the viability and capacity to 
fulfil the underlying aim for the reconceptualization of constitutionalism, which will 
be used to assess whether one of the three models gives a full account of conditions 
necessary and sufficient for a constitutionalized international legal system. It will be 
argued in this chapter that none of them does.  However, based on the cognitive 
framework of international order, built on the cosmopolitan paradigm and the 
underlying aim of constitutionalism, which is to create self-governance of the free 
and equal individuals, together with analyses of the three models, it will be proposed 
that the necessary conditions for the emergence of an international constitutional 
legal system are as follows:  
 
1. International law must be sufficiently equipped with secondary rules which will 
provide efficacy for international law to exist as a legal system.  
 
2. There must exist a hierarchy of international primary rules providing supremacy 
for primary rules that protect peace and fundamental human rights.   
 
3. The institutionalization (allocation and limitation) of international constituted 
power must be achieved in order to establish international self-governance with a 
mandate for the protection of international peace and fundamental human rights. 
 
In Chapters III–VI, the second task — the determination of whether the three 
conditions proposed have been met in the current international legal structure — will 
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legal system by using Hart’s concept of a legal system as a union of primary and 
secondary rules.  The rules that function as rules of recognition, of change and of 
adjudication in international law will be identified in order to determine whether or 
not international law is sufficiently equipped with secondary rules to deal with legal 
defects occurring in a primitive society. Then, the hierarchical structure of 
international primary rules with the supremacy of rules protecting peace and 
fundamental human rights will be affirmed in Chapter IV. The thesis will propose 
that the secondary rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens and the secondary rule 
of primacy of the Charter of the United Nations23 have elevated jus cogens rules and 
the UN Charter to become higher rules of the system. It will further argue that the 
link between both sets of international constitutional rules and fundamental shared 
values can provide explanations for their higher and universal character. In other 
words, the source of the validity of jus cogens and the UN Charter as a higher rule 
derives from the fundamental shared values of the international community. 
Accordingly, the hierarchical structure of primary rules reveals the content of the 
unifying rule of recognition, which embraces fundamental shared values as a source 
of validity of constitutional primary rules. The identification of international 
constitutional primary rules and their source of validity will also reveal the holder of 
constitution-making power (constituent power-holder), which will provide the 
foundation for the discussions in the next chapter. Also, the scope of the application 
and legal consequences of the rules of the non-derogability of jus cogens and the 
primacy of the Charter will also be addressed in order to paint a more comprehensive 
picture of how they have shaped the structure of international law. Finally the third 
condition of the institutionalization of international constituted power, which can 
compel states to act against their will, with a mandate for peace and fundamental 
human rights, will be the subject of study of Chapter V. This chapter will explore the 
institutional structures that have been established, if any, within the regime of jus 
cogens and the UN to see whether any relevant secondary rules allocate international 
constituted power above state wills to any actor and, if so, whether such powers are 
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limited based on the nexus to the international constituent power identified in 
Chapter IV. It will also attempt to show that based on pluralist-international law and 
the multi-level governance of the world, the vertical checks and balances between 
states (and their organs) and the international constituted power-holder can be 
resorted to in order to limit international constituted power. 
 
The last chapter will summarise the two tasks undertaken in this writing – the 
proposition for necessary and sufficient conditions of the international constitutional 
legal system and the assessment of international law as a constitutional legal system 
in light of its current structure. Suggestions for how international law can be further 
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To assess the quality of international law as a constitutionalized legal system,  
among the first issues to be addressed is what the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for an existence of constitutionalized international legal system are. A key difficulty 
lies in the content and contours of international constitutionalism having been 
defined differently from one scholar to another, ranging from a very broad notion of 
reading international constitutional rules in which any fundamental rules, organizing 
rules or meta-rules of international society are viewed as constitutional to one strictly 
based on liberal-democratic statist constitutional legal structures. This semantic 
problem of global constitutionalism is rooted in the ambiguity over the idea of 
constitutionalism, even in the domestic contexts in which the idea of 
constitutionalism originally developed. The transfer of this concept to the 
international context exacerbates the problem, due to the particularities of 
international society and international law. The challenge is to contextualize the 
notion of constitutionalism within the international environment in a way that does 
not undermine its underlying aims which is to create a self-regulating society. Thus, 
this chapter seeks to set out the conditions – individually necessary and cumulatively 
sufficient – for the establishment of a constitutionalized international legal system. 
 
II. Semantic Problem and Transfer of the Concept of Constitutionalism to the 
International Context 
 
As observed by MacDonald and Shamir-Borer: ‘[t]here is, of course, no single list of 
indicators of constitutionalism or constitutionalisation. The number of such lists 
found in the literature is (at least) equal to the number of authors writing in the 
field.’1 Hence the semantic issue that arises with respect to the definition and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Euan Macdonald and Eran Shamir-Borer, ‘Meeting the Challenges of Global Governance’ 
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contours of constitutionalism is obviously one of the puzzles that need to be solved 
in order to assess the quality of international law as a constitutionalized legal system. 
This difficulty is not confined to the international setting since even in the intra-state 
context where this concept was originally developed, this issue remains unresolved.2 
Constitutionalism has been described as ‘essentially contested’,3 ‘deeply contested’4 
and ‘increasingly polymorphic’.5 Taking the idea of constitutionalism out of the 
domestic context does, however, complicate the problem, as it involves the transfer 
of an idea that was originally developed in – and closely attached to – one 
environment into a very different one, thus necessitating a degree of 
reconceptualization or remodelling.6   
 
As Walker notes, one element of a good ‘translation’ of a concept from one setting to 
another is to have a ‘thick conception’ of the object of translation, based on a 
‘detailed hermeneutic understanding’ of both source and destination contexts.7 In 
articulating the basics for the transfer of a concept, Walker also stresses the 
importance of balancing particularity (which requires susceptibility to relevant 
particular features of the contexts involved) with generality (which aims to ensure 
that the concept being transferred retains ‘some interpretive or explanatory 
purchase’).8 The requirement for an understanding of the differences between source 
and destination contexts and some balance between particularity and generality will 
underpin the effort here to set out the proper criteria to determine whether or not 
international law now exists as a constitutionalized legal system. Understanding the 
differences between the domestic and international contexts helps in the formulation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP 
2010) 38–39. 
3  Colin Harvey, John Morison and Jo Shaw, ‘Voices, Spaces, and Processes in 
Constitutionalism’ (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 1, 3. 
4 Neil Walker, ‘Post National Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in JHH 
Weiler and Marlene Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism beyond the State (CUP 2003) 
53. 
5 Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ 65 The Modern Law Review 317, 333. 
6 See the discussion on the transfer of the concept of constitutionalism into the inter-state 
context in Walker (n 4); Krisch (n 2) 35–40. 
7 Walker (n 4) 36–37. 
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of a conception of international constitutionalism which strikes a balance between 
particularity and generality. It will avoid the problem of international 
constitutionalism having been required to meet standards that are too reliant on the 
particularities of domestic societies, and the problem of the criteria for a 
constitutionalized international legal system being overly weak or broad. Any 
plausible conception must reflect the underlying aim of constitutionalism, which 
should not be compromised for the sake of destination context-fitting.  
 
Accordingly, the semantic problem of the content of international constitutionalism 
is rooted in the originally much contested content of constitutionalism, even in the 
domestic realm, as well as the process of the transfer of the concept of 
constitutionalism to the international sphere. With respect to the process of the 
transfer of an idea, the articulation of necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
constitutionalized international legal system must strike a balance between 
particularity and generality based on an understanding of the differences between the 
original context and the destination context in order to avoid the criteria being too 
attached to a statist environment in the domestic context and too general to 
contribute to a meaningful development of international law.       
 
 
III. Terminology Clarifications: Interactions between International 
Constitutionalism, the Constitutionalization of International Society and its 
Law and the Constitution of the International Community as an Idea, a Process 
and a Product 
 
Three closely connected terms in international constitutional discourse, ‘international 
constitutionalism’, the ‘constitutionalization of international law’ and ‘the 
constitution of the international community’, must be distinguished, and the relations 
between them set out. It is suggested here that each refers to a different dimension, or 
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caused confusion in the current literature9, thus further exacerbating the semantic 
issues outlined above, clarifying their respective meanings and roles will not only 
help to dispel confusion, but also provide a foundation of the attempt in this chapter 
to articulate a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a constitutionalized 
international legal system It should, however, be noted here that, in this section, in 
order to explain the interactions between these terms, a broad understanding of those 
three terms will be resorted to in order to provide the most inclusive approach to 
considering necessary and sufficient conditions for a constitutionalized legal system.  
 
3.1. International Constitutionalism 
 
Although having different understandings of the contours and content of 
constitutionalism, scholars agree in seeing constitutionalism as an idea. For example, 
Klabbers views constitutionalism as ‘an attitude, a frame of mind’, understanding 
constitutionalism as ‘the philosophy of striving towards some form of political 
legitimacy’, 10whilst Schwöbel, sees constitutionalism as the idea of a ‘legal 
framework that pertains to the coexistence of humans on a given territory’ and ‘a 
normative framework that is ordered and good’.11  Construing the relationship of 
constitutionalism with the other two terms, Tsagourious holds that  
 
…constitutionalism is the ideology behind the process of constitutionalisation 
and ideology behind constitutions as outcomes. To put it differently, 
constitutionalism provides the ideological context within which constitutions 
emerge and constitutionalisation functions.12  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Bardo Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of International Constitutional Law’ in Nicholas 
Tsagourias (ed.), Transnational Constitutionalism International and European Perspectives 
(CUP 2007) 311–312; DZ Cass, ‘The “Constitutionalization” of International Trade Law: 
Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International 
Trade’ (2001) 12 EJIL 39, 39, 40–41 and 47–49. 
10 Jan Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’, The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 
2009) 10.  
11  Christine EJ Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective 
(MNP 2011) 144. 
12 Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘Introduction’, Transnational Constitutionalism International and 
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Based on this understanding, constitutionalism is the idea that drives – and directs – 
the process of ‘constitutionalization’, a process that has a ‘constitution’ as its 
product. Constitutionalism thus understood also provides a standard by which 
putatively ‘constitutional’ rules can be evaluated.  
 
Based on a very broad and weak sense of constitutions as a product of the 
actualization of constitutionalism, ‘any reasonably developed legal order can be 
conceived as having a constitution at its disposal’13 and ‘the fundamental order of 
any autonomous community or body politic can be addressed as a constitution’.14 
Allot defines a constitution as ‘a structure-system which is shared by all societies’.15 
Thus, constitutionalism might be seen, in a very broad sense, as an idea regarding 
how society should be legally structured, and so a constitution can exist in any 
society which is sufficiently structured; naturally, ideas about how each society is to 
be structured will vary depending on many factors. Therefore, constitutionalism 
develops divergently in different jurisprudences which cultivate different juridical 
traditions16 as ‘a differentiated legal system needs different structures’.17 Henceforth, 
international constitutionalism can be broadly understood as the idea of how 
international society should be legally structured; and due to the fact that the nature 
of international society differs from that of domestic societies, the content of 
domestic constitutionalism, which is rooted in the idea of how one specific domestic 
society should be structured or in particular domestic legal cultures, might not be 
able to be directly transferred and applied to international society. Further, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Stefan Kadelbach and Thomas Kleinlein, ‘International Law – a Constitution for 
Mankind? An Attempt at a Re-Appraisal with an Analysis of Constitutional Principles’ 
(2007) 50 German Yearbook of International Law 303, 308. 
14 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of International Constitutional Law’ in Ronald St. John 
Macdonald and Douglas M. Johnston (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism (MNP 2005) 
838. 
15 Philip Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (OUP 1990) 167. 
16 Douglas M Johnston, ‘World Constitutionalism in the Theory of International Law’ in 
Ronald St John Macdonald and Douglas M Johnston (eds), Towards World 
Constitutionalism (MNP 2005) 15–16. 
17  Brun-Otto Bryde, ‘International Democratic Constitutionalism’, in Ronald St John 
Macdonald and Douglas M. Johnston (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism (Martinus 
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individuals from different domestic societies will have different ideas about how 
international law should be structured. This is the main reason for divergences in the 
contours and content of constitutionalism in international law as proposed by legal 
scholars. As illustrated before, however, adopting a very broad idea of international 
constitutionalism as the notion of how international society should be legally 
systematized, without taking into consideration the underlying aim of 
constitutionalism that should be transferred to the international sphere, would not 
reflect the fundamentality of the idea of constitutionalism which should not be 
compromised in the process of transfer to the new context. Nor does it reflect any 
significant development in international law. However, this issue will be discussed in 
detail later in this Chapter. 
 
3.2. The Constitutionalization of International Society and its Law 
 
Not so different from the term ‘international constitutionalism’, the 
constitutionalization of international society, and its law, is an ambiguous term. For 
instance, Joerges speaks of this term as ‘a trendy concept filled up with a plethora of 
meanings and messages’.18 Nevertheless, one shared characteristic of the divergent 
usages of the term of constituionalization is ‘the connotation of a process’19 based on 
its suffix, i.e. ‘-ization’. Accordingly, in light of the broad meaning of 
constitutionalism discussed before, the constitutionalization of international society 
can be simply understood as the process of the actualization of international 
constitutionalism, resulting in a constitution for the international community; or it 
can be perceived as the process of moving towards a more constitutionalized 
international society.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Christian Joerges, ‘Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance: Exploring a Magic 
Triangle’ in Christian Joerges and Inger-Johanne Sand, Gunther Teubner (eds), 
Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing 2004) 373. 
19  Christian Walter, ‘International Law in a Process of Constitutionalization’, New 
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Nevertheless, the question of what developments in international society can be 
regarded as the process of the constitutionalization of international society is indeed 
based on one’s opinion of the content and contours of constitutionalism that define 
the requirements for the product of the process of ‘constitutionalization’; as Loughlin 
puts it, ‘the contentious character of constitutionalisation can best be explained by 
bringing this process into alignment with an account of constitutions and 
constitutionalism’.20 Walter observes that ‘the term may even imply some degree of 
imperfection – a situation of transition from one underlying concept to another, the 
contours of which are not yet entirely clear’. 21 Hence, the process of 
constitutionalization is to be understood as a matter of degree rather than an all-or-
nothing approach; the existence of a certain number of constitutional rules in 
international law does not put a stop to the process of constitutionalization but it can 
be viewed as a trend towards constitutionalization; and the greater the number of 
rules with constitutional status, the more constitutionalized international society 
becomes. This explains the overlapping situation where some academics refer to a 
certain set of international rules as evidence of the ongoing process of the 
constitutionalization of international law, whilst others discuss them as part of 
existing international constitutional legal system.22 Human right law is indeed a clear 
example that scholars refer to as one involving both an already-existing international 
constitutional legal system and the ongoing process of constitutionalization of 
international law.23 In this thesis, the term constitutionalization is used in two 
different contexts – the constitutionalization of international society and the 
constitutionalization of international law. The difference is that the former discusses 
constitutionalization in the international realm in a broader sense, including social, 
political, cultural and normative dimensions, whilst the latter focuses only on the 
normative dimension. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Martin Loughlin, ‘What is Consitutionalisation?’ in Dobner Petra and Martin Loughlin 
(eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism (OUP 2010) 61. 
21 Walter (n 19) 192. 
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3.3. Constitution of the International Community 
 
Constitutions are, essentially, a product of the actualization of constitutionalism, 
produced through the process of constitutionalization. Allot adopts this broad 
understanding of constitution, defining a constitution as ‘a structure-system which is 
shared by all societies’24 and ‘the fruit of a society’s contemplation of itself in time 
and space’25. Defining society as ‘a sharing of consciousness and a sharing of willing 
and acting’,26 he further explains that a ‘constitution, in all its forms, is an essential 
part of the self-structuring of society, its organization of power’.27 In this sense, the 
contours and content of constitutionalism in a given society will be a product of the 
self-contemplation of that society regarding how it should be structured, and this will 
vary from society to society, resulting in differences between constitutions of 
different societies.  
 
In terms of their character, constitutions are sets of rules that are different in 
character from other rules. The characteristics of universality, primacy and 
indelibleness are proposed as the distinctive features of constitutions.28 Universality, 
or inclusiveness, is one of the outstanding characteristics of constitutions. It signifies 
that constitutions apply to all members of the community they are constituted to 
regulate, with no exceptions.29 Constitutions serve as ‘an agreement that establishes 
an ongoing community creates a web of criss-crossing mutual expectations, duties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Allott (n 15) 167. 
25 Ibid 133. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid 142. 
28 Different scholars have divergent opinions on the distinct features of constitutions. See  
e.g. Chesterman, Franck and Malone who propose that perpetuity, indelibleness and primacy 
are distinct characteristics of constitutions, Simon Chesterman, Thomas M Franck and David 
M Malone, Law and Practice of the United Nations (OUP 2008) 5–11; Meanwhile Bodansky 
is of the view that the characteristics of primacy and entrenchment are what distinguish 
constitutions, Daniel Bodansky, ‘Symposium: The ILC’s State Responsibility Articles: 
Introduction and Overview’ (2002) 96 AJIL 773, 571. 
29 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of The International 
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and entitlements that, being a carefully knotted skein, are not readily disentangled’.30 
Thus, if one is permitted to opt out, this can be taken as abrogation of the legitimate 
expectations of all those who remain members, since an act might detrimentally 
affect the community as a whole. 31In terms of primacy, constitutions are bestowed 
with superiority above other legal norms in the community they serve.32Constitutions 
exist as a hierarchically superior form of law for, in cases of conflicts, they surpass 
ordinary rules,33as well as all acts of governance inconsistent with them, no matter 
whether precedent or subsequent in time, and the only exception to this is 
amendments to the constitution.34 After the entry into force of a constitution, all the 
norms in a legal system that the constitution governs are to be concordant with the 
standards set by the constitution.35The indelibleness of a constitution means that 
constitutions are normally more difficult to amend or change than ordinary rules.36 
This is because ‘constitutions address fundamental issues and are intended to provide 
a stable framework of governance of indefinite duration’.37 This also reflects the 
notion of the validity of a constitution, irrespective of the passage of time, i.e. ‘every 
constitution aspires to eternality.’38 Accordingly, the fact that certain international 
rules possess the character of universality, primacy or indelibleness might signify a 
constitutional element or the existence of a constitution for the international 
community. 
 
In terms of composition and form, the constitution of the international community 
contains two types of rules based on their function; applying Hart’s terms, these are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Chesterman, Franck and Malone (n 28) 5. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid 7. 
33 Daniel Bodansky, ‘Is There an International Environmental Constitution?’ (2009) 16 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 565, 571. 
34 Chesterman, Franck and Malone (n 28) 7. 
35 Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International 
Community (MNP 2009) 103. 
36 Chesterman, Franck and Malone (n 28) 6. 
37 Bodansky (n 33) 571. 
38  Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International 
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primary rules and secondary rules.39 The first category is constitutional primary rules 
which are substantive rules establishing obligations for the subjects of international 
law, i.e. jus cogens rules and rules regarding the protection of fundamental human 
rights.40 The second type is international secondary rules or meta rules, which are 
rules about rules.41 Tomuschat explains that rules governing the creation of, the entry 
into force of, the implementation of, the adjudication of, the interpretation of or the 
application of rules are meta rules; and meta rules on law-creation, the operation of 
the executive and adjudicating functions serve as part of the constitution of any legal 
system.42 Likewise, Verdross argues that fundamental international secondary rules 
that govern the sources of law, subjects of law and their application and jurisdiction 
are international constitutional rules.43 Examples of international secondary rules 
which are commonly proposed as constitutional rules are a rule of the sanctity of 
treaties (pacta sunt servanda),44 as well as Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ.45 
Further, constitutional rules can exist in both written and unwritten forms46 and there 
exists no requirement that constitutional rules, including international ones, need to 
exist in a single document.47 
 
After discussing those three terms, one vital clarification that needs to be addressed 
is that international constitutionalism as studied in thesis is the idea of how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39  Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of International Constitutional Law’ (n 14) 842–843; 
Bodansky (n 33) 570. 
40 Bodansky (n 33) 570; Schwöbel (n 11) 18. 
41 Tomuchat employs the term ‘meta rules’ rather than secondary rules; however it was 
clearly explained that it is equivalent or influenced by the idea of secondary rules of Hart 
(although Tomuschat states that meta rules are equivalent to rules of recognition not 
secondary rules) Christian Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States without or against 
Their Will’ (1993) 241 Recueil des Cours 194, 216; Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of 
International Constitutional Law’ (n 14) 842–843. 
42 Tomuschat (n 41) 216. 
43  Alfred Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, at v as cited in 
Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of International Constitutional Law’ (n 14) 842. 
44 Hermann Mosler, ‘The International Society as a Legal Community’ (1974) 4 Recueil des 
Cours 17, 84–85. 
45 Schwöbel (n 11) 18. 
46 Mosler (n 44) 84–85. 
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international society shall be legally systematized. Thus, in this thesis, the 
international ‘constitution’ being discussed is a constitution of the international 
community, not just a constitution of an international organization. As the statutes of 
certain organizations ‘constitute’ an organization and can contain certain 
constitutional features, they might be taken as constitutions; however, the object of 
the founding statute of an international organization’s object is too restrictive to fit in 
the meaning of a constitution as the highest law of the community which governs any 
matter and binds everyone in the community to which they belong,48 i.e. ‘big-C’ 
constitution not ‘small-c’ constitution,49 or ‘macro-constitutionalism’ not ‘micro-
constitutionalism’.50 However, it does not rule out the possibility of certain statutes 
of international organizations having a constitutional status if they can earn 
omnipotence and other necessary characteristics of a constitution for the international 
community.  
  
IV. Broad Understanding of the Constitutionalization of International Law as 
the Systematization of International Law and The Propositions of a Model for 
An International Constitutional Legal System in Current Literature. 
 
In the preceding section, the definitions of international constitutionalism, the 
constitutionalization of international society (law) and international constitutional 
rules, and the interaction among them as an idea, a process and a product, have been 
discussed. In this section, based on the discussion in the last section, the premise that, 
in a very weak and broad sense, the constitutionalization of international law can be 
understood as the systematization of international law will be developed to create an 
understanding of the differences in the proposition for an international constitutional 
legal structure. This will be helpful in the articulation of the necessary and sufficient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Mosler (n 44) 32; See further discussion in Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of International 
Constitutional Law’ (n 14) 839–840. 
49  Mattias Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship 
between Constitutionalism in and beyond State’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff, Joel P. Trachtman 
(eds), Ruling the World? International Law, Global Governance, Constitutionalism (CUP 
2009) 258–263. 
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conditions for the emergence of a constitutionalized international legal system. After 
a broad understanding of the constitutionalization of international law as the 
systematization of international law has been considered, based on the broad 
understanding of the constitutionalization of international law, an exploration of the 
proposals in the existing literature on the legal structures that international law needs 
to possess in order to qualify as a constitutionalized legal system will be conducted. 
 
International constitutionalism entails many dimensions – social, political, cultural 
and normative. Accordingly, the success of the actualization of international 
constitutionalism can be measured in different dimensions. The focus of this thesis, 
however, is the normative aspect of constitutionalism, i.e. the legal structure and its 
function. The rationale behind this lies in the interaction of constitutionalism as an 
idea, constitutionalization as a process and constitutional rules as a product. Based on 
this interaction, despite the different contours of international constitutionalism 
proposed, the way to assess whether international constitutionalism has been 
sufficiently actualized in the international realm or not is to seek products which are 
both constitutional rules and legal structures, with a legal mechanism established by 
them, and to determine whether the products can satisfy the ideologies or aims 
underlying the idea. Of course, the impact of the actualization of international 
constitutionalism will also have a social, political and cultural dimension; however, it 
is the impact on the legal structure that will be the most tangible, and readily 
assessable; and the legal structure can also be seen as a tool to achieve the further 
sociocultural and political purposes of constitutionalism. Thus, the focus here is on 
the normative dimension of international constitutionalism, i.e. the 
constitutionalization of international law. 
 
Generally, the normative dimension of international constitutionalism focuses on the 
identification of specific norms as international constitutional norms which could 
provide a normative framework for an international constitutional order, i.e. the 
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within an international legal realm,51  reflecting the movement towards relative 
normativity in the international sphere.52 For those with a very broad notion of 
constitutionalism – simply, for example, the idea of subjecting human relations to a 
framework of legal rules – any rules that contribute to the systematization of such a 
framework will also appear as contributing to its constitutionalization. Thus, from 
this perspective, the processes of systematization and constitutionalization come to 
appear, at least in a very broad and weak sense, as the same thing but with different 
labels. However, for those who have specific dimensions of or requirements for 
constitutionalism in mind, especially ones that exclusively attach constitutionalism to 
a state-like structure, they would set the specific direction of legal systematization or 
the specific requirements of a legal structure or legal mechanism to accord with the 
more specific contours of constitutionalism that they have in mind. For example, for 
those for who hold a very robust understanding of constitutionalism exclusively 
attached to a state-like structure, far more than a basic systematization tendency will 
be required before a legal system rule can be appropriately labeled ‘constitutional’. 
However, despite the differences in the content of international constitutionalism that 
one might have in mind, the creation of a list of necessary and sufficient 
requirements for the emergence of what can be called a constitutionalized 
international legal system can be achieved via a determination of what legal 
structures international law must possess in order to satisfy one’s specific idea of 
international constitutionalism. 
  
Patently, the weak but accommodative understanding of the constitutionalization of 
international law as the systematization of international law is unlikely to help us to 
articulate the conditions necessary and sufficient for an international constitutional 
legal system in a meaningful sense. However, let us momentarily adopt this 
understanding for the specific purpose of gathering together potential models for an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid 42. 
52 See Stefan Kirchner, ‘Relative Normativity and the Constitutional Dimension of 
International Law: A Place for Values in the International Legal System?’ (2004) 5 German 
Law Journal 47; Prosper Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’ (1983) 
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international constitutional legal structure in a way that is as inclusive as possible. 
Exploring current relevant literature, this difference in the normative dimension of 
each different proposal of international constitutionalism varies, based on how 
international law is to be systematized. At one end, there is a very broad notion of a 
secondary-rule constitutional structure that defines a constitutional structure as 
merely a fundamental meta/ secondary/ organizing structure which varies from 
society to society as a product of the self-contemplation of each society without 
specifying the underlying core requirements that the legal structure of any kind of 
society needs to achieve. 53  In the middle of the spectrum is a hierarchical 
constitutional structure which demands more than constitutional secondary rules and 
focuses on the hierarchical structure of higher rules established by higher rules and 
the supremacy of the community interest as a source of higher validity superior to the 
interests of any individual member of the community or group.54 At the other end of 
spectrum is a very narrow statist constitutional structure55 that, apart from the 
hierarchical structure, necessitates legal structures with specific legal mechanisms 
which can only be developed in very centralized societies, such as domestic 
societies. Such a legal structure is closely connected to statehood or the sovereignty 
of states that comprehensively centralizes political power in states and enables states 
to compulsorily and comprehensively regulate their internal structure.56 It can be 
seen from this order that meta-rules constitutional structure has the greatest 
flexibility in terms of allowing such structures to be created in different kinds of 
society. Located at the other end of the spectrum, it is an international constitutional 
legal structure which is highly attached to the particularity of the source context – a 
state structure built upon the idea of state sovereignty – in the sense of the transfer of 
an idea as discussed earlier.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Schwöbel (n 11) 43–45; Allott (n 15) 167; Aoife O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in 
Global Constitutionalisation (CUP 2014) 15–16. 
54 Bryde (n 17) 104–106; Schwöbel (n 11) 37–39. 
55 See the discussion of Democratic-Statism Constitutional Approach in Mattias Kumm, 
‘The Best of Times and Worst of Times’ in Dobner Petra and Martin Loughlin (eds), The 
Twilight of Constitutionalism (OUP 2010) 203–212. 
56 See the argument on how sovereignty is essential to the constitutional order in Jeremy A 
Rabkin, Law Without Nations?: Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States 
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4.1. Secondary-rule Constitutional Legal Structure 
 
Roth argues that the constitutional legal structure of a legal order supplies a society 
with ‘secondary rules’ – the rule of recognition by which primary rules of obligation 
are recognized, the rules of adjudication by which primary rules are adjudicated, the 
rules of change according to which primary rules are altered.57  
 
The secondary/ meta-rule based constitutional structure is probably the oldest version 
of normative constitutionalism in the international context since the Westphalian 
era.58 In his 1926 book ‘Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft’, Verdross 
defines constitutional rules as ‘norms which deal with the structure and subdivision 
of, and the distribution of spheres jurisdiction in, a community’.59 Likewise, in 
discussing the concept of a constitution of the international community, Tomuschat 
explains:  
 
Generally law-making is the expression of the original power vested in the 
political forces of the community concerned … Together with the rule of 
discharge of the executive and the judicial functions, the rules on law-making 
form the constitution of any system of governance. All these sets of 
prescription can be logically characterized as meta rules… .60  
 
However, Schwöbel makes the observation that, in their later books, both Verdross 
and Tomuschat put more emphasis on constitutional primary rules.61 The idea of a 
meta-rule constitutional structure is also supported, albeit with a focus on the rule of 
recognition, by Kadelbach and Kleinlein who argue that, in theory and in a modest 
sense:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Brad R Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (OUP 1999) 52. 
58 Schwöbel (n 11) 43. 
59 Alfred Verdross, Völkerrecht (5th edn Springer, Vienna 1964) 22 as cited in ibid. 43–44. 
60 Tomuschat (n 41) 216. 
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…any reasonably developed legal order can be conceived as having a 
constitution at its disposal, in the sense of a basic norm (constitution in a 
logical or systematic sense) or in terms of what legal theorists call “rules of 
recognition”, i.e. norms which are necessary to bring ordinary law into being 
and from which it derives its validity.62 
 
Schwöbel comments that, to a large extent, secondary-rule-based constitutionalism 
does not focus on substantive rules, which countenances basic legal values since the 
concept neither necessitates any values or idealism nor demands the protection of 
human rights. Added to this, despite the fact that, to some degree, secondary 
constitutional rules do deal with the institutionalization of power, they are not built 
on the idea of participation by the people as the constituent-power holder based on 
political ideology but rather based on the aim of standardization. Thus, she perceives 
that secondary-rules constitutionalism aims for the progress of society in light of 
procedural standardization.63  
 
4.2. Hierarchical Constitutional Legal Structure 
 
A hierarchical constitutional legal structure requires more than the existence of 
international constitutional secondary rules: it sees the existence of international 
constitutional primary rules – i.e. the existence of secondary rules that elevate certain 
international primary rules into constitutional rules –, as a prerequisite to a 
constitutional structure. Bryde strongly argues that a structure comprising only 
secondary rules is not adequate to establish a constitutional structure in international 
society as he rejects the weak conception of international constitutionalism in the 
sense that divergent legal systems demands different legal structures, since he 
believes that an international constitution must contain both constitutional primary 
rules and secondary rules.64 He perceives that a secondary-rules structure in the 
Westphalian sense is ‘only well-ordered anarchy’, arguing:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Kadelbach and Kleinlein (n 13) 6. 
63 Schwöbel (n 11) 45. 
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It was a horizontal legal system, which knew no common interest beyond the 
sum of interest of individual states, no hierarchy of norms, no higher authority 
than states themselves. With the help of international law the states regulated 
their international affairs but the regulation of their own affairs (“domaine 
réservé”) knew no restrictions.65  
 
He insists that the constitutional model of international law must be based on the 
verticalization of international law, which embraces a source of validity of primary 
rules superior to the will of individual states, i.e. a hierarchy of international rules,66 
explaining that the purpose of a constitution is to limit, via a set of higher norms, the 
omnipotent power of law-making entities in international law, either states or 
international organizations. 67 
 
The establishment of a hierarchical structure of primary rules in state-centered 
international law would necessitate the recognition of a source of validity of primary 
rules superior to state consent such as the common interest or values or people.68 In 
other words, the secondary rule of recognition of the international legal system has to 
recognize other sources of validity, apart from state consent. In one sense, 
hierarchies have an effect that can oblige relevant actors to act against what they 
believe is in their interests,69 which, in the case of the international sphere, will force 
states to act against their will. The two prime candidates for higher primary rules are 
jus cogens rules and the UN Charter. 
 
4.3. Statist Constitutional Legal Structure 
 
At the other end of spectrum is a statist model which is based on the legal structure 
of constitutional states. The legal structure of constitutional states comprises: first, a 
comprehensive legal structure which all the political powers in one limited territory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Ibid 106. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See e.g. ibid; Erika De Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 51. 
69 Tanja A Börzel, ‘European Governance: Governing with or without States?’ in Dobner 
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are subject to based on the concept of state sovereignty; and second, a legal 
mechanism that creates a limited government based on the idea of a self-regulating 
society.70 
 
4.3.1. Comprehensive Legal Structure 
 
Based on statist constitutionalism, constitutions exist as the highest law of the land 
which constructs the legal system of the sovereign nation-state. 71  This is the 
conventional understanding of constitutionalism, which is fundamentally connected 
to the concept of statehood and state sovereignty.72 According to Grimm, a statist 
legal constitution in this sense is ‘a coherent and comprehensive regulation of the 
establishment and the exercising of public power’, which has two preconditions.73 
First, there must be an entity which can be comprehensively governed in a given 
legal constitutional legal structure. A modern state is such an entity, which is 
distinguished from earlier polities by the concentration of all public power in a given 
territory. Grimm explains that ‘(o)nly after public power had become identical with 
state power could it be comprehensively regulated in one specific law’,74 i.e. one 
constitutional legal structure.75 A second precondition for the constitution is that 
there is no external entity which also has public power over the given territory of the 
state. I.e. the constitution cannot distribute domestic public power to a foreign entity, 
for states that cannot protect their territory or domestic affairs from the intervention 
of external political power are not capable of providing a comprehensive legal 
structure.76 Statehood, sovereignty and statist constitutionalism are deeply attached 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70  See Dieter Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and Its Prospects in a 
Changed World’ in Dobner Petra and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism (OUP 2010). 
71 Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism in and beyond State’ (n 49) 265. 
72 Ulrich K Preuss, ‘Disconnecting Constitutions from Statehood’ in Petra Dobner and 
Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism (OUP 2010) 23. 
73 Grimm (n 70) 11. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid 10. 
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to the concept of territoriality. Preuss explains that the existence of an authoritative 
power that has exclusive control over a given space turns that space into territoriality. 
The idea of territoriality depersonalizes the exercise of power. Based on such an 
idea, the ruler of a territory does not exercise power over subordinates on the basis of 
personal relationships but on the basis of the validity of his/her power over the 
territory by which he/she can control individuals’ actions or events within the 
physical space of the territory. Such exclusive control over territory is indeed 
sovereignty77 and the only entities that can control the legal structure within their 
territorial can be called states.78 With an attachment to sovereignty, Fassbenber 
observes that, based on the idea of separate and legally self-contained states, statist 
constitutionalism generates the premise that one group of individuals will be subject 
to only one constitution. However, this is contradictory to the reality where there 
exists an international legal structure to which states and their constitutions are 
subject.79  
 
4.3.2. Collective Self-Government 
 
Regarding limited government, state sovereignty alone cannot create a constitutional 
structure as if the sovereign has unlimited or unconditional power to control 
subordinates, a comprehensive legal structure is unnecessary and meaningless.80 
Accordingly, the constitutionalization of political power is more than the legalization 
of political power, i.e. not just the submission of political power to law. Without a 
legal mechanism to limit the exercising of the rule-based power of the sovereign, no 
matter whom the ruler is, there is a high likelihood that government will become 
tyrannical and despotic.81 However, as sovereignty is subject to no political power 
outside the territory, the limitation of the ruler who exercises control over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Preuss (n 72) 26–27. 
78 Nick Barber, The Constitutional State (OUP 2010) 78. 
79  Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of The International 
Community’ (n 29) 556. 
80 Grimm (n 70) 11–12. 
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subordinates must be created by that very sovereignty in that territory: this is the idea 
of limited government in the sense of collective self-regulating governance. Thus, a 
statist constitutional legal structure, in this sense, is a comprehensive legal 
framework in which collective self-regulating government can emerge. 82 
Accordingly, the creation of the self-governance is the underlying purpose of the 
domestic constitutionalism. 83  Collective self-regulating government is strongly 
rooted in the notion of the people: ‘We the People’ as the constituent power. 
According to Paine, ‘a constitution is a thing antecedent to a government, and a 
government is only the creature of a constitution. The constitution of a country is not 
the act of its government, but of the people constituting a government.’84 Based on 
this caveat, Paine distinguishes constituted power which belongs to government and 
constituent power, which is held by the people and establishes the notion of the 
primacy of the people over the government.85 Limited government is understood as 
government constituted by the people through their consent for the sake of the 
people.86 Therefore, the people are both governors and governed at the same time. 
Hence, constitutions in this meaning of constitutionalism are the supreme law of the 
legal system, to which both holders of constituted power (government) and 
constituent power (people) are bound, based on the mechanism of the rule of law.87 
This constitutional structure as a comprehensive legal structure with collective self-
governing government is rooted in liberal-democratic legal culture. In the realm of 
democratic liberal-statist constitutionalism, i.e. the statist model, there are four 
elements of legal structure that serve as a mechanism to establish a collective self-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 See the discussion in Mattias Kumm, ‘Global Constitutionalism and the Cosmopolitan 
State: An Integrated Conception of Public Law’ (2013) 20 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 605. 
83  E.g. Grimm takes the creation of self-governance as the achievement of domestic 
constitutionalism, Grimm (n 70); See also Preuss (n 72) 23–24. 
84 Thomas Paine, ‘Rights of Man’ in Philip S Foner (ed.), The Complete Writings of Thomas 
Paine (The Citadel Place 1945) 278. 
85 Loughlin (n 20) 49. 
86 Ibid 47–48. 
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government: 1. Rule of Law, 2. Separation of Powers, 3. Democratic Legitimacy and 
4. Protection of the Basic Rights of the Constituent Power-holder.88  
 
A. Rule of Law   
 
According to Dicey, the rule of law means:  
 
…no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods 
except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner 
before the ordinary Courts of the land. In this sense the rule of law is 
contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise by persons 
in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint89  
 
 
Dicey further argues, based on the rule of law: ‘no man is above the law, but (what is 
a different thing) that here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to 
the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
tribunals’.90 Essentially, the rule of law requires, as O’Donoghue puts it, that ‘law to 
be applied equally, created openly and administered fairly’.91 Hayek proposes that 
the naked meaning of rule of law without technicalities is that:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 There exist differences in scholars’ opinions on what the key elements of the democratic-
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and potential presence of constitutionalism for the operation of a governance order that 
locates the body it serves at the centre of its operation’, ibid 22; Paulus opines that ‘the 
principles this contribution thereby derives from the Western constitutional traditional are 
democracy, separation of powers, rule of law and Rechtsstaat, as well as states’ rights and 
human rights', Andreas Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution' Andreas L 
Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P 
Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance (CUP 2009) 92; Kumm, Lang, Tully and Weiner regard human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law as ‘the trinitarian mantra of the constitutionalist faith’ Mattias 
Kumm and others, ‘How Large Is The World of Global Constitutionalism?’ (2014) 3 Global 
Constitutionalism 1, 3. 
89 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Liberty 
Classics 1939) 110. 
90 Ibid 114. 





	   	  
32	  
…government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced 
beforehand – rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how 
the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan 
one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.92  
 
If the element of the rule of law is achieved in the international context, this will 
create consistency, coherence and predictability within international law and remove 
arbitrariness.93 
 
However, the rule of law focuses on the certainty of the legal system, thus 
representing only one of the admirable features that a legal system should attain apart 
from, inter alia, justice, equality, democracy and human rights.94 Thus this sole 
element of rule of law is insufficient to establish limited government in the sense of 
‘collective-self government’ as it omits a necessary connection between law and 
morality;95 as Raz cautions, ‘the rule of law is essentially a negative value. It is 
merely designed to minimize the harm to freedom and dignity which the law may 
cause in its pursuit of its goals however laudable these may be’96 and ‘(t)he law may, 
for example, institute slavery without violating the rule of law’.97 Added to this, one 
of the underlying principles of the rule of law is the existence of independent judicial 
review,98 and the judicial function is a linkage between the idea of the rule of law 
and the next element of democratic-liberal constitutionalism, i.e. the ‘separation of 
powers’.99 
 
B. Separation of Powers  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge 1944) 49. 
93 O’Donoghue (n 53) 157. 
94 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press 2011) 
211. 
95 Ibid 224–225. 
96 Ibid 228. 
97 Ibid 221. 
98 Ibid 216–217. 
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The separation of powers is at the core of the creation of self-governance in the 
liberal-democratic legal tradition. At its heart, the separation of powers aims to 
prevent the constitutional actor from turning into an exclusive holder of the 
constituted power by dividing and distributing the constituted power to multiple 
actors. 100  According to O’Donoghue, the separation of powers plays a role 
complementary to other constitutional elements in the establishment of collective-
self government. First, the separation of powers helps to tighten the linkage between 
constituted power-holders and constituent power-holders in order to alleviate the 
problems of the detachment between constituted power and constituent power as 
well as the defects in democratic legitimacy. Secondly, the separation of powers 
serves as a mechanism to permit one constituted power-holder to ensure that others 
exercise their power within the boundaries set by the rule of law.101 The separation 
of powers can be achieved along two axes – horizontal and vertical. On the one hand, 
classical horizontal separation operates via the division of executive, legislature and 
judicial powers.102 This form of separation of powers is based on the idea that the 
only way to prevent despotism from occurring is to have a mechanism that disallows 
these three branches of judicial, legislative and executive powers to be integrated.103 
On the other hand, a vertical separation of powers is employed in a federal state’s 
legal system where power is ‘allocated at various points of distance from constituent 
power holders depending upon the perceived efficiency in decision-making’.104 
Loveland terms this kind of vertical separation of powers a ‘geographical separation 
of powers between national and State government’.105 Discussing the case of the US, 
Loveland explains that the US Constitution creates ‘a multiplicity of powerful 
political societies within a single nation-state, each wielding significant political 
powers within precisely defined geographical boundaries'; however, the constitution 
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imposes restraints on the autonomy of national government by conferring exclusive 
power over certain matters on the national government. 106 
 
C. Democratic Legitimacy  
 
Democratic legitimacy can be understood as a nexus between constituent and 
constituted power which guarantees that the exercise of power is done in a 
transparent and legitimate fashion, and it establishes a mechanism for dismissal of 
the constituted power-holder in the case where constituent power-holder sees fit to 
do so.107 Democracy requires the individual’s right to self-government as well as to 
the right to political participation to be established in the legal system, thus serving 
as a link between constituted power and constituent power and generating 
democratic legitimacy for the actions of the constituted power-holder108 Therefore, it 
is seen as being an indispensible element for the establishment of collective self-
government and as one of the core elements of this statist international 
constitutionalism.109 
 
Grimm explains that this is not very illuminating, in that democracy is a necessary 
element of the legitimatization of political power. However, if the legitimacy of 
political power is to be grounded on other stands, the constitution might not be able 
to function properly. For example if a certain absolute truth, either religious or 
secular, serves as the basis for the legitimacy of political power, that truth will trump 
what is written in the constitution. Consequently, this can lead to a situation where 
certain elites insist that they have the power to rule over others, irrespective of the 
others’ consent, based on their self-claim to possess a better understanding of 
absolute truth. 110  Although democracy might triumph over other grounds of 
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legitimacy, such as absolute truth based on religion or theory, democracy does not 
provide a comprehensive account of the legitimacy of government.111 Democracy is 
not exactly equivalent to majoritarianism, since if the majority deprive minorities of 
their basic rights, such as the right to property, the right to vote or the right against 
enslavement, this is inconsistent with democracy.112 Thus, the protection of the basic 
rights of constituent power-holders – another element of the establishment of limited 
government– also helps to shape the application of democracy. Sunstein argues that 
equality serves as an ‘internal morality’ for democracy which denies the creation of 
‘second-class citizenship’ by law,113 thus reflecting the underlying idea of the rule of 
law. 114  Accordingly, other key constitutional elements – the rule of law, the 
separation of powers and the protection of basic rights, which together help to 
implement equality between constituent power-holders – will act as restraints on 
democracy and together provide a full legitimacy basis for liberal-democratic statist 
constitutionalism.115 
 
D. Protection of the Basic Rights of the Constituent Power-holders 
 
The protection of fundamental human rights is one of the core elements of liberal-
democratic constitutionalism.116 A constitution functions as a tool to set limits on the 
scope within which the state can invade individuals’ rights and freedoms and to 
guarantee the rights to political participation and self-determination of the people in 
society.117 One of the great implications of two key moments in history for statist 
constitutionalism – the American and French Revolutions – is that the people 
vindicated their natural right to remove the existing regime and reconstitute a new 
limited government with a constitutional legal structure which allows people to 
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resort to the courts as guardians of their basic rights.118 The protection of the 
fundamental rights of people in the community by the government (in a broad sense, 
not limited to executive bodies), constituted by such people themselves, reflects the 
respect for the government as the constituted power over the people as constituent 
power-holder.   
 
Whilst the other elements of liberal-democratic constitutionalism are more 
procedural in character, the protection of human rights can be seen as a substantive 
part of constitutions. This indicates that constitutionalism in this sense is not purely 
constitutive in nature as it also instils fundamental values into the system.119 In 
liberal-democratic constitutional states, fundamental rights are not determined by 
popular consent or a majority; otherwise, this might lead to the tyranny of the 
majority.120 Rawls proposes that one of the constitutional essentials is:  
 
…equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities are to 
respect: such as the right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of 
conscience, freedom of thought and of association, as well as the protections of 
the rule of law.121  
 
If the scope of fundamental rights is based purely on the will of the majority, this 
risks the tyranny of the majority. In contrast, if the content of fundamental rights is 
determined by a minority, that would cause a serious problem for democratic 
legitimacy. What then should be the basis for the determination of the content of 
fundamental rights? The idea of public reason-based rights can be seen as one 
candidate.122 As Rawls explains:  
 
Public reason is characteristic of a democratic people: it is the reason of its 
citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship. The subject of their 
reason is the good of the public: what the political of justice requires of 
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society’s basic structure of institutions, and of the purpose and end they are to 
serve.123 
 
According to Rawls, fundamental rights as ‘constitutional essentials’ need ‘to be 
justifiable to all citizens as the principle of political legitimacy requires’.124 For him, 
citizens have a duty of ‘civility to appeal to public reason’. They have to engage in 
discussions regarding the fundamental rights based on values that others as a free and 
equal to them  ‘can reasonably be expected to endorse’ and they have to be ready to 
defend and explain the relevant concepts to others.125  Accordingly, in a democratic-
liberal society, individuals who think of themselves as the free and equal beings are 
those who determine the legitimate scope of their fundamental rights and liberties 
based on a mindset in which they solemnly regard others as being as free and equal 
as themselves; and in such a context, public reason serves as the heart of the 
articulation of the scope of the restraints imposed on collective self-government with 
regard to individual rights in the community.126  
 
One vital point about the protection of the basic rights of the constituent power-
holder is that the implementation of basic rights depends on the existence of legal 
control over the government and violations of basic rights, notably judicial review. 
As discussed before, independent judicial review is rooted in the other two key 
elements of liberal- democratic constitutionalism – the separation of powers and the 
rule of law. One of the most debated issues in relation to judicial review is, however, 
the issue of its democratic legitimacy, which is another key element of liberal-
democratic constitutionalism due to the lack of any linkage between judicially 
constituted power and constituent power.127 Nevertheless, if one takes the public 
reason-based rights approach, the genuine issue of judicial review will reside not in 
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the problem of democratic legitimacy but rather in the public reasonableness of 
decision-making organs.128 
 
Sceptics of the idea of international constitutionalism model largely base their 
scepticism on the idea of liberal-democratic statist constitutionalism. They deny the 
quality of international law as a constitutional legal system due to the lack of a 
comprehensive legal structure based on centralized power, comparable to state 
sovereignty in the domestic realm. They also ground their criticisms on the non-
existence or lack of development of legal structures that serve as a mechanism 
limiting constituted power such as the rule of law, democracy, the separation of 
powers and the protection of the fundamental rights of the constituent power-holder. 
For instance, Grimm denies the constitutional character of the UN Charter on the 
ground that, despite ‘its all-encompassing nature, its peacekeeping purpose and its 
corresponding powers’, the UN structure is ‘far from aggregating all public power 
exercised on the global level and even farther from the concentrated and all 
embracing public power of the state’.129 He suggests that due to the insufficient 
development of the legitimatization and limiting of public power at the international 
level, and despite the expansion of the regulation of the exercising of public power in 
the international sphere, it is not capable of fulfilling the requirements of 
constitutionalism.130 Paulus rejects taking international law as a constitutionalized 
international legal system, at least in a strong sense, for two reasons. First, there 
exists no ‘comprehensive judicial structure or unequivocal judicial hierarchy’ to 
address conflicts between values, rules and specialized regimes in the international 
sphere. Secondly, an international legal structure cannot fulfil the core elements of 
constitutionalism, specifically democratic legitimacy and the rule of law.131  Of 
course, the merit of such attacks on international constitutionalism is important; 
however, equally important but logically a priority is the issue of whether 
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international society should be judged based on the cognitive framework of statist 
international constitutionalism.132 
 
In this section, based on an inclusive approach that takes the constitutionalization of 
international law as the systematization of international law, the spectrum of the 
requirements for a constitutional legal structure based on the different propositions 
for international constitutionalism has been demonstrated. In the next part, two key 
factors that should be taken into consideration in the process of the transfer of the 
concept of constitutionalism into the international realm – viability in the 
international context and the capacity to fulfil the underlying aim of 
constitutionalism –will be discussed in order to provide a foundation for the 
articulation of the proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for an international 
constitutionalized legal system, based on an analysis and evaluation of the three 
models outlined above. 
 
V. Keys for the Transfer of Constitutionalism to the International Level: 
Viability and the Capacity to fulfil the Underlying Aim of Constitutionalism  
 
As discussed before, one of the main elements concerning the definitional issue of 
international constitutionalism is the transfer of the concept of constitutionalism 
which was originally developed in the domestic setting into the international context. 
One of the keys for a well-articulated transfer of ideas to another context relies on 
the viability of the reconceptualization in the destination context, along with its 
capacity to sustain the core underlying aim of the concept, based on an understanding 
of both contexts. This means that the generality which is created during the transfer 
of the concept of constitutionalism must not be so great that it compromises the core 
purpose of that concept. On the other hand, too much attachment to the source 
context’s particularities should also be avoided for that might create unnecessary 
conditions that could undermine or rule out the viability of a concept transferred to 
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the destination context. Accordingly, the transfer process must be based on an 
understanding of the differences between domestic and international contexts in 
order to determine necessary conditions which are viable in the destination context 
and which have the potential to fulfil the underlying aim of constitutionalism.  Thus, 
the criteria of the viability and the capacity to fulfil the underlying aim of the 
constitutionalism will serve as a tool to assess the three models. Before doing so, it 
would be helpful to understand the characteristics of international society first, as 
this will provide the foundation for the assessment of three models in the light of its 
viability and capacity to fulfil the underlying aim of the constitutionalism in the 
international setting.  
 
5.1. Characteristics of International Society: a Pluralist Structure as Part of World 
Multi-Level Governance.  
 
In this part, there will be a discussion of two important characteristics of 
international society which need to be taken into consideration when determining the 
viability of the proposals for a model for an international constitutional legal system 
and the capacity of such proposals to create collective self-governance, which is an 
underlying goal of constitutionalism. These are, first, a pluralist structure based on 
the state-centred nature of international society; and second, the character of 
international society as one of the world’s multi-level governance, together with 
domestic societies.  
 
5.1.1. Pluralist Structure of International Society  
 
A foundational difference between domestic society and international society is that 
whilst domestic society is essentially a society of individuals, international society 
membership is composed of both states and individuals, though with a dominant role 
for states. This points to a problematic issue when statist constitutionalism, based on 
a cognitive framework which is built on the nature of domestic society, is consulted 
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legal system or to assess the constitutional quality of international law. Kumm argues 
that international constitutionalism sceptics who build their argument on the statist 
model of constitutionalism apply a statist paradigm to provide a cognitive framework 
for the analysis of contemporary international law. According to him, applying such 
a cognitive framework is improper as it is very likely to create ‘a general tendency to 
idealize municipal law and to cast a doubt on international law’. Kumm posits that 
this is based on the presumption that there exists neither a vital conceptual distinction 
between domestic and international constitutionalism, nor unique problems attached 
to the particularities of international or domestic law with respect to legitimacy or 
compliance.133 Thus, in order to give a descriptive and analytical account of the 
current international legal structure fundamental to the articulation of essential 
components of an international constitutional legal structure, an alternative paradigm 
must be provided. According to Kumm, suitable alternative paradigms are those 
which ‘are able to better make sense of legal and political practice as it currently 
exists than does the statist paradigm of constitutionalism’.134 In his view, a cognitive 
framework based on Kant’s cosmopolitan paradigm serves as a better alternative to 
rectify the problems caused by using a cognitive framework based on the statist 
paradigm to assess the constitutional quality of international law.135 The reason for 
this is that the cosmopolitan paradigm can offer an explanation of the connection of 
the current legal phenomenon occurring in fragmented international law which is 
generated by the largely decentralized nature of international society.136 Further, it 
also provides a more comprehensive account of the relationship between 
international constitutionalism and domestic constitutionalism. 137 Thus, the 
cosmopolitan paradigm will be consulted here to provide an understanding of state-
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centred international society (the destination context for the transfer of the concept of 
constitutionalism) and its differences from the source context.   
 
One of the vital characteristics of international society is its pluralist structure, in the 
sense that, as a result of territory-based sovereignty, there are a number of national 
states, co-existing in international society, 138  which can be the object of the 
constitutionalization process. Consequently, this results in the pluralist character of 
the international sphere. Thus, whereas international constitutionalism based on a 
statist paradigm which demands a world-state structure or world sovereignty does 
not fit into a state-centred international society, a cosmopolitan perception of the 
world might be helpful for understanding the pluralist character of state-centred 
pluralist character of international society. It is suggested by Kleingeld that, ‘a core 
issue for political cosmopolitanism concerns the role and importance of states’.139  
 
Despite some readings of the Kantian cosmopolitan project as supporting a world 
state/ republic,140 the position adhered to here is that Kant defends the pluralism of 
states and rejects a movement towards a world government, 141  i.e. world 
sovereignty. Kant clearly states a preference for the pluralism of states over a single 
world state:  
 
…in the light of the idea of reason, the state is still to be preferred to an 
amalgamation of the separate nations under a single power which has overruled 
the rest and created a universal monarchy. For the laws progressively lose their 
impact as the government increases its range, and a soulless despotism, after 
crushing the germs of goodness, will finally lapse into anarchy.142  
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The fear that a world state might become despotic does indeed serve as a compelling 
ground to reject movement towards having a world state. The despotism of a world 
state would be a greater peril than that of national states due to the more centralized 
power of a world state that could negatively affect the rights of people. Further, 
unlike the case of states where other states might have legitimacy to intervene to 
some extent143 and the citizens of an abusive state can flee and earn the status of 
refugees, if a world state were to become abusive, there would be no external power 
to intervene and nowhere to run to. Added to this, if the model of a world state is 
chosen, given the historical data, only a limited number of states would be willing to 
give up their sovereignty, and so the world might be endangered by the use of force 
by states to subjugate others claiming legitimacy based on the world-state model. 144 
 
Nevertheless, Kant admits that the natural state of international society with ‘the 
separate existence of many independent adjoining states’ is ‘essentially a state of 
war’ without a federation of free states to prevent inter-state armed conflict.145 
Further, on this point, he explains that a pacific federation (foedus pacificum) is 
required if peace is to be achieved and sustained. However, this kind of federation 
does not aim to attain sovereignty over state members.146 Contrariwise, it seeks only 
to create a partnership among states,147 for its purpose is ‘to preserve and secure the 
freedom of each state in itself, along with that of the other confederated states’.148 
The member states of the federation are to defend one another from aggression 
committed by external entities; however, they must not intervene in one another’s 
internal conflicts,149 with arguably an exception in cases of violations of fundamental 
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human rights.150 Kant proposes that it is practical to believe that a federation of free 
states would gradually extend to and include all states, resulting in peace.151 The 
expansion of such a federation is likely to prevent wars,152 and by creating peace this 
would allow freedom, equality and self-government to be successfully achieved.153 
One observation from Kant’s federation of free states model is that whilst Kant 
rejects the option of a world state, which is the most centralized structure of 
international society, carrying too much risk of despotism, he does not believe that 
countenancing free and equal sovereignty, the Westphalian international legal system 
with its highly decentralized structure, can sustain the conditions for perpetual 
peace.154 Thus, Kant’s cosmopolitan model for a legal structure sits between the 
world-state model and the Westphalian model in terms of the centralization of public 
power.  
 
Another very vital point concerning Kant’s preference for a pacific federation in the 
sense of a union of free states is that, unlike in the case of individuals where a natural 
right can be claimed to demand that men living in a lawless state should forsake it 
and be subject to the constitution of states, each state possesses a lawful domestic 
constitution. Therefore, states do not need to submit to the coercive rights of others 
that demand they be subject to ‘a wider legal constitution in accordance with their 
conception of right’.155 No states, even those with a despotic constitution, can be 
required to renounce their constitutions by other states.156 This marks an important 
difference of statist constitutionalism that mainly deals with the relationship between 
of individuals and international constitutionalism that governs the relationship 
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among states which have their own constitution constituted by their constituent 
power-holders.   
 
This cosmopolitan paradigm thus rejects international constitutionalism based on a 
world state whilst believing that states which countenance domestic 
constitutionalism serve as important mechanisms for increasing human wellbeing 
and nurturing a cosmopolitan condition.157 Therefore, based on a cosmopolitan 
cognitive framework, international law has to recognize the freedom of states, as a 
result of the fact that states have their own constitutional structures, and aims to 
preserve the peace among them. The cosmopolitan paradigm offers an explanation 
for the decentralized nature of international law and the highly consent-based 
character of international law, with the protection of peace as an exception to state 
consent. At this point, it should be noted that although the cosmopolitan paradigm 
recognizes the importance of states, it also moves beyond states as the sole subject of 
the international constitutional order.158 The notion of individuals as subjects of 
international law is also clearly recognized in the cosmopolitan paradigm, in the part 
on cosmopolitan right. Cosmopolitan right is rooted in the notion that as the world is 
not unlimited and no human inherently possesses a superior right over any other to 
dwell in any part of the world, this establishes ‘the right to the earth’s surface’ of all 
human beings.159 This right can be understood as ‘the right of a stranger not to be 
treated with hostility when he arrives on someone’s else’s territory’.160  In his 
writing, Kant states: ‘The people of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees 
into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of 
rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of cosmopolitan right is 
therefore not fantastic and overstrained.’161This type of right is ‘concerned with the 
status of individuals as human beings, rather than as citizens of states’. 162 
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Cosmopolitan rights can be construed as being reflected in the idea of universal 
human rights,163 and thus this explains that, apart from peace, the protection of 
human rights is another exception to state consent. 
 
5.1.2. International Society as Part of Multilevel Governance of the World 
 
A second characteristic of international society is that it is part of the multilevel-
governance of the world. This characteristic does not mark a difference between 
international society and domestic society, as they are both part of the multi-level 
order of the world. However, this feature must be taken into consideration when 
articulating the underlying aim of a constitutionalized international legal system as 
part of the world’s multi-level governance together with domestic constitutional legal 
systems rather than as a self-contained order separate from municipal legal systems  
 
As explained above, an international constitutional legal system is not going to 
replace or absorb the domestic constitutional legal system. Thus, the world has two 
levels of governance – the international order and multiple domestic orders. The 
linkage between these two levels of governance is that states are constituted in the 
domestic constitutional order by domestic constituent power and recognized and 
protected by the international constitutional order. However, states are not, at the 
same time, both the constituted power-holder of the domestic constitutional legal 
system and the constituent power of the international constitutional legal system. 
However, it is individuals that serve as the constituent power of both the 
international constitutional legal system and domestic constitutional legal systems. A 
state is just the representative of relevant individuals in the international community 
where there is no direct channel to exercise their constituent power at the 
international level. However, this issue will be discussed in detail in the section that 
considers the necessary conditions for a constitutionalized international legal system 
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The fact that international law exists as part of world multi-level governance should 
be taken into serious consideration when deciding the role of a constitutionalized 
international legal system as part of the world’s multi-level governance. Kumm 
suggests that:  
 
The debate about constitutionalism in international law is not appropriately 
understood exclusively as a debate internal to the public international law. It is 
also a debate that concerns national constitutional law and its conception of 
legitimate constitutional authority. The debates about constitutionalism in 
international law are complemented by highly contentious debates within 
national constitutional law about how domestic institutions should relate to the 
structural changes of international law, given national commitment.164  
 
Based on the cosmopolitan paradigm which offers an explanation for the state-
centred nature of international law, the relationship between an international 
constitutional legal system and a domestic constitutional legal system must not be 
understood as that between independent legal systems, as dualists argue.165 Nor does 
the international legal system exist as hierarchically superior to domestic ones based 
on the monist concept, for the international legal system does not subjugate domestic 
legal systems as a subordinate part.166 As explained in the last section, whilst an 
international legal system needs to respect states as a constituted power-holder 
constituted by their people (which is itself part of the international constituent power-
holder), international law provides a framework for peaceful coexistence among 
them, in which domestic constitutionalism can develop further. Thus, the relationship 
between a constitutional legal system and national ones will be argued here as being 
one of complementarity, as each of them has inherently different structures, causing 
differences in limitations and strengths, whilst arguably having the same aim to 
create collective self-governance of the free and equal. Thus, these two levels of 
world governance shall complement each other to create a world as a self-governing 
regime. The idea of complementarity between an international constitutional legal 
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system and domestic constitutional legal systems will be further developed in the 
next section regarding the underlying aim of constitutionalism 
 
5.2. Underlying Aim of International Constitutionalism  
 
Apart from understanding the characteristics of the international environment and its 
differences from the domestic setting as a source context, another key factor for the 
proper transfer of a concept is the understanding of the core underlying aim of 
constitutionalism, which must be sustained during the process of transfer. After 
being stripped of any unnecessary conditions, if the underlying purpose cannot be 
achieved in the destination context, it could be construed that the concept in question 
cannot be transferred to the new environment.  
 
Of course, the underlying purpose of constitutionalism will depend on how one 
defines the concept. However, the vital point to which we have to give some thought 
first is why international constitutionalism needs to be addressed and discussed. 
When setting the scene for the increase in constitutional discussion at the 
international level in Chapter I, to a large extent, the constitutional approach is raised 
to address the legal problems of both domestic and international law.  
 
Regarding domestic law, domestic constitutions based on the idea of territory lack 
any comprehensive capacity to deal with international activities and have a problem 
regarding constituent legitimacy with respect to outsiders affected by the constitution 
and domestic law. This calls for the international constitution to implement what the 
domestic constitutional legal system cannot. At the international level, international 
law has its own own problems owing to its fragmented nature, thus triggering the 
need for the creation of more unity at the international level. Further, due to the 
proliferation of international rules and organizations with political power, 
international law needs to be constitutionalized. Thus, If a very broad idea of 
constitutionalism is resorted to and its very broad underlying purpose is used as an 
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the Westphalian era, has existed as a constitutionalized legal system in the sense that 
it has been unequivocally regulated by fundamental meta rules, such as the rules 
regarding states’ sovereignty.167 Also it can be seen as a constitutional legal system 
in the sense that it has established an international legal community among states as 
equal members based on the rule of sovereign equality.168 However, this cannot 
address the problems that have triggered the international constitutional debate and it 
should not be regarded as the underlying purpose of the currently ongoing 
constitutionalizing process.  
 
One vital point that needs to be made here is that the tendency to resort to statist 
constitutionalism as a model of international constitutionalism occurs not solely 
because constitutionalism was originally developed in the domestic context. It is also 
because if the underlying aim of statist constitutionalism, which is to create self-
government, can be transferred to the international level and fulfilled, then legal 
problems which are a cause of constitutional discussion at the international level can 
potentially be resolved. This strongly suggests that the creation of self-governance 
might be as the essence of the concept of constitutionalism which should not vary, no 
matter what type of society, in which the concept of constitutionalism will be 
actualized.  
  
Through the process of configuration to accommodate many changes in human 
society, Loughin has a view that constitutionalism ‘is now being presented as meta-
theory which establishes the authoritative standards of legitimacy for the exercise of 
public power wherever it is located’.169 This simply suggests that wherever the 
public power emerges, the process of constitionalization is needed to legitimatize 
such a power.  Nevertheless, the constiutionalization of international society and 
domestic society should not be seen as separate projects for the legitimatization of 
public power, but rather as an integrated ongoing process by humankind to 
legitimatize the political power in human society. Although, they differ in their 
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characteristics, both international society and domestic society have individuals as 
the ultimate stakeholders.  Domestic constitutionalism attempts to create self-
governance to establish the primacy of the people over the government. Since the 
globalization has changed the landscape of the world and resulted in issues that 
cannot be dealt with effectively by the domestic constitutional legal systems, human 
beings attempt to build and improve a legal structure at the international level to cope 
with such problems However, an international legal structure naturally also has 
certain deficiencies that also need to be legitimatized. An attempt to constitutionalize 
international society and its law should be seen as a furtherance of self-governance 
of the free and equal which originally began in the domestic arenas, to create the 
governance that recognizes the primacy of humanity at international level. The lack 
of totality of domestic constitutionalism reveals its vital shortcoming in fulfilling the 
creation of self-governance. However, whilst such inherent limits of domestic legal 
systems are to be accepted, the underlying aim of the creation of self-governance 
should not be hopelessly ignored and left behind in the domestic sphere.  On the 
contrary, it should be taken into the international sphere to further this underlying 
aim and cure the defects of domestic constitutional legal systems.  Construing the 
creation of self-governance as an underlying aim of international constitutionalism 
does not only reflect the process of constitutionalization in a meaningful sense but 
also serves as a underlying connecting link between domestic constitutionalism and 
international constitutionalism through the process of the transfer of the concept.  
Therefore, it is proposed that the creation of self-governance should be taken as the 
underlying aim of constitutionalism and that the capacity to fulfil this underlying 
purpose must not be compromised during the process of the transfer of the 
constitutionalism into the international setting. Because all individuals can be 
included as part of the constituent power-holder at the international level, 
understanding the constitutionalization of international law as an integrated part of 
the constituionalization of human society, strengthening the legal strictures already 
established in domestic societies will enable us to create of self-governance of the 
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However, it must be emphasised again that this does not mean the international 
constitutionalization of international society must repeat the exact same steps of the 
domestic constitutionalization; that is, it does not need to have the same legal 
structure as constitutional domestic legal systems. However, because they have the 
different characters but share the same goal, functional differentiation would be 
helpful. Due to the idea of multi-level governance of the world, an international 
constitutional legal system exists together with domestic constitutional legal systems, 
and each level will have its own problems and strengths in terms of actualizing the 
idea of constitutionalism on its own level. The underlying aim of creating a self-
governing world will be achieved by the actualization of constitutionalism at both 
levels, i.e. an international constitutional legal system and a constitutional domestic 
system should complement each other to achieve this underlying aim. Again, the 
cosmopolitan paradigm will be consulted here to explain this idea of 
complementarity. Unlike the statist paradigm which leads to a limited mindset as it is 
developed at the national level, the cosmopolitan paradigm offers a universal 
perspective that covers the interactions between domestic constitutions and the 
constitution of the international community.170 
 
Let us start by discussing the idea of self-governance in the cosmopolitan paradigm. 
Kant’s account of self-governance is based on the idea of freedom; he argues that: 
‘my external and rightful freedom should be defined as a warrant to obey no external 
laws except those to which I have been able to give my own consent’,171 and 
collective self-governance is also reflected in his idea of the citizen as co-legislator, 
in that,  
 
…a public law which defines for every one that which is permitted and 
prohibited by right, is the act of a public will, from which all right proceeds 
and which must not therefore itself be able to do an injustice to anyone. And 
this requires no less than the will of the entire people (since all men decide for 
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all men and each decides for himself). For only towards oneself can one never 
act unjustly.172   
 
However, the creation of self-governance in the cosmopolitan paradigm relies on the 
creation of perpetual peace based the fulfilment of conditions both inside and outside 
states aka cosmopolitan conditions.173 The three definite articles – the cosmopolitan 
conditions – of Kant for creating perpetual peace, are: First, ‘the civil constitution of 
every state shall be republican’; secondly, ‘the rights of nations shall be based on a 
federation of free states’; and thirdly, ‘cosmopolitan rights shall be limited to the 
condition of universality hospitality’.174   
 
These three cosmopolitan conditions illustrate what are the underlying functions of 
both domestic constitutionalism and international constitutionalism. Regarding 
domestic constitutionalism, a republican constitution of states is based on three 
principles:  
 
…firstly, the principle of freedom for all members of society (as men); 
secondly, the principle of the dependence of everyone upon a single common 
legislation (as subjects); and thirdly, the principle of legal equality for 
everyone (as citizens).175  
 
Further, what distinguishes republican constitutions from despotic ones is the 
mechanism of the separation of powers since as Kant states: ‘Republicanism is that 
political principle whereby the executive power (the government) is separated from 
the legislative power’.176 This corresponds to the four core principles of statist 
constitutionalism: democracy, rule of law, the separation of powers and the 
protection of the fundamental rights of constituent power-holders. 177  These 
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fundamental principles of republican will contribute to the legal structure that 
nurtures the freedom in the sense of ‘the absence of any restraints that are not self-
imposed’178 which is at the heart of the creation of the collective self-governance.179 
As this first cosmopolitan condition sets the principles for a state’s legal structure, 
this shall be fulfilled by domestic constitutionalism. However, the development of 
domestic constitutionalism relies on the fulfilment of the other two cosmopolitan 
conditions. 
 
With respect to international constitutionalism, the constitutional legal structure is to 
be responsible for the creation of international rights and cosmopolitan rights. As 
discussed before, the international rights of states recognize freedom (sovereignty of 
states) which is not to be subject to the coercive rights or constitutions of other states. 
The main purpose of these rights is to achieve peaceful co-existence among states. 
The importance of international rights for the creation of perpetual peace is that a 
federation of free states, the aim of which is protection of the freedom of each state, 
will extend gradually to encompass all states. Nonetheless, this is not because they 
need to be subject to the public law of other states or international organizations, but 
because, as Kant argues:  
 
…if by fortune one powerful enlightened nation can form a republican 
constitution (which is by its nature inclined to seek perpetual peace), this will 
provide a focal point for federation association among other states. These will 
join up with the first one, thus securing the freedom of each state in accordance 
with the idea of international right, and the whole will gradually spread further 
and further by a series of alliances of this kind.180  
 
Accordingly, this federation will expand further and further and create the condition 
of peace. Regarding cosmopolitan rights, these can be construed as being enshrined 
in universal human rights; Kant believed that if the cosmopolitan right, ‘the natural 
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right of hospitality’, can be made possible, then ‘continents distant from each other 
can enter into peaceful mutual relations which may eventually be regulated by public 
law, thus bringing the human race nearer and nearer to a cosmopolitan 
constitution’.181 
 
Based on the cosmopolitan paradigm, the international community is obliged to 
intervene to stop violations of the cosmopolitan norms of human rights whilst, based 
on its roots in liberal thought, at the same time, rejecting imperialism or hegemony in 
the guise of constitutional principles.182Thus, it can be seen that although the 
cosmopolitan paradigm emphasises the state independence, cosmopolitan rights will 
provide a minimum standards for rights fundamental to the development of domestic 
constitutionalism and the creation of peace. If such rights are violated, this allows the 
international community to legitimately intervene. The idea of cosmopolitan rights 
will complement the political rights of citizens based on a republican constitution 
and international rights, creating universal rights of humanity; and under this 
condition, perpetual peace can be achieved.183 
 
Accordingly, the underlying aims of international rights and cosmopolitan rights are 
the peaceful co-existence of states and the protection of fundamental of human 
rights. These two values are two candidates for international primary constitutional 
rules: both jus cogens rules and the UN Charter aim to protect these rights, as will be 
illustrated in Chapter IV. Based on the ideas of international rights and cosmopolitan 
rights, the aim of international constitutionalism is to create peace and protect human 
rights beyond the condition of territory. Based on the main mission, which is to fulfil 
the international rights of states and the cosmopolitan rights of people, the 
international constitutional legal system aims for the protection of peace and human 
rights. Nevertheless, focusing on these two underlying aims might not cover the full 
and essential composition of an international legal constitutional system. A further 
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duty of the international constitutional legal system is to legitimatize the political 
power that it creates in seeking to achieve the protection of peace and human 
rights.184 To elaborate further, a federation of free states would not have the same 
centralized power as that of a world state; however, the protection of peace and 
fundamental human rights could never be achieved without an international 
constituted power to which states must be subject as far as peace and human rights 
are concerned. Thus, a federation of free states must have internationally constituted 
power, to the extent that it can achieve peace and the protection of fundamental 
human rights. However, such constituted power must be limited by law based on the 
nexus of the international constituent power-holder, just like limited government in 
the domestic sphere.  
 
The form of the limitation on power may, however, differ from what has been 
developed municipally. Thus the underlying idea is that the constituent power of the 
international constitution will constitute power whose aim is to achieve peace and set 
the standard for universal human rights, and there must be a legal mechanism to limit 
this exercise of constituted power to create self-governance at the international level. 
It should also be noted here that a limited mandate for international constitutionalism 
for peace and the protection of fundamental human rights would be a more proper 
option in terms of diversity, to avoid disguised imperialism and hegemony, than the 
world-state route; as Habermas argues: 
 
If the international community limits itself to securing peace and protecting 
human rights, the requisite solidarity among world citizens need not reach the 
level of the implicit consensus on thick political value-orientations that is 
necessary for the familiar kind of civic solidarity among fellow nationals.185  
 
Hence the power of a federation within the scope of peace and fundamental human 
rights will not put the diversity of the world in danger. On the contrary, as the 
creation of peace and the protection of fundamental human rights essentially aim to 
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protect the existence of states and individuals and the liberties of individuals, it 
would create an environment that increases the level of diversity in the world.   
 
However, in order to address the underlying goal of international constitutionalism, 
which is to create self-governance at the international level in order to determine the 
legal structure that is required in the next step, it is very important to understand 
what constituted power and constituent power are in international constitutionalism. 
With respect to constituent power, based on Kant’s political thought that firmly 
believes in human beings’ potential to rule themselves on a rational basis,186 the 
cosmopolitan international constituent power derives from individuals, not states. 
This recognizes that the sovereignty of states in the international sphere occurs 
because states are constituted by a part of humanity in such states. Also, it is 
important to preserve a peaceful condition that allows despotic states to turn into 
republican states based on public reason, not through external coercive power. 
Further, constitutional domestic states can set up a stronger link between constituent 
power and constituted power via a democratic method.187 Thus, although states 
enjoy certain rights and have law-making power in the international sphere, they are 
not the international constituent power-holder but they are allocated certain powers 
because they are themselves constituted by their individual citizens,188 who are part 
of the constituent power-holder of international constitutionalism. Thus, pursuant to 
the cosmopolitan cognitive framework of constitutionalism, international 
constitutionalism and domestic constitutionalism both have individuals as constituent 
power-holders, despite differing in their scope. Whilst individuals as a constituent 
power-holder in the domestic sphere may be limited to the condition of nationality or 
residence, the constituent power-holder of international constitutionalism embraces 
all humankind. The idea of humanity as a source of international constituent power 
establishing the international constitution shows how international constitutionalism 
can compensate for the defects of domestic constitutionalism that cannot take 
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account of all individuals or ‘outsiders’, especially those who are outsiders of every 
state constitution, i.e. ‘stateless persons’. This is because, at least universal human 
rights as the cosmopolitan right of every human being will set a minimum standard 
for the rights of every human regardless of their nationality. On the other hand, as the 
option to create a world state is not favoured due to fears about world despotism and 
the maintenance of peace, without a world state which is an unviable option, 
international constitutionalism might not be able to establish a sufficiently strong 
democratic link between constituted power and constituent power. On this point, 
Krisch argues:  
 
The global polity is not capable of instituting structures of democratic 
participation nearly as thick and effective as those possible on the national 
level. It is too far removed from individuals, and intergovernmental 
negotiations will never come with the deliberative structures necessary for 
effective public involvement; moreover, as mentioned above, we face serious 
limits of communication across cultural, linguistic, and political boundaries.189 
 
Hence, the task to create a cosmopolitan self-regulating world relies heavily on the 
development of domestic constitutionalism in order to create self-governance in 
domestic societies.  When all states have achieved that aim, the world will become a 
self-governing society with the pluralist structure of multiple self-governing states 
existing side by side, held together by an international constitutional legal system. 
 
In sum, in terms of the viability of a constitutional legal structure, the cosmopolitan 
paradigm offers an understanding of international society as a pluralist structure with 
a multiplicity of states, seeing the international order, together with domestic orders, 
as part of the multilevel governance of the world. It rejects a world statist legal 
structure as a viable constitutional legal structure due to fears about world despotism, 
respect for the constituent power of domestic constitutions and the peace-making 
condition. With respect to the underlying aim, it is argued here that the underlying 
purpose of the concept of constitutionalism is the creation of self-governance, and 
this should be transferred from the domestic setting into the international setting as 
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an underlying purpose of the international constitutional legal system. However, due 
to its complementary role to the domestic constitutional legal system, the 
international legal constitution shall have a mandate for the creation and preservation 
of peace and the protection of fundamental human rights. This, hence, necessitates 
international constituted power which can make demands of states, against their 
wishes. Added to this, there must be a legal mechanism that limits such power by 
creating a nexus between international constituted power and the constituent power-
holder, i.e. ‘humanity’, in order to create and self-govern at the international level. 
The two key factors of viability and the capacity to fulfil the underlying purpose will 
be used as a threshold to discuss the three models proposed as an international legal 
constitution in the next part.  
 
VI. Discussion of the Three Models 
 
This section aims to analyze, based on the criteria of viability and the capacity to 
fulfil the function of international collective self-governance with a mandate for 
peace and fundamental human rights discussed before, the three models for a 
constitutional legal structure outlined previously – a secondary-rules constitutional 
legal structure, a hierarchical legal structure and a statist constitutional legal 
structure. Of course, the aim is to determine whether any of these three legal 
structures could serve as a model of international constitutional legal system 
containing all the necessary and sufficient conditions for a constitutionalized 
international legal system or not.  
 
6.1. Secondary-rule Constitutional Legal Structure as an International 
Constitutional Legal Structure  
 
The secondary (meta/ organizing)-rule constitutional legal system model is the 
broadest version of the three options as it focuses on the systematic element, i.e. 
every legal system can be called a constitutional legal system based on this model. 





	   	  
59	  
there exists a rule of recognition, or Grundnorm, that generates the validity of other 
lower rules,190 meta-rule constitutional legal systems do not need to possess a 
hierarchy of primary rules, which will add substantive unity to the system. Further, 
they do not need to have a specific aim, neither to create peace, nor to protect 
fundamental human rights nor to establish self-governance of the free and equal. The 
meta-rule constitutional legal structure focuses on the creation of certain qualities of 
law, such as legal certainty, legal effectiveness and the capacity to keep up with 
changes in society. For instance, according to Hart, a legal system exists when a 
society is adequately equipped with secondary rules to deal with three defects in 
primitive societies, namely legal uncertainty, legal ineffectiveness and legal 
stagnation.191 Raz argues that ‘a test of the general efficacy of legal systems’ is a 
preliminary test to determine the existence of a legal system; a legal system exists 
only if it reaches a certain minimum degree of efficacy.192  Likewise, Dupuy 
proposes that unity is a prerequisite of a legal system. 193  The existence of 
fundamental secondary rules to hold international law together as a system will 
provide the procedural unity.194  
 
Basically, according to Hart, secondary rules are rules that ‘specify the ways in 
which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated or 
varied, and the fact of their conclusively determined’195. Given this, the existence of 
fundamental secondary rules, which hold international law together as a system of 
rules, will at least provide procedural unity.196 Thus, meta-rule constitutionalism will 
create unity in international law to this extent; however, the existence of secondary 
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rules does not necessarily create a condition for the substance of primary rules, 
therefore it does not necessarily create substantial unity.197 Thus, a genuinely state-
consensual-based legal system which only sets a procedural requirement for the 
validity of law, but not a substantive one, can be seen as a constitutional legal system 
in this sense.  
 
With the flexibility of the secondary-rule constitutional legal model, its legal 
structure is viable in international society. However, this model of a secondary-rule 
constitutional legal structure focuses only on the efficacy of the system and does not 
associate itself with any specific purpose. Thus, it cannot be taken as establishing the 
minimum conditions for an international constitutional legal system since it does not 
require the pursuit of the protection of fundamental human rights, not to mention the 
institutionalization of international constituted power to create collective self-
governance to achieve these purposes. Accordingly, the secondary rule constitutional 
model might pass the viability test but it lacks the capacity to fulfil the aim of a 
constitutionalized international legal system. 
 
Nevertheless, although the systematic element does not suffice to create an 
international constitutional legal system, it is one of the necessary conditions to 
establish an international constitutional legal system, in fact any type of 
constitutional legal system as the systemic quality ensures that international law has 
a general efficacy. To elaborate more, the underlying purpose of the systematization 
of law is to create efficacy in the application and enforcement of the legal system. 
Efficacy is itself a necessary condition of every constitutional legal system, whatever 
its underlying purpose, for in its absence, no legal systems would be able to achieve 
their purpose.  
 
Thus, constitutional secondary rules that hold together international law as a legal 
system must exist to provide general efficacy for international law to create 
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international self-governance. Put otherwise, the systemic nature of international law 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the establishment of an international 
constitutional legal system in a cosmopolitan sense. 
 
6.2. Hierarchical Constitutional Legal Structure as an International 
Constitutional Legal Structure 
 
As explained earlier, the hierarchical constitutional legal structure differs from the 
secondary-rules constitutional legal structure, it requires more than the secondary-
rules constitutional legal structure. It necessitates the international constitutional 
primary rules (which requires the existence of international secondary rules that 
elevate certain international primary rules into constitutional rules), as a prerequisite 
for a constitutional structure. As primary rules are rules of obligation, the hierarchy 
of primary rules contributes to substantive unity.198 As supremacy is one of the 
essential characteristics of constitutional rules,199 the hierarchy of rules which is built 
on the supremacy of constitutional rules is evidence for the existence of one element 
of a constitutional legal system. As international law is state-centred in nature, to 
establish a hierarchy of international primary rules, the rule of recognition of an 
international legal system needs to embrace a source of validity apart from state 
consent and to regard it as a higher source of validity of international primary rules. 
To elaborate more, given the state-centred character of international law, if state will 
is the sole source of validity of international primary rules, then there cannot be a 
hierarchical structure of international primary rules as every primary international 
rule will be regarded as equal and subject to nothing but the will of relevant states. In 
such a genuinely consent-based international legal system, states are able to derogate 
from any primary rules if relevant states exercise their wills to do so. Hence, this 
would rule out the establishment of a hierarchically superior status of certain primary 
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rules. Further, a hierarchy of primary rules would help in adding unity to 
international law in which the problem of conflict of norms, due to the decentralized 
and fragmented nature of international law, can jeopardize the legal certainty of 
international law.200  
 
However, as Fassbender notes, ‘not every increase in legal regulation, and not even 
every evolution of a hierarchical system of rules, equals “constitutionalization”’.201 
Based on the underlying aim of a constitutionalized international legal system to 
create international collective-self governance with a mandate for peace and 
fundamental human rights, a hierarchy of primary rules that can contribute to self-
governance at the international level would need to serve the peace-making purpose 
and the protection of human rights. That is, it would have to ensure that states cannot 
derogate from constitutional primary rules that impose an obligation to protect peace 
and fundamental human rights. In other words, the primary rules that protect peace 
and fundamental human rights must enjoy the status of constitutional primary rules. 
Added to this, the higher source of validity of primary rules must derive from the 
constituent power of the international constitutional system, i.e. humanity in a 
manner similar to the recognition of the people of a state as a form of constituent 
power-holder, the highest source of validity in domestic constitutional legal systems, 
linking constituted power and constituent power. A hierarchy of law that recognizes 
the opinion of certain states or a king in one country as the highest source of validity 
would not contribute to the establishment of an international legal constitutional 
legal system. 
 
Although the verticalization of international law to place certain primary rules 
protecting peace and fundamental human rights, the validity of which derives from 
humanity as a whole, requires movement towards the centralization of international 
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law to a certain extent, this hierarchical structure is not only a viable but also a 
necessary condition for a constitutionalized international legal structure. The reason 
for this is that, in creating such a hierarchical structure, states do not need to give up 
all of their sovereignty to become part of a world state. They are still masters of their 
own will over matters apart from peace and fundamental human rights. Further, the 
non-derogable character of the primary rules protecting peace and fundamental 
human rights is essential to the survival not only of the international community and 
states but also of individuals who are the constituent power-holder that creates the 
constituted power of states. Thus, a portion of states’ power will be limited by such a 
hierarchical structure for the sake of individuals which is an origin of such power. 
Added to this, based on the idea of collective self-governance, the source of validity 
must derive from humanity whose will is expressed mainly via states in a state-
centred international society. States and their citizens as their constituent power-
holders can be seem as co-legislators, and at the same time the subject of such 
international constitutional primary rules. Therefore, the hierarchical structure of 
international primary rules that elevate primary rules protecting peace and 
fundamental human rights, the validity of which derives from humanity as the 
international a source of international constituent power, is not fundamentally 
incompatible with but rather essential to the state-centred nature of international 
society.  
 
However, even if there does exist such a hierarchy of primary rules within a union of 
primary and secondary rules, does this represent the minimum sufficient conditions 
for an international constitutional legal system? Should there be a legal mechanism 
that institutionalizes international constituted power to implement and protect the 
hierarchical structure of international primary rules that gives supremacy to rules 
protecting peace and fundamental human rights? This brings us to a controversial 
issue in Kant’ s model of a federation of free states. One shortcoming of Kant’s 
federation of free states model is that he does not provide, in Brown’s words, a 
‘practical institutional design’202 for the federation he proposes. Thus, to use a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





	   	  
64	  
constitutional term, Kant does not provide details for the institutionalization of 
international constituted power, terms of either allocation or the limitation of powers. 
Covell argues that is because Kant does not see the necessity of having institutions or 
international organizations that have been conferred international constituted power 
that can be exercised against states’ wills to create cosmopolitan conditions.203 Thus, 
there has been an interpretation that Kant did not agree with the right of a federation 
of free states to use coercive power to enforce international rules regarding peace and 
fundamental human rights.204 However, although the right to use the coercive power 
of a federation of free states could be abused, such a power as far as the enforcement 
of rules protecting peace and fundamental human rights is concerned is in practice 
necessary for the protection of peace and fundamental human rights. On this issue, 
Habermas argues for the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention based on the reality 
of the world politic: 
 
…now the danger was violence of a previously unimaginable level of 
savagery, the transgression of elementary and previously “inviolable” 
inhibitions, the wholesale trivialization and normalization of absolute evil. 
Confronted with this new form of evil, international law could no longer cling 
to the main premise underlying the prohibition on intervention.205 
 
However, he also proposes that the exercise of such power should be under the 
control of the courts, regarding its legitimacy.206 Further, Habermas who, like Kant, 
regards a world state as an unsuitable model,207argues for the necessity of the 
institutionalization of constituted power at international level, explaining:  
 
What is missing in classical international law is not an analogue of a 
constitution that founds an association of free and equal consociates under law, 
but rather a supranational power above competing states that would equip the 
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international community with the executive and sanctioning powers required to 
implement and enforce its rules and decisions.208 
 
Thus, Habermas takes the institutionalization of international constituted power as 
part of the constitutionalization of international law enabling relevant the 
international organization to tackle the problem of peace and fundamental human 
rights without creating a world government or a single demos.209 Habermas’ opinion 
is referred to here in support of the claim that the mere existence of constitutional 
primary rules with a higher status regarding peace and the protection of human rights 
cannot of itself fulfil the creation and protection of human rights. International law 
does need a mechanism that can effectively put an end to the violation of or 
derogation from such rules. Indeed the allocation of international constituted power 
that can be exercised against the will of states triggers another risk of the abuse of 
power and the use of force by such an international constituted power-holder. 
However, the centralization of power only in the area of peace and fundamental 
human rights is not as concentrated as that of the world state, and also the 
centralization of power to that extent is necessary for the peaceful co-existence of 
states that holds the pluralist structure together. Indeed, the allocation of power to 
such a constitutional actor necessitates legal mechanisms to limit the exercise of 
power of the constituted power-holder when implementing peace-making and human 
rights primary rules based on the nexus between international constituted power and 
international constituent power. Thus, the allocation of international constituted 
power to the scope of peace and the protection of fundamental of human rights needs 
to be achieved in order to enforce the primary constitutional rules and protect the 
hierarchical order. Accordingly, the hierarchy of primary rules of the international 
legal system is a necessary but insufficient condition for the establishment of an 
international constitutional legal system. The institutionalization of international 
constituted power to enforce and protect the constitutional primary rules is another 
element that is needed.  
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6.3. Statist Legal Constitutional Legal Structure as an International Constitutional 
Legal Structure 
 
As noted previously, the statist approach to global constitutionalism requires two 
elements of the legal structure. First, there must exist a comprehensive legal structure 
based on sovereignty and which is not subject to external power to juridify all 
political power in one constitutional site. Secondly, it must provide a legal 
mechanism that sets limitations on the remit of the constituted power which is 
constituted and allocated by a constitution, based on the nexus of constituted power 
and constituent power.  
 
The first condition, requiring a comprehensive legal structure, is argued here as not 
being viable, or at least improper, as a model for an international legal structure, as 
such a legal structure must be built on the existence of world sovereignty which 
would contribute greatly to the risk of despotic government, which is at the opposite 
end of the spectrum to the creation of self-governance. Given that each state has its 
own constitutional structure constituted by its constituent power-holder, or at least 
the potential to have it, other states or any international organization shall have a 
right to demand that any state be subject to another constitution. Added to this, from 
history, this idea is impractical as it can be expected that very few states, if any, 
would be willing to subject themselves to a world state. Thus this makes the use of 
coercive force the only possible way to create a world government with global 
sovereign power. Consequently, it is possible that the idea of a world state might be 
used as a ground for legitimating the use of coercive power to subject one state to 
another or to an international organization. This would jeopardize the peace-creating 
environment and respect for the constituent power, i.e. the people in domestic states. 
Added to this, as now, a world state does not fit into the diversified nature of the 
world and it could easily lead to serious problems of imperialism and hegemony in 
terms of the sociocultural aspect. Therefore, the use of a statist paradigm to articulate 
an international constitutional legal structure ignores the state-centred nature of 
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On the point of the necessity of a state-like legal structure and the emergence of 
constitutions, Habermas argues for the separateness of states and constitutions:  
 
The terminus ad quem of the process of juridification of political power is the 
very idea of a constitution that a community of free and equal citizens gives 
itself. We must distinguish between “constitution” and “state.” A “state” is a 
complex of hierarchically organized capacities available for the exercise of 
political power or the implementation of political programs; a “constitution,” 
by contrast, defines a horizontal association of citizens by laying down the 
fundamental rights that free and equal founders mutually grant each other.210  
 
Thus, without a world-state structure, international constitutionalism is still 
achievable via a movement towards ‘governance without government’;211. However, 
this requires a structure that can achieve the underlying purpose of constitutionalism, 
international collective self-governance with a constituted power overseeing peace 
and the protection of fundamental human rights, grounding on the cosmopolitan idea 
of the complementarity of international law and domestic law to create a world as a 
self-governing society. An international constitutional legal structure would aim for 
the creation of conditions for the development of domestic constitutionalism, ‘the 
creation of peace’, and compensates for the shortcomings of domestic 
constitutionalism.  
 
The second condition for a statist constitutional legal structure is the existence of 
legal mechanisms to limit the exercising of power by a government based on the 
nexus between constituent and constituted power. Unlike constituted power in the 
statist sense, international constituted power is not kind of a comprehensive power in 
that it has only limited mandate for the furtherance of peace and fundamental human 
rights based on the character of international society which is pluralist and as part of 
multi-level governance. However, despite its limited scope, there needs to be a legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Habermas (n 168) 131. 
211 Höffe (n 143) 198–199; See further in James N Rosenau, ‘Governance, Order, and 
Change in World Politics’ in James N Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds), Governance 
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mechanism that limits international constituted power based on the nexus between 
constituted power and the constituent power-holder, i.e. ‘humanity’. Thus in the case 
that international constituted power is conferred on certain actor enabling them to 
force a state to act against its will, there must be a legal mechanism to limit such 
power. As Paulus puts it:  
 
Where, however, the international constitutional order itself resembles in 
effectiveness and coercion the domestic legal order – as the example of the 
terror lists of the Security Council has shown – international law needs to 
respect similar limitations to its power. As in the domestic sphere, 
constitutionalization may lead to a limitation rather than an extension of 
international power.212 
 
In domestic constitutionalism, four core elements that domestic legal structures need 
to contain to qualify as a constitutional legal system are: 1. the rule of law, 2. the 
separation of powers, 3. democratic legitimacy and 4. protection of the basic rights of 
the constituent power-holder.  
 
However, with the differing nature of domestic and international legal structures, 
these four element might not be found, or not in exactly the same way as in domestic 
systems, in the international legal structure. Considering those four elements, despite 
the need for their adaption, the rule of law, the separation of powers and the 
protection of fundamental human rights element are not much troubled to be 
developed within the pluralist structure of international law without a world state. 
However, the element of democratic legitimacy is the most problematic of all to 
transfer to the international constitutional legal structure due to the lack of a common 
‘demos’213  Added to this, there is the question of whether democracy can be 
developed in the context of a pluralist structure of state-centred international law in 
which multiple demoi exist, i.e. a ‘demoicracy’.214 It is argued here that as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Paulus (n 88) 107. 
213 Krisch (n 2) 56. 
214 Paulus (n 88) 94; See the dicussion on the idea of ‘demoicarcy’ in Kalypso Nicolaïdis, 
‘Our European Demoi-Cracy: Is This Constitution a Third Way for Europe?’ in Kalypso 
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cosmopolitan world constitutionalism denies a world state, a common demos is not 
an avenue that international constitutionalism needs to go down. Further, 
notwithstanding whether a ‘demoicracy’ can be achieved or not, at the moment it 
does not exist, as not all states are democratic. However, as illustrated earlier, the 
international constitutional legal structure does not need to resemble that of a state 
and all four elements have their own defects and in themselves cannot contribute to 
self-governance. Thus, the element of democracy might not be an inclusive factor to 
decide whether or not an international constitutional legal structure exists. However, 
with or without democratic legitimacy, there must exist legal mechanisms that set 
limits on international constituted power by establishing a link between international 
constituted power and humanity as a source of international constituent power-holder 
This stance is also shared by Paulus who argues that ‘while an international ‘demoi-
cracy’ is yet to be established, the strengthening of deliberation and the inclusion of 
the individual stakeholders in international decision making may lead to a better 
legitimacy… ’.215Another point that should be taken into account is that the domestic 
constitutional legal structure is not complete in itself and needs to be independent of 
the international constitutional legal structure. Likewise, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for an international constitutional legal structure do not aim to create 
complete self-governance in themselves but rather to establish an international legal 
structure to complement domestic constitutionalism. 
 
Accordingly, based on the analytical account in this section, none of the three models 
represents the necessary and sufficient conditions for a constitutionalized 
international legal system. Therefore, in the next part, it will attempt to make a 
proposition for the necessary and sufficient conditions for a constitutionalized 
international legal system.  
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VII. Conclusion: Proposal for the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for an 
International Legal Structure 
 
None of the three models, then, in itself, entails all the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for an international legal constitutional legal structure based on the 
criteria of viability in the state-centred international society and the capacity to create 
international self-governance with a mandate for peace and the protection of 
fundamental human rights. Thus, in this part, a proposition for the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a constitutionalized international legal system that can 
rectify the shortcomings of the three models will be made. 
 
A statist constitutional structure cannot be seen as a viable option in the international 
context as an international state-like, comprehensively centralized legal structure, 
necessitating world sovereignty or a world state, is fundamentally incompatible with 
the pluralist nature of the international sphere. Although it might not be impossible to 
achieve such a model, the use of coercive force seems to be the only alternative to do 
so given states’ unwillingness to give up their sovereignty, thus destroying the peace 
and disrespecting the constituent power of the domestic constitutions. Added to this, 
even if a world state can be achieved, it also carries a serious risk of a despotic world 
government with no possibility of external intervention to assist where violations are 
committed by the world government and with no safe places to seek refuge. 
Nevertheless, it is argued here that the underlying purpose of international 
constitutionalism is the creation of self-governance similar to statist legal 
constitutionalism. However, based on the cosmopolitan paradigm of the two-level 
governance of the world, in order to create a self-governing world, international 
constituted power has a limited mandate only for international peace and the 
protection of human rights, i.e. to create the conditions for the development of states 
into republican states and to compensate for the shortcomings of domestic 
constitutionalism. The international constitutional legal system should leave matters 
other than peace and fundamental human rights to states’ will in order to respect the 
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international invention into undemocratic states apart from cases of violation of 
fundamental human rights in order to allow domestic constitutionalism to grow from 
within.  
  
The secondary-rules constitutional legal structure represents a necessary condition 
but not a sufficient condition, as it focuses on the efficacy of the law which is 
required for every kind of constitutional legal structure to achieve its purpose. 
However, the purpose of creating self-governance with constituted power to create 
peace and protect fundamental human rights is not an element required by this 
model. Specifically, albeit based on the idea of sovereign equality, the Westphalian 
meta-rules constitutional legal model in which the only source of validity of primary 
rules is state consent cannot achieve the purpose of peace creation and the protection 
of fundamental human rights as it does not create a non-derogable duty for states to 
protect peace and fundamental human rights. However, the systemic elements 
created by the operation of international secondary rules are here proposed as the 
first condition that international law needs to fulfil in order to develop into a 
constitutionalized international legal system, as it allows international law to fulfil its 
purpose, whatever that may be.  
 
The hierarchical constitutional legal structure demands a hierarchical structure of 
primary rules which is necessary to create the supremacy of those primary rules that 
protect peace and fundamental human rights, which is the main purpose of an 
international constitutional legal structure. The purely state-consent based 
international legal system, lacking a hierarchical structure of primary rules, is not 
capable of creating peace and protecting fundamental human rights as it permits 
states to derogate from or opt out of obligations regarding peace and fundamental 
human rights. Thus, in state-centred international law in which states are attributed 
international law-making power, the hierarchical structure that establishes the 
obligations to protect the peace and fundamental human rights as absolute and non-
derogable obligations is the second condition that international law needs to fulfil in 
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the protection of human rights can serve as one element to create a nexus between 
international constituted power and the international constituent power-holder, 
‘humanity’. However, even if there exist within a legal system constitutional primary 
rules aiming at peace and fundamental human rights, whose validity derives from 
international constituent power, this is still insufficient for the existence of a 
constitutionalized international legal system.  Not until that system has allocated 
international constituted power to certain actors to enforce the primary rules and 
protect the hierarchical structure can it be said to be meaningful constitutionalized. 
This allocation of international constituted power, in turn, necessitates a legal 
mechanism for limiting the exercise of constituted power that can compel states to 
act against their wishes. Therefore, the third condition for the emergence of a 
constitutionalized international legal system is that international law must possess a 
legal mechanism to allocate international constituted power to certain actors to 
implement the hierarchical legal structure of international law and to limit the 
exercising of such constituted power by establishing a link between the international 
constituted power and the international constituent power. That is to say, the 
institutionalization of the international constituted power regarding peace and 
fundamental human rights must exist in the international constitutionalized legal 
system. This is where the legal mechanism in the domestic constitutional legal 
system that imposes limitations on constituted power, namely the rule of law, the 
separation of powers, the protection of the fundamental rights of the constituent 
power-holder and democratic legitimacy, can offer guidance for the establishment of 
self-governance at the international level. Nonetheless, again, the differences 
between domestic society and state-centred international society must be taken into 
consideration.  
 
Thus, based on an analysis of the three models, the nature of international law as a 
pluralist legal structure and as a part of world multi-level governance and its 
underlying aim to create international collective self-governance with a mandate for 
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necessary and cumulatively sufficient – for the existence of a constitutional 
international legal system can be set out as follows: 
 
1. International law must be sufficiently equipped with secondary rules which will 
provide efficacy for international law to exist as a legal system.  
 
2. There must exist a hierarchy of international primary rules providing supremacy 
for primary rules that protect peace and fundamental human rights.   
 
3. The institutionalization (allocation and limitation) of international constituted 
power must be achieved in order to establish international self-governance with a 
mandate for the protection of international peace and fundamental human rights. 
 
Thus, if current international law satisfies these three conditions, it can be held to be 
a constitutionalized legal system. However, this does not mean that an all-or-nothing 
approach is taken; rather, the articulation of these three conditions will help to set the 
criteria to determine whether or not important elements of the constitutional legal 
structure exist or are developing. Thus, the existence of legal rules which help in 
fulfilling any of these three conditions can provide evidence of an ongoing process of 
constitutionalization, and the more there are of them, the more international law can 
be said to have been constitutionalized.   
 
Whereas this chapter has aimed to lay out all of the necessary conditions for an 
international legal system in theory, based on the cosmopolitan paradigm which is 
compatible with the nature of international society, the following chapters, III, IV 
and V, will aim to examine whether each of the three conditions has been met in the 
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In this chapter, the aim is to determine the quality of international law as a legal 
system, which is one of the necessary conditions for the establishment of an 
international constitutional legal system. A systematic element to create the basic 
efficacy necessary for any legal order to achieve its underlying purpose, including 
that of a constitutionalized international legal system, which is to create international 
collective self-governance with a mandate for peace and fundamental human rights.  
 
There exist a number of theories offering explanations of the systemic quality of law. 
However, Hart’s theory of a legal system as the union of primary rules and 
secondary rules will be consulted here to determine the systematic element of 
international law. The advantage of applying Hart’s theory of a legal system is that 
his distinction between secondary and primary rules will be helpful in distinguishing 
the systemic element based on the existence of secondary rules to uphold 
international law as a system and the hierarchy of primary rules in international law 
which is another necessary condition for a constitutionalized international legal 
system. Added to this, Hart illustrates, in detail, the transition from a primitive 
society with a disunified set of primary rules into a more developed society with a 
legal system reflecting the ongoing nature of both systematization and 
constitutionalization. The focus by Hart on transition hinges on the existence of 
secondary rules to cope with certain legal defects. In other words, legal 
systematization, in the sense of Hart, is based on the existence of secondary rules. 
However, the identification of secondary rules based on the acceptance of 
international legal officials can be also used to determine the hierarchical structure of 
primary rules that is created by the secondary rules that govern the relationship 
between sources of the validity of primary rules. Also, It can help to indicate the 
institutionalization of international constituted power by identifying the secondary 
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fundamental rights mandate, and the secondary rules that establish a limitation on 
exercising the constituted power of such a constitutional institution. Thus, Hart’s 
theory of secondary rules will be helpful in determining each of the three 
international legal structures necessary for a constitutionalized international legal 
system. When discussing the meta-rules’ constitutional structure, Tomuschat points 
out the importance of secondary rules in the constitutional structure, in that:  
 
These rules do not only enjoy logical precedence, as the sign posts of the legal 
order in which they operate. They also reflect the distribution of powers within 
a given community. Every modern system of governance is operated through 
law-making, administration and adjudication.1 
 
The confirmation of secondary rules as a rule of the international legal system based 
on the internal view of international officials is obviously helpful in the international 
context, given that international law remains an ongoing process of both 
systematization and constitutionalization, so that secondary rules may not have been 
fully codified into written rules like those in most domestic jurisprudence.  
 
It will be argued in this chapter that international law meets Hart’s criteria of a legal 
system. However, due to its largely decentralized character, the international legal 
system is expecting to have a serious problem of conflicts between rules that can 
undermine its systemic quality. Thus, a brief discussion regarding the specific 
problem of conflicts between international rules to determine whether the 
international legal system is adequately equipped with secondary rules that can solve 
normative conflicts will also be pursued in this chapter.  
 
Accordingly, this chapter will begin with the discussions on Hart’ conception of 
legal system as a union of primary and secondary rules. 
 
II. Hart’s Concept of a Legal System 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Christian Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States without or against Their Will’ (1993) 
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In this section, Hart’s concept of a legal system as a union of primary and secondary 
rules will be discussed to provide a theoretical foundation for a determination of the 
quality of international law as a legal system in this chapter, as well as other issues in 
subsequent chapters for which the notion of primary or secondary rules can offer a 
theoretical background. 
 
Hart develops the concept of a legal system as the union of primary and secondary 
rules. The distinction between primary and secondary rules enables Hart to offer an 
explanation for both the existence and role of power-conferring rules, whilst Austin’s 
command theory fails to do this.2 According to Hart, primary rules are rules under 
which ‘human beings are required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they 
wish to or not’.3 Primary rules are simply rules that impose obligations. On the other 
hand, secondary rules regulate how primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, 
introduced, eliminated or varied, and how the fact of their violation may be 
determined. 4 In other words, as Payandeh puts it, secondary rules are ‘rules about 
rules’.5 Power-conferring rules fall into the category of secondary rules.6 
  
Hart expounds that the function of secondary rules is to deal with defects in the legal 
order of a primitive society. A primitive society is a society without a legislature, 
courts or officials of any kind, where the only social control mechanism is the 
general attitude of the people in society towards the standards of their own 
behaviour, which constitutes, in Hart’s term, primary rules of obligation.7 This type 
of social control is what we call customs.8 Hart posits that ‘only a small community 
closely knit by ties of kinship, common sentiment, and belief, and placed in a stable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 HLA. Hart, The Concept of Law (Joseph Raz and Penelope A. Bulloch eds, 3rd edn, 
Clarendon Press 2012) 27–29. 
3 Ibid 81. 
4 Ibid 81, 94. 
5 Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘The Concept of International Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. 
Hart’ (2011) 21 EJIL 967, 973. 
6 Hart (n 2) 96. 
7 Ibid 91. 
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environment’ could prosper with such a simple regime based only on unofficial 
primary rules of obligation. Hence, under other conditions, such a simple form of 
social control will prove ineffective, with at least three defects.9 First of all, there 
will be doubts regarding what the rules of the system are as well as the clearly 
delineated scope of the application of specific rules; and without rules to clarify such 
doubts, this will result in legal uncertainty.10 The next defective characteristic is the 
static character of the rules. In a primitive society, the only way to change primary 
rules is via a ‘slow process of growth whereby courses of conduct once thought 
optional become first habitual or usual, and then obligatory, and the converse process 
of decay, when deviations, once severely dealt with, are first tolerated and then pass 
unnoticed’.11 Thus, the rules cannot be altered by a deliberate process designed to 
react promptly to changes in society, and this therefore renders the primitive regime 
static.12 The ‘inefficiency of the diffuse social pressure by which the rules are 
maintained’ is the third shortcoming of simple social control.13 In the absence of an 
agency specially empowered to have a final and authoritative say regarding the 
determination of the facts of rule violations, disputes as to whether or not rules have 
been broken will always emerge and will continue endlessly. Moreover, in a society 
without a special agency with the authority to administer punishments for breaches 
of rules, or any other modes of social pressure, rules are enforced by individuals 
affected or by a large group of people in society. Therefore, this results in a waste of 
time due to the disorganized character of their efforts to capture and penalize 
offenders. These factors contribute to the inefficiency of the rules system.14 
 
Hart explicates that the cure for these three main shortcomings of such a simplest 
form of social structure lies in the emergence of different kinds of secondary rules to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid 92. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid 92–93. 
12 Ibid 93. 
13 Ibid 93. 
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facilitate the operation of primary rules of obligation.15 To deal with the uncertainty 
of primary rules, a rule of recognition which provides ‘conclusive affirmative 
indication’ of the rules of the society which are to be maintained by the social 
pressure, has to be established.16  Regarding how their static character can be 
overcome, this is achieved by the introduction of rules of change, which are rules 
authorizing an individual or a group of individuals to articulate new primary rules 
and eliminate old ones.17 In solving the issue of the inefficiency of the diffusion of 
social pressure existing in a regime with only primary rules, a third supplement, rules 
of adjudication, which consist of secondary rules empowering individuals to 
determine authoritatively questions of the violation of primary rules, should be 
introduced.18 
  
Hart takes the rule of recognition as the core of a legal system. He explicates that if 
there exists any situation deserving to be regarded as the foundation of a legal 
system, it is a situation where ‘a secondary rule of recognition is accepted and used 
for the identification of primary rules of obligation’ since, in such a situation, certain 
truths regarding important features of law can be clearly elucidated and their 
importance can be accurately evaluated.19 A rule of recognition not only provides the 
criteria by which the validity of other rules is determined, but also regulates the 
relationship and order of precedence between these criteria as well as the supreme 
criterion. According to Hart, a criterion for the legal validity or source of law is 
considered as having primacy if:  
 
…rules identified by reference to it are still recognized as rules of the system, 
even if they conflict with rules identified by reference to the other criteria 
whereas rules identified by reference to the latter are not so recognized if they 
conflict with the rule identified by reference to the supreme criterion.20 
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17 Ibid 95. 
18 Ibid 96–97. 
19 Ibid 100–101. 





	   	  
80	  
A rule of recognition is the ultimate rule of the legal system, in the sense that it 
provides criteria for the validity of other rules in the system. However, in the case of 
a rule of recognition itself, there is no rule providing criteria for its legal validity. 
Thus, a question over the validity of a rule of recognition cannot arise as it cannot be 
valid; nor can it be invalid. Henceforth, the question is simply whether or not it is 
accepted as an appropriate criterion for determining the validity of other rules. Put 
another way, the existence of a rule of recognition is to be treated as a matter of 
fact.21 
 
Based on his construction of a legal system as a union of primary and secondary 
rules, Hart develops the idea that there are therefore two minimum conditions that 
are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system. Primary rules of 
obligation, which are valid according to the rule of recognition, must be generally 
obeyed. The second condition is that the rule of recognition, rules of change and 
rules of adjudication must be effectively accepted by the system's officials as 
‘common public standards for official behaviour’.22 
 
 
III. Definition and Scope of International Law 
 
In the last section, Hart’s concept of a legal system as a union of primary and 
secondary rules is discussed in order to provide a theoretical tool for the assessment 
of the systematic quality of international law. In this section, in order to determine 
the quality of international law, as either law or a legal system, unavoidably, the 
definition and scope of international law must be discussed in order to demarcate the 
scope of what can be deemed to be the object of assessment. 
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Based on Bentham's classic definition of international law, it is defined as a 
collection of rules governing the relations between states.23  Contemplating this 
classic definition and current international jurisprudence, international law has 
evolved considerably from its origins. In 1927, the PCIJ expounded that international 
law was law governing the relationship between free states, and accordingly its 
binding force arose from the consent of states – express or implied.24 Thus, this 
results in the widely accepted notion that international law is exclusively applicable 
to states; as Oppenheim explicates,  
 
Since the Law of Nations is based on the common consent of individual States, 
and not of individual human beings, States solely and exclusively are the 
subjects of International Law. This means that the Law of Nations is a law for 
the international conduct of States, and not of their citizens. Subjects of the 
rights and duties arising from the Law of Nations are States solely and 
exclusively.25 
 
Nonetheless, the exclusivity of international law to states is not an incontestable 
theory. Notably, other than states, among the many candidates to be a subject of 
international law, international organizations and individuals have been treated as an 
important subject of international law in current international jurisprudence. 
 
In the case of international organizations, the question of the personality of 
international organizations in international law was authoritatively decided by the 
International Court of Justice26 in the Reparation case where the court held that the 
UN has an international legal personality.27 A consequence of the determination that 
international organizations possess an international legal personality is that they can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Batoche 
Books 2000) 10. 
24 The SS Lotus (1927) PCIJ Ser A No 10, p 18. 
25 Lassa Francis Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise. Volume I (of 2) Peace (2nd, 
Longmans, Green and Co 1912) 19. 
26 Hereinafter, the ‘ICJ’.  
27 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: 
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be taken to be one of the subjects of international law, together with states, and are 
considered capable of attaining rights and duties according to international law.28  
 
With respect to individuals, even in the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice29, the court ruled that although international agreements cannot 
directly create rights and obligations for individuals, they can bind states to adopt 
definite domestic rules creating rights and obligations for individuals to be enforced 
by domestic courts if the intention of state parties can be proved.30 Further, there is a 
series of international treaties granting individuals direct access to international 
adjudicating bodies, e.g. the 1969 Inter-American Convention on human rights, the 
1966 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the 1965 International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes.31 
This demonstrates that, in certain contexts, individuals enjoy ‘the right intuitu 
personae, which they can vindicate by international actions’.32 Added to this, in 
terms of obligation, the Nuremberg Tribunals clearly affirmed that international law 
may impose duties and liabilities upon individuals in the form of responsibility for 
international crimes committed by individuals, not by abstract entities, and such 
international criminal law can actually be enforced only by the punishment of 
individuals.33 
 
At present, apart from international organizations and individuals, whether 
governmental or non-governmental, international law has expanded to include 
transnational companies as well as terrorists. Although not all of them have a legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 1298. 
29 Hereinafter, the ‘PCIJ’ 
30 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 15 
(Mar. 3), 17–18. 
31 Shaw (n 28) 259. 
32 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principle of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 
121. 
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personality, their actions, to some extent, shape international law.34 The expansion of 
international law may be attributable to the fact that an array of contemporary issues, 
such as human right violations, the environment and terrorism, may not be dealt with 
effectively only at the domestic level or by governmental sectors. This necessitates 
the internationalization of such issues as well as the participation of non-state entities 
at the international level. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the expansion of actors and 
participants in international law, states are still perceived to be the most important 
subject of international law and as a centre for social interactions of humanity as well 
as for international law.35 Thus, despite the greater complexity of international law, it 
is vital to take into consideration the primacy of states for, as Friedmann propounds, 
quoting Jessup’s statement: ‘the world is today organized on the basis of the co-
existence of States, and that fundamental changes will take place only through State 
action, whether affirmative or negative’36, Friedmann propounds that:  
 
…the States are the repositories of legitimated authority over peoples and 
territories. It is only in terms of State powers, prerogatives, jurisdictional limits 
and law-making capabilities that territorial limits and jurisdiction, 
responsibility for official actions, and a host of other questions of co-existence 
between nations can be determined … This basic primacy of the State as a 
subject of international relations and law would be substantially affected, and 
eventually superseded, only if national entities, as political and legal systems, 
were absorbed in a world state.37  
 
Thus, it is clear that international law today does not exclusively pertain to states; 
however, it is valid to conceive that international law is still state-centric in 
character. 
 
However, in this study, European Union law will not be covered within the scope of 
international law due to its debatable character of sui generis, in the sense that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibid 196–197. 
35 Ibid 197. 
36 Philip G Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (Macmillan Company 1948) 17. 
37 Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (Columbia University 
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European Union38 goes beyond being an international organization but is less than a 
state system.39 The EU has developed more into a comprehensive system, similar to 
a municipal legal system, rather than a sub-system of international law; thus, to 
include the EU in this study might blur its scope which is to examine the process of 
the consitutionalization of international society. The Kadi Case of The European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) 40  can be construed as reflecting the separateness of 
international law and the European Union. Whereas the Court of First Instance 
(CFI)41 ruled that it is empowered to review indirectly the lawfulness of the SC 
resolutions, to the extent of its conflict with jus cogens rules, understood as higher 
rules of international law,42 the ECJ reversed the decision of the CFI on the issue of 
the power to review the validity of SC solutions. The ECJ ruled that it has no 
jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of a resolution adopted by an international 
body, although that review was limited to examination of the conflict between SC 
resolutions and jus cogens rules.43 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Hereinafter, the ‘EU’ . 
39 For further discussions, see e.g. the paper by Marek Hlavac, ‘Less than a State, More than 
an International Organization: The Sui Generis Nature of the European Union’ (2010) SSRN 
paper <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719308> accessed 10 July 
2015; Jane Jenson and Denis Saint-Martin, ‘Is Europe Still Sui Generis? Signals from The 
White Paper on European Governance Fostering Social Cohesion, Working Paper No.9 
(Prepared for the Eighth Biennial International Conference, European Union Studies 
Association, 27–29 March 2003, Nashville, TN). 
40 Hereinafter, the ‘ECJ’ . 
41 Hereinafter, ‘CFI’. 
42 Kadi v Council and Commission, Judgment of The Court of First Instance (Second 
Chamber, Extended Composition), 21 September 2005, Case T-315/01, para. 226. 
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Kadi Case: Rethinking The Relationship Between EU Law And International Law?’ (2009) 
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Paper 2009/4 






	   	  
85	  
IV. Assessment of International Law as a Legal System 
 
After setting the scope of international law, which is a step towards searching for a 
systematic element, in this section, based on Hart’s concept of a legal system as a 
union of primary and secondary rules, an assessment of the systemic quality of 
international law will be pursued. However, in addition to Hart’s minimum 
conditions of the existence of legal system, one section will specifically deal with the 
issue of conflicts of international rules which is often regarded as a serious threat to 
the systematic quality of international law. 
 
Whilst Hart’s theory of a legal system as a union of primary and secondary rules will 
serve as a theoretical tool to assess the systemic quality of international rules, Hart 
himself disproves the perception of international law as a legal system. He based his 
position on ‘the absence of an international legislature, courts with compulsory 
jurisdiction, and the centrally organized sanctions’ which exist in modern municipal 
law.44 Hart opines that this makes international law resemble the ‘simple form of 
social structure’ which can be found in primitive societies, comprising mainly 
primary rules with no existing secondary rules, neither rules of recognition, nor rules 
of change, nor rules of adjudication on the international level.45 However, Hart’s 
equating of the international community with a primitive society remarkably 
contradicts the resemblance between international law and municipal law that he also 
ponders in Concept of Law;46  
 
In form, international law resembles such a regime of primary rules, even 
though the content of its often elaborate rules are very unlike those of a 
primitive society, and many of its concepts, methods, and techniques are the 
same as those of modern municipal law.47  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Hart (n 2) 214. 
45 Ibid 214. 
46 GJH van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
1983) 54–55. 
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Hart’s approach of denying the systematic quality of international law has been 
criticised by scholars in other respects which will be discussed throughout this 
chapter.48 Nevertheless, one factor that needs to be taken into consideration here is 
that, in Hart’s time, the establishment of a legal system of international law, if it 
existed, would have been less manifest than what we can perceive in the 
contemporary international context. Payandech makes the observation that at the 
time when the ‘Concept of Law’ book was first published, the world was still in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, reflecting on the collapse of the League of 
Nations and its inability to prevent armed conflict. The newly established United 
Nations could not be seen as representing new hope, primarily because the system of 
collective security was almost immediately crippled right after the beginning of the 
Cold War due to the veto system.49 This signified the ill-constructed beginning of 
international law of the UN era. Thus, the developments and advances that 
international law achieved in the second half of the twentieth century may not have 
been foreseen by Hart, as he himself embraced the fact that international law was, in 
his time, in a stage of transition.50 Therefore, the assessment of international law as a 
legal system based on Hart’s concept of a legal system, as a union of primary and 
secondary rules, as well as his arguments against international law as a legal system, 
will be revisited here.  
 
According to Hart, the two minimum conditions that are necessary and sufficient for 
the existence of a legal system are: 
 
1. Primary rules of obligation, which are valid based on the rule of recognition, must 
be ‘generally obeyed’.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 E.g. Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs  : International Law at the 
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Walden, ‘Customary International Law: A Jurisprudential Analysis’ (1978) 13 Israel Law 
Review 86, 90; Payandeh (n 5). 
49 Payandeh (n 5) 979. 
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2. The secondary rules of recognition, the rules of change and the rules of 
adjudication must be ‘effectively accepted as common public standards of official 
behaviour by the officials of the system’.51  
 
Regarding the first condition, there exist two diverging schools of thought on 
obedience to primary rules in international law. On the one hand, international law 
sceptics take the view that international law is often violated, thus it is not generally 
obeyed. This group of scholars supports their argument with a long list of infamous 
treaty violations, e.g. the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization's52  intervention in Kosovo.53  On the other hand, international law 
optimists adhere to Henkin’s famous statement that ‘almost all nations observe 
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all 
of the time’.54 The international law optimists perceive the notorious breaches of 
international rules referred to by international law sceptics as the exception rather 
than a regular phenomenon.55 They argue that the expanding network of trade and 
investment international agreements, together with the countless ways in which 
international law governs current globalized life, is a consequence of the 
standardized operation of international rules.56 Thus, international law is generally 
obeyed. Considering the factual situation within the international community, 
although it is undisputable that there are a number of cases where international law is 
violated, this does not rule out the fact that, generally, international law is complied 
with, given the endless compliance of states to their long list of obligations which 
occurs every day. This can be also seen in the situation in the international 
community, which is far too stable for one to be able to come to the conclusion that 
international law is normally violated. Added to this, according to Koh, empirical 
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52 Hereinafter, ‘NATO’. 
53 Harlan Grant Cohen, ‘Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources’ 
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research conducted by legal scholars largely confirms that primary rules in 
international law are generally obeyed.57 Also, in irregular situations where states 
can be deemed to be primarily or obviously not honouring their international 
obligations, states have a tendency to justify their actions by relying on legal 
arguments rather than accepting that they are not complying with international law.58 
The ICJ in the Nicaragua case has interpreted this pattern of behaviour as reflecting 
their internal view that they are bound by international rules, not otherwise, 
explaining that:  
 
If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but 
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained 
within the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact 
justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather 
than to weaken the rule.59 
 
With respect to the second condition, this lies at the heart of the assessment of 
international law as a legal system by applying Hart’s concept of the union of 
primary and secondary rules, since Hart's denial of international law as a legal 
system relies on this condition. Hart propounds that the introduction of each of three 
kinds of secondary rules, providing remedies for three types of defects – uncertainty, 
stagnation and inefficiency – emerging in primitive society might, in itself, be 
considered a differentiating step in moving from a pre-legal order towards a legal 
system. Moreover, certainly, the existence of these three remedies together is 
sufficient to convert the regime of primary rules into what is indisputably a legal 
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system. 60  Accordingly, the acceptance of three kinds of secondary rules, of 
recognition, of change and of adjudication, in international law by officials is 
adequate to prove that international law qualifies as a legal system. Thus, despite the 
fact that Hart treats a rule of recognition as a founding rule of the system,61 he does 
not articulate that the acceptance of a rule of recognition by officials is sufficient for 
the existence of a legal system. Hence a determination of the actuality of 
international law as a legal system will be made here by examining whether or not 
there exist all three kinds of secondary rules which are accepted by officials in 
international law, rather than focusing only on the rule of recognition, whilst 
recognising the utmost importance of a rule of recognition at the same time. 
 
However, before exploring the existence of the three secondary rules on the 
international plane, the term ‘officials’ in the international context shall be 
contemplated, given the diverging nature of the international community and 
municipal communities on which Hart bases his concept of law. 
 
4.1. International Officials 
 
This section aims to provide an understanding of the scope of international officials, 
whose internal views are the tool to determine the existence of accepted secondary 
rules in international law, as well as their scope and content. 
 
Prior to a particular examination of international officials, a general understanding of 
the idea of officials should be crafted first. In his Concept of Law, repeatedly, Hart 
employs the terms ‘private persons’ and ‘officials’; however, he does not provide 
any explicit definition of the term ‘officials’. Tamanaha suggests that this may be 
based on his presumption that we understand who qualifies as legal 
officials.62According to Hart, the second condition for the existence of a legal system 
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relies on the officials of the system. The officials must treat secondary rules as 
‘common standards of official behaviour’ and ‘critically appraise their own and each 
other's deviations as lapses’.63 Hart points out that 'obedience' is not a term properly 
used to express the way in which these secondary rules are respected by courts and 
other officials as rules. Hart explains that when legislators conform to law-making 
rules, or judges comply with a rule of recognition, it involves the internal view that 
what they do is ‘the right thing both for themselves and for others’, whilst obeying 
does not necessarily involve such a thought.64In other words, secondary rules must 
be ‘effectively internalised’ by officials of the system.65  Therefore, what Hart 
demands is that there should be a unified or shared official acceptance of secondary 
rules, especially the rule of recognition, which is taken by Hart as a founding step of 
the system. 66  This elaborates that the existence of secondary rules alone is 
inadequate to affirm the existence of a legal system, as they are to be uniformly and 
sharedly accepted by officials of the system.67 
 
Thus, the notion of ‘officials’ is a vital part of Hart’s concept of a legal system. 
However, this concept is also a source of the problem of circularity in Hart’s theses. 
At the heart of the problem of the circularity in Hart’s concept of law is that the rule 
of recognition that Hart perceives as the foundation of a legal system seemingly 
presupposes the prior existence of a legal system as Hart posits that the attainment of 
a rule of recognition relies on its acceptance by officials, and identification of whom 
the officers are may occur only if the legal system has already been established.68 
Regarding this point, Ian Duncanson expounds: ‘[W]ho is an official, and how is he 
constituted as such? He can only be a person, natural or corporate, whose ‘officiality’ 
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has been conferred by a rule or norm, justified by reference to a rule or rules.’69 
Many scholars have come to rescue Hart’s thesis from being sunk by the problem of 
circularity.70 One of them is Shapiro, who claims to provide a way out of such 
endless circularity by proposing that:  
 
The problem with this objection is that it presupposes a certain relationship 
between rules and authority that Hart rejected. We should not confuse Hart's 
claim that courts have the authority to generate the rules of the system with the 
false claim that they have this authority by virtue of their status as courts. On 
the contrary; for Hart, a court is a court because it plays a role in generating 
and sustaining the rule of recognition. Courts have the power they do as a 
conceptual matter: it is part of our concept of a social rule that these rules 
govern conduct in a group because, and only because, members of that group 
guide their conduct accordingly. It is not necessary, therefore, for courts to be 
pre-authorized by some legal or moral rule to generate the secondary rules of 
the legal system. Because rules of recognition are social rules, courts are able 
to create such rules simply by engaging in a certain practice with the 
appropriate critical attitude.71  
 
He further elaborates on his argument that, as the concept of ‘official’ also regularly 
arises in non-legal contexts such as the social context, this concept does not belong 
exclusively to the legal realm. Take, for example, the heads of academic institutions 
and referees who are also officials in a non-legal context. Added to this, he expounds 
that: ‘what makes an official an official is that the rules that create the office 
occupied designate the occupant as having certain power’. 72  Hence, with an 
understanding of the function of secondary rules of change and of adjudication, the 
concept of ‘official’ can be comprehended as a non-legal concept.73 This position of 
Shapiro is shared by Tamahana, who explicates that: ‘A legal official is whomever, 
as a matter of social practice, members of the group (including legal officials 
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themselves) identify and treat as legal officials.’74 Likewise, Greenawalt suggests 
that the way to break the circle is to resort to whom ‘the population at large’ perceive 
to be officials.75 Thus, the idea that determines officials by referring to a social 
practice can offer rescue from the issue of circularity in Hart’s theory.  
 
Social-practice theory does not only help to solve the issue of circularity in Hart's 
theory, it may also be applied to construe the scope of the term ‘official’. Based on 
Tamahana’s social-practice approach to define the term ‘official’, d’Aspremont 
proposes that the practice in which the content of a rule of recognition is grounded 
must not be confined to narrowly-defined law-applying officials but must also cover 
other social actors who participate in law-applying activities.76 Of course, this 
proposition shall not be restricted to law-applying officials but shall also apply to 
other types of officials whose practice will be a basis of secondary rules, such as law-
creating, law-ascertaining and law-enforcing officials. 
 
With regard to international law, the proposition for a wider interpretation of 
officials that covers other social actors who participate in relevant activities, such as 
law-making, law-ascertaining, law-applying and law-enforcing activities, is more 
compatible with the non-centralized nature of the international community. This 
point has been well illustrated by d’Apresmont, particularly on law-ascertaining 
officials. He argues that, given the lack of any vertical and institutional hierarchy, 
this wider concept of law-applying officials can help to provide a better 
understanding of who actually participates in the social practices that ascertain 
international legal rules and create the social practice of law ascertainment. Such an 
expansion resolves the shortcoming of a limited understanding of law-applying 
officials, as well as serving ‘the necessity of not restricting the production of 
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communitarian semantics to the practice of the judiciary authorities only’.77 The 
broader definition of ‘official’ in an international-law context is also supported by 
Cohen, who suggests that the actors whose internalization of secondary rules on 
which international law is built may include other actors apart form states and their 
agents.78 
 
In the international sphere, it is extremely difficult to argue against the participation 
of other social actors in law-ascertaining activities. Their practice should be count 
towards the determination of communitarian semantics based on the convergence of 
social practices which constitute the law-ascertaining secondary rules.79As the 
ascertainment of international secondary rules is vital to the affirmation of the 
content and structure of international law, either a systematic structure, a hierarchical 
structure or an institutional structure, some space will be dedicated here to a 
discussion of two types namely domestic courts and international legal scholars. 
These two actors have no powers to make or apply international law; however, their 
international law-ascertaining roles are recognized by international law. Another 
interesting point of these two actors is that whilst international scholars are non-state 
actors, albeit constituted by domestic law of states, domestic courts are less 
politically influenced compared to other state officials. Thus, they are actors which 
are less attached to national interests and whose roles in the ascertainment of 
international rules are recognized by international law.  
 
Article 38 (1) (d) of the Statute of the ICJ provides for: ‘judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law’.80 Although, in light of this article, 
judicial decisions and the teachings of highly-respected scholars are frequently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Ibid. 
78  Harlan Grant Cohen, ‘Finding International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal 
Community’ (2012) 44 NYU JILP 1049, 1064. 
79 d’ Aspremont, ‘Herbert Hart in Today’s International Legal Scholarship’ (n 76) 134; See 
the discussion of communitarain semantics as law-ascertainment criteria in Jean d’ 
Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law (OUP 2011) 196–203. 
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misleadingly referred to as secondary sources of international law, at least in the 
context of this article 38 (1) (d), judicial decisions and scholars’ writings do not 
function as a source of law in the sense that judges and scholars have law-making 
power. 81 The phrase ‘as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’ does 
not only denote that courts’ judgments and the teachings of highly qualified scholars 
are not attributed with the status of a source of international rules in a formal sense, 
unlike treaties, customs and general principles, but also distinguishes the law-making 
method and law-determining process.82 Borda suggests that the law-determination 
function of Article 38 (1) (d) comprises first, ‘a verification of the existence and state 
of rules of law’; and secondly ‘a verification of the proper interpretation of rules of 
law’.83 Accordingly, Article 38 (1) (d) can be taken as reflecting the acceptance of 
judges and scholars as international ascertaining officials in international society. 
  
Specifically discussing domestic courts as a law-ascertaining official of international 
law, although domestic adjudicating bodies are established by domestic law, the 
wording of Article 38 (1) (d)84 is not limited to international adjudicating bodies, 
domestic judicial bodies can also be taken as an actor that practises international law-
ascertainment activities. Crawford explains that certain domestic judicial decisions 
have value in international law, inter alia in the sense that they offer ‘an independent 
investigation of a point of law and a consideration of available sources and thus may 
offer a careful exposition of the law’.85 D’Aspremenont argues that due to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81  See the discussion in Hoof (n 46) 169–178. 
82 Ibid 170; see also Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law: International Law as 
Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Stevens & Sons 1957) 26–28; Jörg 
Kammerhofer, ‘Law-Making by Scholars’ (2012) SSRN paper 2–5 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2182547> accessed 10 July 2015. 
83 Aldo Zammit Borda, ‘A Formal Approach to Article 38(1) (d) of the ICJ Statute from the 
Perspective of the International Criminal Courts and Tribunals’ (2013) 24 649, 650. 
84 However, national courts are also treated as evidence of the emergence of customary 
international rules under Article 38 (1) (b). For example, in German Interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia, the PCIJ opines: 'From the standpoint of International Law and of the Court 
which is its organ, municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the 
activities of States, in the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures', 
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germ. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7 (May 
25), para 52. See the further discussion in Borda (n 83) 657–658. 
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expansion of the ‘ratione materiae’ of international law to govern matters that used 
to be governed by domestic law, international law has increasingly permeated into 
the domestic sphere, resulting in a rise in the application of international law by 
municipal adjudicating bodies.86According to him, the application of international 
law by domestic courts occurs in two different scenarios. First, courts of one state 
may apply international law, which is readily incorporated as law of its municipal 
system.  Secondly, in scenarios where specific international rules have not been 
incorporated into the law of the system, if there exist domestic secondary rules 
demanding that domestic courts interpret municipal law in conformity with 
international law, domestic courts may need to interpret both domestic law and 
international rules in order to avoid conflicts in interpretation.87 D’Aspremont argues 
that because of the increasing application of international law due to the expansion of 
the object of international law, as well as the fact that states are more willing to 
comply with international rules, it is unequivocal that domestic courts engage in law-
ascertaining practice.88 Thus, domestic courts can be construed as law-ascertaining 
officials in the international legal system.   
 
Regarding legal scholars’ teaching, historically, when the natural law dominated 
international law and state practices did not have the importance they have today, the 
teachings of prominent scholars such as Grotious and Vattel were of utmost 
importance in articulating the form, scope and substance of international rules.89 
However, with the increasing influence of positivism, the importance of scholars in 
international law-ascertainment declined. 90  Nonetheless, with the largely 
decentralized nature of international law in which the hierarchy of rules and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Non-State Actors from the Perspective of Legal Positivism: The 
Communitarian Semantics for the Secondary Rules of International Law’, in Jean 
d’Aspremont, Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-
State Actors in International Law (Routledge 2011) 29. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Shaw (n 28) 112; d’ Aspremont, ‘Non-State Actors from the Perspective of Legal 
Positivism: The Communitarian Semantics for the Secondary Rules of International Law’ (n 
86) 30–31. 
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institutions is ambiguous, Shaw opines that international legal scholars can play a 
vital role in creating coherence or systematic quality in international law91 since, as 
Shaw puts it:  
 
…states in their presentations of claims, national law officials in their opinions 
to their governments, the various international judicial and arbitral bodies in 
considering their decisions, and the judges of municipal courts when the need 
arises, all consult and quote the writings of the leading juristic authorities.92 
 
On the face of it, the ICJ seems rarely to refer to scholars’ writings in its decisions. 
Nevertheless, Crawford makes the observation that this is because of the process of 
the collective drafting of decisions that disfavours the selection of citations from 
academic writing by individual judges; however, the references to publicists’ 
writings are manifest in separate or dissenting opinions.93 Thus, although legal 
scholars do not have a law-applying authority and they do not either directly engage 
in law-applying social practice, their law-ascertaining practice directly and hugely 
influences the practice of law-applying officials.94  Therefore, international legal 
scholars serve as another important type of law-ascertaining official of the 
international legal system. D’Aspremont views international legal scholars as 
‘grammarians of the language of international law’ whose ultimate duties are ‘the 
systematization and the fine-tuning of the criteria for the distinction between law and 
non-law’.95 
 
The modifier ‘the most highly qualified’ can be understood as being widely 
recognized. However, the determination of which scholars are the most highly 
qualified or widely recognized can be very subjective.96 According to Crawford, this 
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93 Crawford (n 32) 43. 
94 See the discussion in d’ Aspremont, ‘Non-State Actors from the Perspective of Legal 
Positivism: The Communitarian Semantics for the Secondary Rules of International Law’ (n 
86) 31. 
95 Ibid. 
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phrase is ‘not given a restrictive effect, but authority naturally affects weight’.97 
International legal scholars in the context of Article 38 (1) (d) should be understood 
as including groups of legal scholars in the form of commissions or committees 
which act in a non-state capacity.98The patent examples for this are, of course, the 
International Law Commission (ILC)99, the Institut de Droit International and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross.100  
 
Accordingly, although national courts and legal scholars do not possess the formal 
authority to apply international law, their law-ascertaining practices shape and craft 
the criteria of international ascertainment. Their roles are officially recognized under 
Article 38 of the Statute of ICJ which is also applied as a tool to identify 
international rules beyond the context of the ICJ. Thus, this practice should be seen 
as reflecting the acceptance of secondary rules by international legal officials and the 
content of such rules. Thus, both national courts’ decisions and the relevant teachings 
of international highly qualified legal scholars, especially the highly respected work 
of the ILC, will be consulted here, from time to time, to reflect the existence of 
secondary rules as well as their content. 
 
4.2. Existence of Accepted Rules of Recognition, Rules of Change and Rules of 
Adjudication in International Law 
 
In this section, the aim is to determine whether there is general acceptance of three 
types of secondary rules – rules of recognition, rules of change and rules of 
adjudication – by officials in the international community, which Hart deems 
necessary and sufficient to confirm the existence of an international legal system.  
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98 Crawford opines that the work of the International Law Commission is analogous to and 
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Ibid. 
99 Hereinafter, the ‘ILC’. 
100 D’ Aspremont, ‘Herbert Hart in Today’s International Legal Scholarship’ (n 76) 134; d’ 
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4.2.1. Rules of Recognition in International Law 
 
According to Hart, rules of recognition are rules about rules, and they serve to deal 
with legal uncertainty caused by doubts over what the primary rules are and what the 
precise scope of the given rules is101 by providing criteria by which the validity of 
other rules in the system can be assessed. According to Hart, to affirm that rules are 
valid is to recognize that the rules satisfy all the tests required by rules of 
recognition.102 
 
A rule of recognition is of the utmost importance in constituting a legal system since, 
as elucidated by Hart, the point when a secondary rule of recognition is accepted and 
used for the identification of a primary rule deserves to be called the foundation of a 
legal system.103 When a rule of recognition is accepted, both private persons and 
officials are equipped with authoritative criteria for identifying primary rules.104 
 
Regarding the existence of accepted rules of recognition in international law, Hart 
states that international law does not necessarily contain a rule of recognition, 
explaining that:  
 
We shall not discuss the merits of these and other rival formulations of the 
basic norm of international law; instead we shall question the assumption that 
it must contain such an element. Here the first and perhaps the last question to 
ask is: why should we make this a priori assumption (for that is what it is) and 
so prejudge the actual character of the rules of international law? For it is 
surely conceivable (and perhaps has often been the case) that a society may 
live by rules imposing obligations on its members as 'binding', even though 
they are regarded simply as a set of separate rules, not unified by or deriving 
their validity from any more basic rule. It is plain that the mere existence of 
rules does not involve the existence of such a basic rule … Yet if rules are in 
fact accepted as standards of conduct, and supported with appropriate forms of 
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social pressure distinctive of obligatory rules, nothing more is required to show 
that they are binding rules, even though, in this simple form of social structure, 
we have not something which we do have in municipal law: namely a way of 
demonstrating the validity of individual rules by reference to some ultimate 
rule of the system. 105  
 
However, Walden and Hoof comment that Hart does not provide any positive 
arguments to affirm that international law does not have a rule of recognition.106 
Hoof further observes that, when it comes to international law, seemingly, Hart’s 
approach becomes much more restrictive. He argues that when addressing 
international law, Hart implies that a rule of recognition necessitates the existence of 
a legislative institution. This is more limited compared to his general theory 
regarding the rule of recognition which is articulated in a broader fashion as a rule 
identifying some features or feature possession accepted as conclusive affirmative 
determination that certain rules are the rules of the system.107 
 
Thus, the issue of the existence of accepted rules of recognition in international law 
should be revisited. There are two characteristics of rules of recognition that may 
need to be pointed out with regard to the assessment of the existence of rules of 
recognition and their acceptance in international law. First, the acceptance of a rule 
of recognition will help significantly in alleviating the legal uncertainty regarding 
what law is and what its precise scope is. However, a rule of recognition, in itself, 
may entail uncertainty to some extent since. Hart expounds, all rules contains ‘a 
fringe of vagueness’ or ‘open texture’ due to ‘the duality of a core of certainty and 
penumbra of doubts when we are engaged in bringing particular situations under 
general rules’. 108 This is of course also the case when the rule of recognition is 
applied to identify rules of the system. The second point is that Hart admits that a 
rule of recognition may be multiple and a source of primary rules may take various 
forms.109  On this second point, Hoof observes that the contours of a rule of 
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recognition can range from ‘very simple to extremely complex’, and in some cases it 
may be partially unrevealed, meaning that it cannot be fully comprehended at first 
sight.110 
 
As the function of a rule of recognition is to provide criteria for the validity of 
norms, i.e. determining what the valid norms of the system are,111 in order to seek 
rules of recognition in international law, the rules that fulfil this function must be 
identified. As Article 38 of the ICJ Statute is frequently treated by scholars as a rule 
governing the source of international rules,112 it can serve as a good starting point.  
 
A. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and Rules of Recognition in International Law 
 
Although whether or not Article 38 of the ICJ serves as an exhaustive list of the 
sources of international law remains debatable,113 the use of this article as a tool to 
identify primary rules in international law has been firmly established. As, Rubin has 
profoundly articulated, imagine the journey from morality to law as a ‘not well-
marked’ walk passing through ‘a fairly well-defined swampy area’ which may be 
dangerous to someone lost. The major signposts to guide someone wandering 
through this swampy area shall be codification of the sources declared in Article 38 
of the statute of the PCIJ,114 on which Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the ICJ is 
almost identically modelled.115 Some scholars perceive that this Article functions as 
a rule of recognition regarding the source of international law. Take, for example, 
Hargrove, who posits:  
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International law does not lack for rules for identifying the rules of the system. 
Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, while by its 
terms a statement of the rule governing law-finding by the Court, is a fair 
approximation of a universally accepted “rule of recognition” for the whole of 
public international law.116  
 
Likewise, Thirlway is of the view that since Article 38 entails enumeration of the 
sources of international primary rules elaborating how the primary rules may be 
made or altered, this article can be seen as functioning as a rule of recognition to 
some extent. 117 However, contrariwise, Klabbers observes that despite the fact that 
most international legal textbooks regard Article 38 as an authoritative enumeration 
of the sources of international law, this is only true for ‘everyday purposes’, as 
Article 38 ‘lacks constitutional ambitions and is at any rate fairly unspecific’.  
Although it entails a list of norms the ICJ may apply to decide its cases, it does not 
stipulate the crieria for how these norms are articulated and come into existence, 
rendering Article 38 as no more than a good starting point.118  
  
By examining the content of Article 38, Klabbers makes a sound observation which 
is shared here. Article 38 does not provide sufficient criteria for the condition of how 
law from each source of law is created; more importantly, it also does not explain the 
secondary rules behind the binding character of each source of law. Thus, Article 38 
alone does not suffice to function as a rule of recognition in international law. 
Supplementation by other rules is indeed needed if Article 38 is to function as a rule 
of recognition. For example, regarding treaties as a source of international law, the 
secondary rule of pacta sant servanda or other relevant secondary rules codified in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969119 may need to be included to 
provide complete criteria. Further, it is essential to note that, based on its text, it is 
unequivocal that this article applies only to the ICJ. Thus, Article 38 of the ICJ does 
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not, at least in and of itself, function as a comprehensive rule of recognition in 
international law. Nonetheless, It is proposed here that although such an article may 
not serve as a rule of recognition, at least not a complete one, the wide acceptance of 
Article 38, within and outside the ICJ context, as a reference for how to identify what 
international law is, at least reflects two important systematic implications of 
international law. First, the sources listed in such an article are generally accepted as 
a source of international law. Secondly, the rules of recognition behind each source 
listed in this article are generally accepted in identifying the international rule 
deriving from each source of law. Accordingly, as Article 38 of the ICJ’s statute, and 
its predecessor in the statutes of the PCIJ, originates from an attempt to codify the 
secondary rules of the source of international law,120 then, if the secondary rules 
relevant to each listed source of primary rules can be demonstrated, this will allow us 
to see the accepted rules of recognition in international law and how each of them is 
formed as part of the unifying rule of recognition. Thus, as the next step, this 
research will attempt to clarify the rules of recognition with regard to each source of 
international law listed in Article 38. 
 
B. Rules of Recognition with regard to Treaties 
 
With regard to treaties, Hart rules against the proposal that the pacta sunt servanda 
principle may serve as a rule of recognition in international law, arguing that not all 
obligations created by international law are based on contractual relationships 
(pacta).121 However, as illustrated before, Hart himself admits that in a modern legal 
system where there is a variety of 'sources' of law, the rule of recognition is complex 
and the criteria for identifying the law can be multiple. Thus, although it is errorless 
to insist that not every international norm is based on the pacta sunt servanda 
principle, the notion does not necessarily prevent the pacta sunt servanda principle 
from being perceived as part of the unifying rule of recognition, but definitely not as 
the sole source of the rule of recognition. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Cohen (n 78) 1056. 





	   	  
103	  
 
As is generally understood, treaties are constructed based on states’ will/ consent. 
However, state consent cannot of itself create legally-binding obligations. On this 
point, Franck astutely argues:  
 
It is quite wrong to think that treaties bind states because they have consented 
to them. If states were sovereign, the mere act of entering into a treaty could 
not "bind" them in any accurate sense. States are not bound only because they 
agree to be bound, in the sense in which neighbors in an apartment building 
might informally agree, for their mutual convenience, to turn off their 
television sets by 10 o'clock every evening. … They believe themselves to be 
bound – which can only be understood as evidence of their acquiescence in 
something demonstrable only circumstantially: an ultimate rule of recognition. 
122 
 
Likewise, Goldsmith and Levison propose that state consent may not result in the 
creation of a legal norm unless some pre-existing rules establishing a link between 
the consent and validity of legal obligation exist. Thus, if in the international legal 
order state consent generates binding norms, it must be because of the virtue of a 
certain background rules of international law that make inter-state consensual 
agreements have legally-binding consequences.123 In other words, there must exist 
secondary rules that create the bindingness of consent. The secondary rule of pacta 
sunt servanda can play such a role and help bridge the gap between state consent and 
the binding legal obligations of treaties. As the secondary rule of pacta sunt servanda 
has been generally accepted, it functions as an accepted rule of recognition, which 
indicates that binding primary rules may derive from consensual agreement as a 
source of primary rules. 
 
C. Rule of Recognition with regard to Customary International Law 
 
Regarding customary international law, Hart refuses to regard the rule that ‘[s]tates 
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should behave as they have customarily behaved’ as a rule of recognition. He argues 
that it elaborates nothing more than that one who accepts certain rules must also 
comply with a rule that the accepted rules ought to be complied with. Thus, it is 
perceived by Hart as a ‘mere useless reduplication of the fact that a set of rules is 
accepted by states as binding rules’.124 Nonetheless, contrariwise, Walden has a 
different opinion, pointing out Hart’s failure to address the nature of customary law 
in a society possessing both primary and secondary rules.125 In other words, if a 
secondary rule regarding the creation of customs emerges in society, will this affect 
the nature of customs. Intriguingly, Walden proposes that in a society with a rule of 
adjudication, tribunals, which are empowered to make authoritative decisions 
regarding the violation of customary law, are to decide, first of all, the issue of the 
existence of the allegedly violated customary law. In order to resolve this issue, 
tribunals have to apply secondary rules specifying what kinds of practices, engaged 
in by whom and for how long they must have been followed, can create such 
customary law. Next, the question of to whom the customary law applies is also to be 
answered. Thus, secondary rules relating to the scope of application of the rule will 
have to be articulated. Based on this explanation, the emergence of rules of 
adjudication, and the consequent application of customary rules to settle disputes, 
unavoidably involves the articulation of secondary rules regulating the validity and 
scope of the application of customary rules.126 He makes two observations that may 
be used to support the existence of an accepted rule of recognition in international 
law. First, doubts arising as to the content, scope and existence of customary 
international law are resolved not by a factual benchmark but by the application of 
legal criteria based on the secondary rules of recognition specifying under what 
conditions that customary international law may come into existence. Secondly, 
customary international law can have a binding effect on states that have not 
participated in its creation. Henceforth, the binding effect on such states must derive 
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by virtue of a secondary rule.127 
 
Moreover, the loosening of the requirements for two constitutive elements of 
customary international law – state practice and opinio juris – also supports the 
existence of an accepted rule of recognition for customary international rules. Take 
for example, the acceptance by the ICJ that a short period of time may be sufficient 
to create a new customary law128 and its reliance on the voting statistics of states 
within international forums as well as on the decisions and resolutions of 
international organizations to determine the emergence of customary international 
law, particularly the existence of opinio juris.129 The reason underlying such a 
phenomenon is that there exists an accepted rule of recognition to specify the general 
features of a rule of recognition which courts can apply to determine whether a norm 
in question counts as customary international law. Thus, when courts apply it, it is 
possible that courts may construe each requirement differently from earlier 
precedents, and this has resulted in modification of the requirement for two 
constitutive elements of customary law. Apparently, this cannot happen if there are 
no accepted rules of recognition since, without them, customary international law 
creation would be based on, to use Hart’s words, a ‘slow process of growth, whereby 
courses of conduct once thought optional become first habitual or usual, and then 
obligatory’, 130  like those in a primitive society, where modification of the 
requirements for the condition of the existence of customary law is not possible. 131 
 
D. Rule of Recognition with regard to General Principles of Law 
 
Along with treaties and customary international law, general principles are listed as a 
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source of law that the ICJ may apply to deem its case. Considering the legal texts 
describing this source of international law, there appear to be two conditions for 
identifying norms from this source of law: first, ‘general principles’, and secondly, 
‘recognized by civilized nations’.132 Nonetheless, the latter condition on the part of 
‘civilized nations’ has lost its legal significance since, at least after the inception of 
the UN Charter, there has been a presumption that all member states of the UN exist 
as civilized states.133 Regarding the part ‘recognized by civilized nations’, this has 
been interpreted by Root and Phillimore as requiring that such principles must be 
accepted in the domestic law of all civilized states.134 However, Oppenheim adds a 
further condition that the general principles of municipal jurisprudence may be 
resorted to inasmuch as they are applicable to inter-state relations.135 Thus it may be 
construed that from the rule of recognition regarding general principles of norms, 
norm X can be regarded as valid binding international law provided that norm X is a 
‘general principle’, is ‘accepted in the domestic law of all civilized states’ and ‘can 
be applicable to the relations of states’.  
 
The practice of adjudicating bodies to identify general principles of law is not very 
clear since, as Crawford argues, usually general principles become part of the legal 
reasoning of international courts without being expressly referred to or labelled.136 
However, the practice of the courts to identify general principles of law based on a 
secondary rule of recognition is reflected in the Barcelona Traction case in which, 
relying on the concept of limited liability, the court ruled that:  
 
If the Court were to decide the case in disregard of the relevant institutions of 
municipal law it would, without justification, invite serious legal difficulties. It 
would lose touch with reality, for there are no corresponding institutions of 
international law to which the Court could resort. Thus the Court has, as 
indicated, not only to take cognizance of municipal law but also to refer to it. It 
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is to rules generally accepted by municipal legal systems which recognize the 
limited company whose capital is represented by shares, and not to the 
municipal law of a particular State, that international law refers. 137 
 
E. State wills as a Source of the Validity of International Primary Rules 
 
After discussing the three sources of international law listed in Article 38 of the ICJ 
Statute, a clearer picture of the accepted rules of recognition behind each source of 
law has been painted. However, all the separate rules of recognition discussed earlier 
are part of the basic unifying rule of recognition, and if the common features or 
shared character of separate rules of recognition can be found, this will help to craft 
an understanding of the unifying rule of recognition that holds the set of separated 
primary rules together as a legal system.  
 
Based on each of the specific rules of recognition for treaties, customary 
international law and general principles of law, state will is a common constitutive 
element of the validity shared by treaties, customary international law and general 
principles recognized by states. 
 
In the case of treaties, the binding force of an international agreement is based on the 
principle that agreements are binding ‘pacta sunt servanda’, which, as discussed 
before, operates as an accepted rule of recognition regarding treaties. The principle 
of pacta sunt servanda makes states consenting to be bound by a treaty bound by it. 
Moreover, based on the maxim ‘pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt’, treaties create 
neither obligations nor rights for a third state without its consent.138 Therefore, state 
consent serves as a base of validity for the source of law in the case of treaties. 
Consequently, the lack of genuine consent of relevant states is one of the common 
traits of the grounds for the invalidity of treaties,139 namely error,140 fraud141 or the 
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coercion of a representative of a state,142 or of states themselves,143 as well as 
corruption of a state’s representative.144 
 
When discussing the role of state wills in the formulation of customary international 
law, the issue of whether state consent is a source of validity of customary 
international law has been a highly debatable topic within international legal 
scholarship. Some scholars posit that the validity of customary international law 
derives from the consent of states. On this point, Judge Fitzmaurice propounds that:  
 
Where a general rule of customary international law is built up by the common 
practice of States, although it may be a little unnecessary to have recourse to 
the notion of agreement … it is probably true to say that consent is latent in the 
mutual tolerations that allow the practice to be built up at all; and actually 
patent in the eventual acceptance (even if tacit) of the practice, as constituting a 
binding rule of law.145 
 
Likewise, Smith holds that ‘the general consent of States must be obtained, directly 
or indirectly, by express agreement or by tacit acquiescence, before we can say with 
certainty that any given change has acquired the force of binding law’.146 
 
As for the rule of a persistent objector, in order not to be bound by a rule of 
customary international law, states have to make their objection publicly known on a 
consistent basis,147and this must be done before the time the practice finally 
transforms into customary international law. 148 This rule has been employed to 
support a consent-based approach towards customary international law. The 
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argument goes that, in light of the persistent-objector principle, every state has the 
opportunity to opt out of a particular customary international law if it explicitly 
objects to its formation and can thus be considered a persistent objector. This reflects 
a voluntarist threshold relying on consent. Hence, when comparing treaties and 
customary international law, one can say that treaties are an opt-in regime since 
states will be bound by treaties if and only if they have explicitly given their consent 
to be bound by relevant treaties; whilst differently, customary international law is an 
opt-out regime as states are bound by customary rules unless they expressly object 
on a persistent basis to their creation.149Alternatively, states can opt out of already 
formed customary international law by entering into a treaty that alters the content of 
customary international law. Nevertheless, there exists a legal opinion that the 
consent approach cannot properly account for the creation of customary international 
law. Regarding the persistent-objector principle, Guzman argues that the failure to 
object to a norm is not equivalent to consent, since a state might fail to object for any 
number of reasons which are irrelevant to consent. Take, for example, states which 
opt to avoid objecting for political reasons or due to their speculating that usage is 
not transforming into custom.150 Guzmen is correct in articulating that a failure to 
object to usage can be exactly perceived as the consent of a state. Nevertheless, the 
consent theory may avail itself of support for this issue from the concept of 
acquiescence and estoppel, or the principle of reasonableness which is proposed to 
form part of a secondary rule for the creation of customary international law to make 
a failure to object to usage equivalent to the consent of a state to be bound by 
customary international law.151 On this issue, MacGibbon holds that the involvement 
of the rule of acquiescence represents ‘artificiality in stressing the element of consent 
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in general rules of customary law based on the common practice of States’ to some 
extent; however, he argues that such artificiality involves only the aspect of how 
state consent can be manifested or presumed, and thus the validity of customary 
international rules can still be deemed as directly based on state consent.152 As states 
can cancel out the effect of such presumption or artificiality by expressing their 
objection based on the persistent-objector rule, the involvement of other rules in 
creating the presumption of state consent does not deprive the state-consent-based 
nature of the customary international rule of its state-consent-based nature. 
 
Another alleged defect of consent theory revolves around newly-emerging states. 
Assuming that a particular consent-based theory of customary international law is 
correct, new states will logically be entitled to consider which customary 
international rules they wish to be bound to, and which they do not. However, this 
does not tally with reality since no state has ever been granted such an entitlement.153 
It was argued by Lauterpacht that newly-emerging states ‘cannot repudiate a single 
rule’ of existing customary international law.154Further, new states cannot avail 
themselves of assistance from the rule of a persistent objector, as the challenged 
practice has already become law by the time they earn their independence or status as 
a state.155Nevertheless, this argument against the necessity for consent to the 
formation of customary international law is still subject to challenge. As Waldock 
observed in 1962, no states had ever made an argument before the Court that it was 
exempt from the bindingness of particular customary international rules on the 
ground that it was a newly-emerging state that had already expressed an objection to 
the relevant rules,156 and this situation has remained unchanged until now. Further, 
there exists a theory objecting to the inability of newly-emerging states to refuse to 
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be bound by particular customs. Tunkin holds that new states have a legal 
entitlement to choose not to be bound by certain customary norms of international 
law. However, in the case where a new state enters the international community 
without making any official reservations acknowledged by other states, this would 
mean that such a state accepts a whole body of principles and norms of existing 
international law according to the basic principles of international inter-state 
relations.157 It can be directly inferred from Tunkin’s opinion that in the case where a 
new state enters the international community with reservations about particular 
customs, the customs objected to will not bind that state. However, as d’Amato has 
noted, no new state has entered the international community with such 
reservations.158 The reason behind this is perhaps that, considering state interest and 
political pressure in the international relationship, newly-emerging states may prefer 
not to reject a particular customary international rule but to opt to show courtesy for 
existing international law and at the same time endeavour to alter the content of 
customary international law to better meet their needs.159 Considering the arguments 
both for and against the consent basis of customary international law, the position 
taken here is that state consent is a necessary component for the creation of 
customary international law, as the secondary rules of the binding effect of 
customary international law permit states to opt out. Further, in theory, allowing 
newly-emerging states the opportunity to refuse to be bound by customary 
international law, whose formation they have not participated in, and which they do 
not desire to be bound by, would be fairer to new states. Nevertheless, a secondary 
rule apart from consensual theory that a failure to object to transforming usage is 
equivalent to the consent of the state failing to do so must exist. This, however, does 
not deprive customary international law of its consensual nature as it does not 
absolutely preclude the possibility of states refusing the binding nature of customary 
international law on them when customary rules are forming, and states can later opt 
out from entering into treaties with different content. 
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With respect to the relationship between general principles recognized by states as a 
source of law and state consent, legal opinions diverge. On one side, it may be 
perceived that the validity of general principles of international law is grounded in 
the implicit consent of states. This argument relies on the fact that the general 
principles of international law derive from states' own domestic principles and their 
content is ascertained through an inductive process. Added to this, assuming that 
express consent is required as a source of validity for general principles, empirical 
evidence that principles exist in the national legal system will satisfactorily fulfil the 
condition.160 On the other side, Pellet is of the contrary position that there is no 
relevance between state wills and the creation of general principles of international 
law, expounding that:  
 
Of course, it is plain that State will has nothing to do with such rules. Most 
certainly, they do exist in national legal orders; but in no way have they been 
created to apply at the international level and, in fact, there are cases when they 
do not apply. This has nothing to do with State will: it depends entirely on the 
question of whether or not the international society can be compared with 
national society.161  
 
However, the former proposition is taken.  Of course, it may be true that whether or 
not the principle can apply at the international level may depend on the compatibility 
of domestic societies with international society with respect to the relevant context of 
such principles. Nevertheless, if such principles are not commonly recognized by 
states, notwithstanding the compatibility of the principles to the international 
community, then the principles cannot be regarded as a valid international norm and 
cannot be applied at the international level. 
 
After considering the three sources of international norms stipulated in Article 38 of 
the ICJ Statute, arguably, it can be concluded that the bindingness of the three kinds 
of primary rules in this article – treaties, customary international law and general 
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principles of law – on a state relies on that state’s will to be bound by the specific 
primary rule; therefore, there exists an essential link of validity between each source 
of primary rules and state wills. Therefore, at this point, it may be construed that the 
unifying rule of recognition international law embraces state wills as one of the 
source of validity of primary rules.  
 
The embracing of state wills as source of validity of primary rules by the unifying 
rule of recognition has also been reflected in accepted sources of international law 
not identified in Article 38, such as unilateral acts. The link between the validity of 
unilateral acts and state wills can be comprehended since, according to Shaw, the 
intention to be bound is a key issue, along with the criteria of publicity and notoriety, 
in deciding whether unilateral acts may create a legal obligation.162 This, to some 
extent, reflects the system approach to identifying primary rules in international law, 
based on the unifying rule of recognition. Accordingly, the notion of a unifying rule 
of recognition that embraces state wills as a common dominator or common 
constitutive element of norms has shown a systematic element in international law to 
a certain extent. Added to this, from cosmopolitan international constitutionalism, a 
rule of recognition that embraces the will of states as a source of validity of primary 
rules would signify the aim of a peace-creating condition in the international legal 
system. To elaborate more, states could not be made to agree to be bound by 
international law by means of force or other means or made to distort their will, 
which would lead to a situation where the peace is violated or at least threatened. 
Moreover, in scenarios where relevant states achieve domestic constitutionalism, 
respect for the will of states which is exercised via constituted power-holders 
established by the people would mean respect for the right to self-governance of the 
people in such states.  
 
Although this part does not deal exhaustively with all rules potentially functioning as 
a rule of recognition in international law, the existence of an accepted rule of 
recognition for the main sources of international rule listed in Article 38 of the 
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Statute of the ICJ and their links to state will as a constitutive element of their 
validity can explain the largely decentralized character of the international legal 
system. This clearly shows that international law is not without adequate criteria for 
the validity of primary rules that both international officials and private persons can 
use to determine what the rules of the system are and to deal with the legal 
uncertainty regarding the identification of rules and determination of scope of their 
application to a large extent. Nevertheless, mention must be made here that there is 
another important candidate for a rule of recognition in international law that has not 
yet been discussed here, which is Article 53 of the VCLT. Article 53 of the VCLT 
provides that:  
 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, 
a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. 163 
 
From its content, this article can be construed as a rule of recognition for jus cogens 
rules. However, as such, this Article is very relevant to the existence of a hierarchy 
of international primary rules and the superior source of validity to state wills which 
is another necessary condition for a constitutionalized international legal system, 
which will be considered in the next chapter. Thus, a full discussion of Article 53 of 
the VCLT will be conducted in the next chapter. 
 
4.2.2. Rules of Changes in International Law 
 
In this section, an exploration of the existence of accepted international secondary 
rules of change, which will enable international law to respond promptly to social 
changes, will be pursued. 
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On this issue of rules of change in international law, Hart denies the existence of 
secondary rules of change due to a lack of legislative institutions,164 thus insisting 
that international law is, in its structure, similar to a primitive regime entailing only 
primary rules or customs.165He also criticized some theorists, claiming that they tend 
to minify such formal differences and overrate the analogies between international 
law-making and municipal legislation for the purpose of defending the status of 
international law as law.166 Nevertheless, Hart is criticized in that he does not engage 
in a detailed and thorough analytical account of international law-making 
mechanisms in coming to his position.167 
 
A position contrary to that of Hart will be defended here. On this point, Franck 
argues that law-making institutions exist at the international level, one patent 
example of which was the well-structured multilateral negotiations at the Law of the 
Sea Conference in the 1970s.168 The importance of international institutions for 
development of the international law-making process is explained by Harrison that:  
 
In few cases does the significance of international institutions stem from their 
formal status and powers. Rather, their importance lies in their ability to act as 
a forum in which states can meet and agree upon mutually acceptable 
approaches to common problems … One of the most important law-making 
events in this field was the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea. Although the Conference was only an ad hoc institution, it had a 
significant impact on the modern law of the sea through its ability to garner 
widespread support for the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. Today, this instrument is widely considered as providing the legal basis 
for the modern law of the sea. While the Convention still falls short of 
universal application, it is nevertheless considered by many to create a 
universal legal order for the oceans.169   
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Thus, superficially, international law seems to lack a legislative mechanism that is 
comparable to those in a municipal legal system, as primary rules of international 
law mainly come into existence through contractual agreements between states or 
through the slow process of the creation of customary international law. However, 
the context of the law-making approach in international law has been altered and 
developed in order to cope with the changes in society with sufficient speed. The 
treaty-making mechanism has been institutionalized in a way that reduces the 
importance of a bilateral process. Currently, the adoption of international treaties 
regularly occurs through majority votes or consensus procedures without engaging in 
any formal voting process.170 Added to this, international organizations also play an 
important organizing role to facilitate and institutionalize inter-state multilateral 
negotiations in many aspects.171 Although this institutionalized character does not 
remove the necessity for state ratification and each state still decides whether to be 
bound by a specific treaty, it does show that the process by which multilateral 
treaties are created is more like an institutionalized parliamentary scenario for 
legislation than an ad-hoc bilateral bargaining scenario.172 This institutionalized law-
making process based on multilateral negotiations with a voting system or a 
consensus procedure consumes much less time than those based on bilateral 
negotiations, and this, at some level, enables the international community to react to 
new problems promptly, therefore overcoming the defect of legal stagnation. 
Regarding this point, Hargrove propounds that the multilateral treaty-making process 
can function as a ‘reasonable approximation’ to general legislative institutions, 
subject to the broadness of states engaging in the process.173  
 
Regarding customary international law, Hart employs the notion of a slow process of 
custom creation in a primitive society in contrast to the more flexible and 
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sophisticated legislative process of legislation in a modern municipal legal system.174 
Nonetheless, given the contemporary understanding of customary international law, 
its creation differs from the creation of customs in many respects. As expounded 
earlier, customary international law differs from customary law in primitive societies 
as the creation of customary international law involves secondary rules and the 
secondary rules involved may be changed or modified to correspond to political or 
socioeconomic changes within the international community. 
 
One important change in the secondary rules regarding customary international law 
is that the requirement for two constitutive elements – customary state practice and 
opinio juris – has been eased. In the North Sea Continental Shelf case, the ICJ 
insisted that state practice over a short period of time may suffice to create a new rule 
of customary international law if the practice of states is in general consistent.175 
Moreover, the court tends to rely on the voting statistics of states within international 
forums and the decisions and resolutions of international organizations when it has to 
determine the emergence of customary international law, particularly the existence of 
opinio juris.176 Accordingly, based on the development of the concept of customary 
international law, unlike the creation of customs in a primitive community, the 
creation of customary international law does not represent a slow and incremental 
process grounded on a factual basis.177 
 
Hargrove makes a legitimate point, noting that despite a number of law-making 
mechanisms, the rules of change in international law are less effective and more 
demanding than those of a parliament in a domestic system. Nevertheless, these 
mechanisms can be deemed as capable of supporting international law as a system 
far into the future, given their compatibility with the decentralized and fragmented 
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character of international realpolitik.178  Albeit not as effective as those in the 
domestic sphere, international legislative processes which are based on accepted 
rules of change allow the international community to cope with emerging new 
problems on the international plane, as an international legal system, and with a 
number of accepted rules of change, the international community has clearly 
developed far beyond primitive social communities in terms of secondary rules of 
change. 
 
4.2.3. Rules of Adjudication in International Law 
 
After the existence of secondary rules of recognition and change in international law 
has been adequately affirmed, finally, it is time to deal with international secondary 
rules of adjudication, the function of which is to provide efficient mechanisms for the 
enforcement of international primary rules.  
 
One ground on which Hart bases his argument against the existence of rules of 
adjudication or adjudicative institutions in international law is that states cannot be 
brought before any international dispute-settlement bodies if they have not given 
their prior consent to the process.179 It is certainly true that there is no genuinely 
compulsory dispute-settlement system existing on the international plane, as even 
though the term ‘compulsory jurisdiction’ has been employed in certain contexts of 
international law, they are not genuinely compulsory. Alexandrov explains that, 
regarding the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, such jurisdiction is compulsory on the 
ground that a state has given its consent to jurisdiction of the ICJ in advance. 
Consequently, when a dispute which falls within the scope of consent emerges, a 
state is bound by its own consent already expressed and subject to the Court’s 
jurisdiction.180 Does this ground suffice to negate the existence of accepted rules of 
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adjudication in international law? A negative answer to this question is chosen here. 
To begin with, it should be accepted that non-compulsory dispute settlement 
emanates from the very nature of the non-centralized character of the international 
community. Thus it may be argued that, considering the nature of the society which 
it serves, an optional dispute settlement mechanism may not necessarily be a defect, 
and possibly a more compatible choice. For example, Hargrove posits that it is 
crucial to take into consideration the fact that, very frequently, disputed states with 
competing claims under international rules can reach a compromise over their 
differences through optional procedures based on mutual consent, and, by chance, 
they typically respect the resolution. Hence, this proves that the non-compulsory 
settlement mechanisms available on the international plane serve as effective 
mechanisms in practice. 181  Further, even in a domestic legal system, a 
comprehensive compulsory mechanism does not exist in certain areas, e.g. disputes 
regarding constitutional issues, especially the power of public officials and 
constitutional actors.182 Take, for example, the United Kingdom where the principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty has prevented any court conducting a judicial review of 
parliamentary acts.183 Likewise, in the US, Goldsmith and Levinson observe that a 
large proportion of constitutional disputes will not be decided before any court but 
rather by non-judicial political actors at different levels and in different branches of 
government. If those political actors hold divergent interpretations of constitutional 
issues, such differences will be settled through political compromise rather than the 
authoritative say of judicial bodies, thus reflecting the decentralized element of the 
dispute-settlement process for constitutional issues in the US system. 184 
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Moreover, if a determination of the existence of rules of adjudication or adjudicative 
institutions is to be based on a comparison with the highly developed regime of 
domestic criminal and private law, one may perceive that there are no such rules of 
adjudication or adjudicative institutions existing on the international plane. However, 
the comparison itself seems to have some fundamental shortcomings. Given the 
decentralized and fragmented nature of international society, which is much more 
diffuse than a centralized national community, and the fact that related international 
actors vary greatly in size, power, interests and domestic structure, this difference 
between international and domestic communities is not to be ignored. In light of such 
a significant difference, it is argued here that a more legitimate way to approach this 
issue is to contemplate it in light of the specific functioning of rules of adjudication, 
which is to overcome the problem of inefficiency of the legal order. On the 
international plane, today, apart from the ICJ which is the principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations with general jurisdiction, the international adjudicating 
mechanism consists of an array of courts and tribunals at either global or regional 
levels with specialized jurisdictions. Take for example the World Trade 
Organization’s	  185 panels and the Appellate Body, the ECJ and The International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, as well as international arbitration. The verdicts of 
these tribunals are, in general, binding, final and authoritative determinations of 
violations of international primary rules. 186  Rules specifying the international 
responsibility of states for wrongful acts and rules regarding the conditions for the 
rightful resort to countermeasures by injured states may, to some extent, be perceived 
as further evidence for the existence of accepted secondary rules of adjudication.187 
Many international agreements confer jurisdiction on international tribunals and 
provide rules of evidence and procedures for relevant tribunals to apply when 
deciding a case.188 Added to this, it is undeniable that there exists an array of 
unwritten secondary rules that are widely accepted in international dispute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Hereinafter, ‘WTO’ 
186 Payandeh (n 5) 985–987. 
187 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International 
Legal System and the International Court of Justice’ (1999) 31 Journal of International Law 
and Politics 791, 793. 





	   	  
121	  
settlements, such as res judicata, litispendence, compétence de la compétence and 
many more regarding the jurisdiction and admissibility of tribunals, due process or 
evidence. One example that reflects general acceptance of the rules of adjudication 
by international officials is the Corfu Channel case where the court ruled, with 
respect to the allowance of circumstantial evidence in the procedure, that ‘this 
indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and its use is recognized by 
international decisions’.189 
 
Even though, undoubtedly, these developments do not create comprehensive and 
compulsory adjudication, such developments have, to a large extent, helped to create 
a mechanism to mitigate the problems of the inefficiency of the international legal 
order. Hence, it is very difficult to come to the conclusion that the international legal 
order is a legal regime with an absence of adjudication. 
 
Another ground that may be raised to support the non-existence of rules of 
adjudication in the international legal order is the lack of any centralization of social 
pressure within it. According to Hart, the centralization of social pressure would 
alleviate the problem of the inefficiency of a legal order. In a more developed legal 
system, the primary rules prohibit or restrict the use of force and self-help by private 
persons, which is an ineffective way to enforce primary rules and may be a danger to 
society in some aspects. Instead, rule-based society establishes an official monopoly 
of sanctions.190 In so doing, the system introduces additional secondary rules of 
adjudication which govern possible punishments for violations of primary rules and 
grant to judges, where the fact of a violation is affirmed by them, the exclusive 
authority to stipulate punishment by other officials. This is how the centralization of 
sanctions of the legal system emerges.191 In international law, there only exists an 
early-developed system of centralized sanctions. One might argue that the power of 
the SC regarding the use of force reflects the existence of a centralized system of 
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sanctions in international law. Unfortunately, although the SC has a monopoly over 
the power to authorize the use of force, apart from cases of self-defence, based on 
Article 43,192 it does not have its own military force and needs to rely on state 
members to provide it with military force; however, agreement to provide military 
force to the SC by member states has never been reached.193 Consequently, the SC 
has to rely on authorization for the use of force by individual states or a group of 
them, instead of commanding the use of force itself, in order to fulfil its peace-and-
security purpose,194 e.g. in the case of military measures against Iraq due to its 1990 
invasion of Kuwait. 195 Nonetheless, considering the divergent nature of the 
international and domestic communities, the development of a mechanism for legal 
sanctions in international law may not need to follow the model of municipal law. 
There have been developments in international law that may resolve the issue of the 
inefficiency caused by the diffusion of social pressure. One solid example is the 
notion of collective self-defence, which allows other states, rather than the state 
unlawfully attacked, to lawfully use force against the attacking state.196 Likewise, the 
concept of erga omnes, which creates a kind of obligation that a state owes towards 
the international community as a whole, rather than an obligation arising vis-à-vis 
another state,197 constitutes a more effective mechanism to enforce the law. In cases 
where an obligation erga omnes is violated, international law allows all states to 
utilize enforcement mechanisms. More importantly, all states are obliged to 
cooperate to put an end to serious breaches of such norms entailing the international 
community’s important shared values. Further they are required not to recognize any 
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situation created by such serious breaches as lawful or to provide any help in 
maintaining such situations.198 Obviously, such a mechanism does not reflect the 
progress towards a more centralized law-enforcement mechanism, rather it is based 
on the aim of utilizing international co-operation as a tool to enforce the law and, to 
some extent, there is a possibility that cooperation between all states in the 
international community may lead to sufficiently effective sanctions to enforce the 
law. Added to this, on careful scrutiny, centralization of the power to use force at the 
discretion of a handful states so as to ensure obedience to international rules may 
result in illegitimate inequalities among states as well as potentially grave risks to 
international security,199 since this could be used abusively to satisfy the hegemonic 
or imperialist attempts of those who control the world’s centralized enforcement 
power.  Thus, the development of a law-enforcement mechanism based on 
international co-operation would serve as a proper approach in the context of 
international law and also reflect the truth that there exist law-enforcement 
institutions or secondary rules regarding this issue. 
 
4.3. Normative Conflicts and Conflict Rules in Fragmented International Law 
 
It has been shown that primary international rules have been generally obeyed and 
international law has been sufficiently equipped with rules of recognition, change 
and adjudication to deal with legal uncertainty, legal stagnation and legal 
ineffectiveness.  Thus, two minimum conditions for the emergence of a Hartian legal 
system have been met. Nevertheless, as the rule of recognition of international legal 
system recognize state-will as a main source of validity of international primary rules 
and other types secondary rules also recognize the importance of state-wills, 
international law is largely decentralized in its nature. Although the largely 
decentralized character of international law does not equal the lack of normative 
development, it poses another problematic issue for the systematic quality of 
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international law, which is the fragmentation of international law.200 The major 
problem of fragmented international law entailing threats to the quality of 
international law as a system is one about normative conflicts. Pauwelyn defines 
normative conflicts as ‘[e]ssentially two norms are, therefore, in a relationship of 
conflict if one constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, a breach of the other’. 201 
Conflict between rules are a cause for legal uncertainty in international law as 
multiple norms refer to the same type of behaviour, and so the subject of law may 
not physically be able to act in conformity with multiple norms.202 Furthermore, 
when multiple norms may apply to the fact, the outcome of the question is very 
likely to vary if different applicable norms are applied. Accordingly, in legal systems 
which are very decentralized in structure, normative conflicts are a potential menace 
to the systematic quality of such legal systems. However, in case of international 
law, the international legal system is already equipped with an array of secondary 
rules to employ by international official to solve normative conflicts and identify the 
applicable rule for the disputes. 203  Most of them are will-based conflict rules which 
solve conflicts by determining which norm most precisely serves or most accurately 
reflects the wills of relevant states There exist two sub-types of state-will-based 
conflict rules, which are those resulting in the ceasing to exist of one conflicting 
norm and those resulting in the priority of application of one norm. The conflict rules 
that reside in the former category are the termination of an earlier treaty by the 
conclusion of a later treaty by the same parties with the intention that the matter 
should be governed by the later treaty, the expressed prohibition of later norms by 
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earlier norms, and illegal inter se modification and suspension according to Articles 
48 and 59 of the VCLT. Within the second category are conflict clauses, lex 
posterior and lex specialis rules. Nonetheless, there exists another type of conflict 
rules which is not based on the wills of states as, apparently, those rules impose a 
limit on the exercising of state will to change or modify international law and prevent 
states from derogating from certain norms.204 Such conflict rules are the secondary 
rule of non-derogability of jus cogens codified in Article 53 of VCLT and the 
secondary rule of primacy of the UN Charter stipulated in Article 103 of the UN 
Charter.205 The existence of these conflict rules enables international law to tackle 
with the problem of legal uncertainty caused by normative conflicts, firmly holding 
international law as a legal system. 
 
 
V. Conclusion: Systematic Element of International Law  
 
Throughout this chapter, the existence of accepted secondary rules for each type of 
rule of recognition, rule of change and rule of adjudication has been proven, and 
those secondary rules hold international law together as a legal system. This position 
is shared by Franck, who explains the systemic quality of international law in the 
Hartian sense:  
 
[The international system] has an extensive network of horizontally coherent 
rules, rule-making institutions, and judicial and quasi-judicial bodies to apply 
the rules impartially. Many of the rules are sufficiently determinate for states to 
know what is required for compliance and most states obey them most of the 
time. Those that do not, tend to feel guilty and to lie about their conduct rather 
than defy the rules openly. The system also has means for changing, adapting 
and repealing rules.206  
 
Although the secondary rules of international law do not bring about a centralized 
system as municipal law, it is not to be concluded that international law is a primitive 
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version of domestic society. The decentralized nature of international law is 
grounded in on the fact that the rule of recognition of international law embraces 
state wills as one of the sources of validity of the primary rules of the system, and 
other secondary rules respect state autonomy which is an agent of the people in such 
states. This is necessary for a peace-creating condition for the world and to allow 
states as representatives of their constituent power-holder at the international level to 
exercise the power conferred on them by the people to designate international law as 
long as it does not impair the protection of peace and fundamental human rights. The 
importance of embracing state will as a source of validity of international rules for 
the protection of peace is reflected in the preamble of the VCLT that stipulates that, 
in agreeing with such a agreement, state parties have in mind:  
 
…the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations, such as the principles of the equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, of the sovereign equality and independence of all States, of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of States, of the prohibition of the threat or 
use of force and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all.207 
 
The recognition of state wills as a source of validity by the unifying rule of 
recognition of the international legal system is equivalent to the allocation of 
international law-making power to states. The international legal system, and a 
number of fundamental secondary rules of the system have been developed based on 
the embracing of state will as a source of validity by a unifying rule of recognition, 
such as pacta sunt servanda, the rule of recognition of customary international law of 
state practice and opinio juris, the rule of recognition for general principles, the rule 
of non-compulsory jurisdiction of the international courts, arbitration and the state-
centred rules of law-enforcement. These fundamental secondary rules can be taken as 
part of secondary constitutional rules, as they provide a fundamental framework for 
how law is made, changed, adjudicated and enforced. Thus, it can be construed that 
there is a largely decentralized systematic structure of international law which is 
based on one of its underlying aims – respect for the sovereignty of states and the 
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creation of peace among them.  However, the largely decentralized structure of 
international law generates another problematic of normative conflict which can 
undermine the systematic quality of international law. Nevertheless, international 
law is sufficiently equipped with secondary rules which can be used to solve 
normative conflict and help to hold fragmented international law as a coherent 
system. 
 
In light of the idea of the complementarity of the domestic constitutional legal 
system and the international constitutional legal system, the respect for states and the 
allocation of power to states is due to the status of a state as the representative of its 
constituent power-holder, ‘the people’. Peters, who advocates a compensatory role 
for international constitutionalism, explains this point thus:  
 
My conclusion on the international constitutional status of states is that states 
are not ends in themselves, but merely instrumental for the rights and the needs 
of individuals. This finalité makes states indispensible in a global 
constitutionalized order, but also calls for their constitutional containment.208  
 
Accordingly, states are allocated legal power by the international legal system; 
however, such power shall be limited by the international legal system, as unlimited 
power for states could jeopardize the peace and human rights purpose of the 
international constitutional legal system. Thus, to exist as a constitutionalized 
international legal system, international law must possess legal mechanisms that can 
provide limitations on the international-law-making power of states and this is where 
the centralization or hierarchization of the international law needs to be achieved.  It 
will be proposed that the two conflict rules of non-derogable of jus cogens and the 
primacy of the UN Charter which have a restricting effect on the international law-
making power of states have established such an international verticalizatized legal 
structure. However, this is the issue that will be comprehensively engaged in the next 
chapter. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Anne Peters, ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional Community’ in Jan Klabbers, 
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All things considered, to a large extent, international law and the international 
community are well equipped to deal efficiently with issues of legal uncertainty, 
inertia and ineffectiveness, given the decentralized nature of international society. 
Thus, international law contains an adequate systematic element to be taken as a 
legal system, based on Hart's conception of a legal system as the union of primary 
and secondary rules.   
 
The systemic element will provide international law with the basic efficacy 
necessary to fulfil its underlying purpose and serve as one of the necessary 
foundations for an international legal constitutional system to some extent; but if 
international law exists as a constitutional legal system, then the further 
systematization of international law to establish international self-governance with a 
mandate to create peace and protect fundamental human rights, the legitimacy of 
which is based on its nexus with humanity, aka ‘constitutionalization’, must be 
further proven. Thus, in the next chapter, the second condition for an international 
constitutional legal system, which is the hierarchical structure of international 
primary rules conferring constitutional status on certain international primary rules 
protecting peace and fundamental human rights, will be proven to confirm that 
despite its largely decentralized character, the obligations of states to protect peace 
and fundament human rights are given a non-derogable and non-compromisable 





	   	  
129	  
Chapter IV: Hierarchical Structure in International Law with 
Supremacy for International Primary Rules Protecting Peace and 




In the last chapter, the systemic structure of international law was proven. Although 
international law is a more decentralized legal system than domestic ones, this is for 
the peaceful co-existence of states and respect for states and their constituent power 
– their people –. However, if international law were a purely consent-based legal 
system – a horizontal legal system – fulfilment of the underlying purpose of 
international constitutionalism, the creation of international self-governance with a 
mandate for peace and fundamental human rights, would be beyond the reach of 
international law. On this point, Bryde comments on the shortcomings of state-will-
based horizontal international law without a hierarchical structure:  
 
It was a horizontal legal system which knew no common interest beyond the 
sum of interest of individual states, no hierarchy of norms, no higher authority 
than states themselves. With the help of international law the states regulate 
their international affairs, but the regulation of their own affairs (“domaine 
réservé”) knew no restrictions.1  
 
Accordingly, a horizontal system seems to lack a shared underlying purpose that it 
and its members need to fulfil. A state-will-based international legal order does 
necessarily not create an obligation for states not to cause a negative situation with 
regard to peace, i.e. an obligation not to use force apart from where it is necessary to 
protect peace and fundamental human rights. Added to this, if international law were 
a purely state-will-based legal system, even if an obligation not to use force exists, it 
would be inadequate to create and maintain international peace as states can enter 
into new international law that exempts them from such an obligation. Thus, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Brun-Otto Bryde, ‘International Democratic Constitutionalism’, in Ronald St John 
Macdonald and Douglas M. Johnston (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism (Martinus 
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hierarchy of primary rules in which international primary rules prohibiting the use of 
force are placed at the top is necessary to create peace. Similarly, if the international 
constitutional legal system has an underlying goal to protect fundamental human 
rights, then primary rules creating an obligation to protect fundamental human rights 
must be elevated to a higher rule of the international legal system as well. Hence, the 
hierarchy of international primary rules granting supremacy to primary rules that 
protect peace and fundamental human rights is another necessary element of a 
constitutionalized international legal system. 
 
Based on the idea of the hierarchical primacy of constitutional rules, constitutions are 
bestowed with superiority over other legal rules in the society they govern.2 Existing 
as hierarchically superior rules, constitutions surpass ordinary rules in cases of 
conflict with ordinary rules,3 thus establishing a normative hierarchy within the 
community. Among a number of conflict rules available to the international legal 
system, two secondary rules can be proposed as establishing a hierarchy of primary 
rules in international law as they do not solve conflicts by determining which norms 
best serve the will of relevant states; rather, such rules impose a limit on the 
exercising of state will to change or modify international law and prevent states from 
derogating or opting out from certain norms,4 hinting at a hierarchical structure in the 
international legal system. Such conflict rules are the non-derogability rule of jus 
cogens and Article 103 of the UN Charter, which arguably represents the secondary 
rule of primacy of the UN Charter. Therefore, this chapter will examine whether or 
not each of these two secondary rules have hierarchized international law and if so, 
how they have shaped the legal structure of international law in order to affirm 
whether or not the hierarchy of international primary rules with the supremacy for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Simon Chesterman, Thomas M Franck and David M Malone, Law and Practice of the 
United Nations (OUP 2008) 7. 
3 Daniel Bodansky, ‘Is There an International Environmental Constitution?’ (2009) 16 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 565, 571. 
4 See e.g how the rule of non-derogability of jus cogens limits the law-making ability of 
states in Michael Byers, ‘Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga 
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rules protecting peace and fundamental human rights exists in the international legal 
system. 
 
 II.  The Secondary Rule of Non-derogability of Jus Cogens Rules  
 
A literal translation of the term ‘jus cogens’ is cogent law, and this reflects a key 
characteristic of jus cogens rules, which is that they are ‘compelling’.5 At the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties (UNCLOT)6, Suarez, the Mexican 
delegate, made a helpful suggestion for the meaning of jus cogens: ‘the rules of jus 
cogens were those rules which derived from principles that the legal conscience of 
mankind deemed absolutely essential to coexistence in the international 
community’.7 Due to their undoubted importance to the international community, jus 
cogens rules were bestowed with a non-derogable character distinguishing them from 
other rules of international law. Thus, jus cogens rules are peremptory in character 
and no derogation from rules qualifying as jus cogens is permitted, with no 
exceptions,8 Rules that conflicts with them is null and void.9 It could be argued that 
jus cogens rules are hierarchically superior rules and such that they reflect the 
existence of public-interest-based rules which govern the legal relationship involving 
the common interest of the international community as a whole.10 The rule of non-
derogability of jus cogens is reflected in Article 53 of the VCLT itself, as well as in 
Article 53 of the 1982 Vienna Convention on Treaties Between States and 
International Organizations or Between International Organizations.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Karen Parker and Lyn Beth Neylon, ‘Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights’ 
(1989) 12 Hastings International Comparative Law Review 411, 415. 
6 Hereinafter, ‘UNCLOT’. 
7 See the United Nations Conference on the Law of treaties, First session (Hereinafter 
‘UNCLOT (First Session)’), (UN Doc. A/CONF.39/11), 52th Meeting of the Committee of 
the Whole, 294. 
8 Kamrul Hossain, ‘The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under the U.N. Charter’ 
(2005) 3 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 72, 73. 
9 ILC Report on Fragmentation of International Law, para 404. 
10 Andreas L Paulus, ‘Jus Cogens in a Time of Hegemony and Fragmentation: An Attempt 
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Thus, the non-derogability of jus cogens as such is argued here as establishing 
limitations on the international-law making power of states and the hierarchical 
structure of the primary rules of the international legal system. In doing so, first, this 
section will discuss the rule of recognition of jus cogens rules in the hope of 
understanding the reason why they exist as higher rules in the international legal 
system, protected by the secondary rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens. The 
proposition which will be made here is that the validity of jus cogens rules does not 
derive from state wills but rather from fundamental shared values of the international 
community. Then, after demonstrating the link between jus cogens and fundamental 
shared values, the last part will discuss the scope and legal consequences of the 
secondary rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens to show the role of jus cogens 
rules in the establishment of a hierarchical structure of international primary rules, 
providing supremacy for primary rules that protect peace and fundamental human 
rights. 
  
2.1. Rule of Recognition vis-à-vis Jus Cogens Rules 
 
In the largely decentralized international legal system where state consent serves as 
the main source of the validity of international primary rules, in order to confirm and 
understand the hierarchical structure established by the secondary rule of non-
derogability of jus cogens, the rule of recognition for jus cogens must be examined 
first. This will help to determine what serves as the source of validity for jus cogens 
and to understand the reason why that source of validity can generate hierarchically 
superior primary rules that take precedence over state-will-based primary rules.  
 
Article 53 of the VCLT provides that:  
 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, 
a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
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which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. 11 
 
Based on this Article, the rule of recognition in the case of jus cogens can be said to 
be twofold: first, rules that will develop into jus cogens must exist as part of general 
international law. Second, such rules are to be recognized and accepted by the 
international community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.12 This 
two-stage creation of jus cogens is key to understanding the conflict between the idea 
that jus cogens rules originally emerge as state-will-based international law and the 
effect whereby jus cogens binds all states in the international community, including 
those dissenting, and their non-derogable character at the time that they transform 
into jus cogens. 
 
2.1.1. First Condition: Existing as Part of General International Law 
 
For the first condition, Pauwelyn explains that ‘the rules of this general international 
law are, by their very nature, binding on all states’; however, he also observes that 
‘this does not mean, of course, that states cannot “contract out” of general 
international law’.13 Likewise, according to Weil, the term ‘general international 
law’ originally denotes ‘a rule applicable except in the event of a particular 
derogation’ 14 . Thus, general international law denotes generality rather than 
universality and this indicates that rules that are part of general international law but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Article 53 of the VCLT 
12 Paulus proposes a twofold test for the creation of jus cogens: ‘rules of jus cogens must 
first become (general) international law – customary law or general principles of law 
pursuant to Article 38, para. 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice – and may 
then be elevated to jus cogens by the international community’, Paulus (n 10) 302; 
meanwhile Akehurst suggests that ‘a rule, in order to qualify as jus cogens, must pass two 
tests – it must be accepted as law by all the States in the world and an overwhelming 
majority of States must regard it as jus cogens’, Michael Akehurst, ‘The Hierarchy of the 
Sources of International Law’ (1975) 47 BYBIL 273, 285. 
13 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates 
to Other Rules of International Law (5th edn, CUP 2006) 148 and footnote 194. 
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have not yet earned the status of jus cogens do not possess a non-derogable 
character. 
 
There are very diverse opinions on what is meant by general international law in 
Article 53. 15  On the one hand, there exists a legal opinion taking general 
international law as equivalent to international customary law.16  For example, 
according to Weil, the idea behind this terminological permutation is to form a 
contrast between a conventional rule, which only binds states, parties and rules, and 
customary international law which is more generally binding on states.17  
 
In contrast, Akehurst contends that the rules of jus cogens may derive from both 
customary international law and treaties, observing: ‘a treaty which has been ratified 
by all or almost all the States in the world is as much a part of general international 
law as most customary rules’.18 Similarly, Tunkin argues that, currently, the progress 
of the international legal system is to a large extent shaped by treaties.19 A number of 
general multilateral treaties have become part of general international law, e.g. the 
Briand-Kellog Pact of 1928 and the UN Charter.20 On this point, the opinion of 
Akehurst and Tunkin is shared here, i.e. that general international law can exist in the 
form of either customs or treaties, since what is required in this condition is the 
generality of law not the form of it, and both of them can generate law that is 
generally binding on members of the international community  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Akehurst (n 12) 282. 
16 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principle of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 
594;  Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (jus Cogens) in International Law (Helsinki 
Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Co 1998) 226–242 as cited in Anthea Roberts, ‘Traditional and 
Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ (2001) 95 AJIL 
757, 783; Weil made an observation that in the North Sea Continental Shelf Judgment, the 
terms ‘customary international law’, ‘general international law’, ‘general or customary law 
rules’, or ‘a general rule of international law’ or ‘a general rule of law’ were employed 
interchangeably, Weil (n 14) 436. 
17 Weil (n 14) 437. 
18 Akehurst (n 12) 284. 
19 Grigory Tunkin, ‘Is General International Law Customary Law Only?’ (1993) 4 EJIL 534, 
541. 
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Paulus argues differently, i.e. that customary law and general principles can serve as 
a source of rules that will become jus cogens.21With respect to the general principles 
of law, Onuf suggests that although, by definition, ‘general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations’ can generate rules of general international law, a 
very small number of rules are perceived as deriving from this source. Moreover, 
they are typically procedural rules for international tribunals which are unlikely to 
qualify as having a peremptory character.22He also argues that given the intrinsic 
nature of the generality of general principles, they are ‘inefficient for identifying 
individual instances of deviant behaviour’; therefore, it might be considered that 
‘their function is not specifically constraint-oriented’, which is a character rule of jus 
cogens.23 Onuf’s point is very important since apart from its character that might not 
be able to create rules of obligations, perceiving general principles of law as a source 
of jus cogens rules is likely to grant too much leeway to the discretion of law-
applying or law-ascertaining officers, thus running the risk of the abuse of jus cogens 
rules. 
 
One important observation regarding this requirement is that the fact that certain 
rules exist as part of general international law does not result in the non-derogability 
or universality of jus cogens since. No matter whether they derive from either 
international customs, treaties or even general principles of law, they exist in the 
form of state-will-based rules. As a result, state wills serve as a source of their 
validity, which means the binding effect on any state relies on the consent of a state. 
Accordingly, a state is still able to contract out from rules of general international 
law that have yet to qualify as jus cogens.  It follows that the requirement that the 
rules that will be developed into jus cogens need to be part of general international 
law is just a prerequisite requirement; the differentiation of jus cogens from ordinary 
general international law will start with the second condition – the acceptance by the 
international community of their peremptory characters; and when this is fulfilled, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Paulus (n 10) 302. 
22 Richard K Birney and N.G. Onuf, ‘Peremptory Norms of International Law: Their Source, 
Function and Future’ (1974) 4 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 187, 191. 
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the non-derogable and universal character of jus cogens will be ascribed to the norms 
in question. 
 
2.1.2. Second Condition: Accepted by the International Community as a Whole as a 
Norm from which no Derogation is Permitted 
 
With regard to the second requirement for the rule of recognition of jus cogens, rules 
that will develop into jus cogens must be recognized and accepted as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted, i.e. as law with a peremptory character by the 
international community as a whole. Two elements are entailed in this condition of 
the rule of recognition for jus cogens: first, acceptance by the international 
community of states as a whole; and secondly, the non-derogable character of rules 
that will be identified as jus cogens. 
 
Pertaining to acceptance by the international community of states as a whole, the 
addition of the phrase ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole’ was among the latest modifications to Article 53 of the VCLT that 
was made during UNCLOT24 before the current version.25 Despite its lack of clarity, 
some delegates were of the opinion that the inclusion of this phrase does, to some 
extent, improve the content of this article in terms of dealing with the legal 
uncertainty created by the ambiguity over how jus cogens rules emerge and are 
identified and ascertained.26  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 UNCLOT (First Session), 52nd–57th and 80th meetings of the Committee of the Whole and 
the United Nations Conference on the Law of treaties, Second Sessions (hereinafter 
‘UNCLOT (Second Session)’), (UN Doc. A/CONF.39/ll/Add.l), 19th and 20th Plenary 
Meetings.  
25 The original text of Article 50 (Article 53 currently) ILC Draft submitted to UNCLOT 
reads as follows: ‘A treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by 
a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.’ 
26 E.g. Mr. Groepper, Federal Republic of Germany, commented that: ‘[the] definition 
contained in article 50 [was] satisfactory and complete. In order to become jus cogens a 
norm had to fulfill two conditions: it had not only to be accepted, it had also to be recognized 
as such by the international community as a whole — not, be it noted, by a more or less 
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The reference to the international community as a whole reflects that the underlying 
rationale of the rule of non-derogability of jus cogens is rooted in the embracing of 
the superior interests of the international community over the interests of individual 
members or groups of members of the international community. Verdross and 
Danilenko share the same position, i.e. the key threshold to identify jus cogens rules 
is the premise that such rules serve the interests of the international community as a 
whole, which is superior to the needs of individual states. Their role in the protection 
of the fundamental interests of the international community renders such norms 
peremptory and absolute in character. 27 In contrast, as other rules only serve the 
interests of individual states, these rules have a relative character, which means they 
are negotiable and derogable based on state will.28 As rules with the status of jus 
cogens protect the fundamental interests of the international community, such rules 
are so compelling that they are accepted by the international community as a legal 
mechanism to invalidate ordinary rules deriving from treaties or customary 
international law that conflict with them. 29  In other words, states accept the 
limitations of their international law-making power, demarcated by the content of jus 
cogens rules. As Paulus explains, the concept of jus cogens signifies that ‘the 
‘system’ of sovereign States is not an aim in itself, but a means for the safeguard of 
human values and interests’.30 Accordingly, the status of jus cogens as higher rules 
exists to relativize state sovereignty; however, such relativization is grounded in 
acceptance of the existence of fundamental shared values of the international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
essential nature of the norm appeared from the expression "from which no derogation is 
permitted"’. See similar opinions of the delegates from Columbia and the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic; however, see also the different opinions of the French and UK delegates, 
UNCLOT (Second Session), 19th Plenary Meeting. 
27 Afled Verdross, ‘Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law’ (1966) 60 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 55, 58; Gennady M Danilenko, 
‘International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making’ (1991) 2 EJIL 42, 45 See also the 
statement by the representative of Zambia, UNCLOT (First Session),  p 322. 
28 Verdross (n 27) 58; Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law 
(OUP 2006) 70–71. 
29 Gordon A Christenson, ‘Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International 
Society’, Virginia Journal of International Law 28 (1988 1987): 586. 
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community. Such fundamental shared values will be defined via the collective 
decision-making of the international community, by which the limits on the 
exercising of law-making power by individual states and their liberty to opt out of 
the most fundamental values of the international community are defined.31 Thus, as 
Orakhelashvili puts it, ‘the very rationale of peremptory norms in international law is 
that the interests of the international community as a whole shall prevail over the 
conflicting interests of individual States and groups of States’.32 Accordingly, it 
should be the conscience or the will of the international community that indicates 
which international rules are jus cogens. 
 
Based on the text of Article 53, it is the international community, whose interests are 
superior to those of its members, that creates and identifies peremptory rules. A 
significant legal implication hinges on how the condition of acceptance by the 
international community as a whole is construed. If acceptance by the international 
community of states as a whole is simply equivalent to the consent of all the states in 
the international community, this represents the traditional idea of state consent/ 
wills as a source of validity for international law. However, if this condition is 
perceived in a fashion that the unanimous acceptance of all states is not required, 
rather that some sort of majority is adequate, then this will signify not only a new 
source of validity for international rules, other than state consent, but also the power 
of law-making by the international community as a distinct entity from that of states. 
 
Addressing this point, M. K. Yasseen, the former Chairman of the Drafting 
Committee of the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, rejects the requirement 
for unanimity, articulating that:  
 
[T]here is no question of requiring a rule to be accepted and recognized as 
peremptory by all States. It would be enough if a very large majority did so; 
that would mean that, if one state in isolation refused to accept the peremptory 
character of a rule, or if that state was supported by a very small number of 
states, the acceptance and recognition of the peremptory character of the rule 
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by the international community as a whole would not be affected.33  
 
This approach is also embraced by the ILC, in the context of state responsibility; it 
defines the term ‘as a whole’ in Article 19 of the 1976 version of the Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility as meaning:  
 
This certainly does not mean the requirement of unanimous recognition by all 
the members of the community, which would give each state an inconceivable 
right of veto. What it is intended to ensure is that a given international 
wrongful act shall be recognized as an “international crime”, not only by some 
particular group of states, even if it constitutes a majority, but by all the 
essential components of the international community.34  
 
The condition regarding the essential components of the international community has 
the consequence that in a case where a small minority can be perceived as 
representing an essential component of the international community, a very large 
majority of the international community cannot force its will on a very small 
dissenting minority based on the universal bindingness of jus cogens rules.35 
 
It should be noted here that the special attention that is paid to the views of a 
significant minority is also found in the creation of customary international law in 
which the uniformity of state practice must include the practices of states whose 
interests are particularly affected.36 However, in the case of customary international 
law, the practice of a particularly affected minority pertains to the process of the 
creation of a general rule which is the first condition of the rule of recognition of jus 
cogens, whilst the acceptance by a particularly affected minority that certain general 
rules have a derogable character is relevant to the second condition of the rule of 
cognition of jus cogens. This, however, shows that a minority that will be strongly 
affected by peremptory norms will have ample opportunity to protect their interests 
from abuse by the majority in the process of the creation of jus cogens rules, even in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 UNCLOT (First Session), 80th Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, 472. 
34 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-eighth/28th session 
3 May–23 July 1976, UN Doc. A/31/10, 119. 
35 Hossain (n 8) 81. 
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the case that the majority approach is taken. 
 
However, during UNCLOT, the majority approach was heavily rejected by the 
French delegate who argued that ‘if article 50 [currently Article 53] was interpreted to 
mean that a majority could bring into existence peremptory norms that would be 
valid erga omnes, then the result would be to create an international source of law 
subject to no control and lacking all responsibility’.37 Contrariwise, certain delegates 
were of the belief that the procedures for claiming the invalidity of treaties, including 
those generated by jus cogens and dispute settlement embraced in Articles 62 and 62 
bis of the draft article (currently Articles 65 and 66 of the VCLT),38 function as an 
essential preventive mechanism against abusive claims for invalidity in light of the 
non-derogability of jus cogens.39  However, the position that unanimity is not 
required to create jus cogens is defended here. Otherwise, this would grant every 
single state a right to veto the creation of jus cogens, thus pragmatically probably 
ruling out the possibility of the emergence of jus cogens in the international 
community. The modification to the notion of an international community by ‘of 
states’ contributes to another issue, whether membership of the international 
community is exclusive to states or not. However, this issue will be addressed in 
detail in the section regarding the notion of fundamental shared values of the 
international community as a source of validity of jus cogens. 
 
The second element of this condition of the rule of recognition of jus cogens that 
needs to be explored here is its non-derogable character. Based on Article 53 of the 
VCLT, it lies within the discretion of the international community as a whole to 
decide whether certain norms are norms from which no derogation is permitted. 
However, what remains unanswered is what constitutes the non-derogable character 
of rules or what makes the international community perceive certain rules to be non-
derogable. To explore this non-derogable character further, a proposition made by 
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38 See Articles 65 and 66 of the VCLT. 
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academics who, according to Article 38 of the ICJ statute, serve as law-ascertaining 
officials in the international legal system, as their opinions can be referred to as a 
subsidiary means for the determination of international law, may help to clarify the 
element of non-derogability required by the secondary rule of recognition of jus 
cogens.  
 
Simma argues that the peremptory character of jus cogens derives from ‘the 
substantive importance of the interests protected by the rules’.40  According to 
Orakhelashvili, there are two questions to be asked: first, ‘whether or not a norm is 
intended to benefit a given actor in the interest of the community’; secondly, 
‘whether a valid derogation would be possible from a given norm’, i.e. ‘whether it 
could be split into bilateral legal relations’.41 For instance, in the case of a rule 
regarding the territorial sea, a state may adopt a limit of twelve nautical miles with 
one state, six nautical miles with a second state and three nautical miles with a third 
state. Therefore, the rule regarding the territorial sea is jus dispositivum rather than 
jus cogens. The derogable nature of the rule of territorial sea is reflected in the 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, which indicates that the regime of territorial sea is 
negotiable and can be regulated differently depending on the specific state involved 
and relevant situation and contexts.42 Likewise, international rules regarding the 
trade and expropriation of property are jus dispositivum, as all states’ relationships in 
this area are negotiable and can be split into bilateral legal relationships. In a case 
where relevant states agree not to apply certain specific rules to their relationship, 
that would involve only the interests of states entering into such an agreement, not 
the interests of the community.43    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Bruno Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ (1994) 
250 Recueil des Cours 217, 288; See the similar opinion of the Cuban delegate; ‘the essential 
difference between jus cogens rules and other rules of international law lay not in their 
source but in their content, UNCLOT (First Session), Summary records of plenary meetings 
and meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 302 and see also the Mexican Delegate‘s 
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41 Alexander Orakhelashvili (n 28) 47. 
42 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, U.K. v. Norway, Order, 1951 I.C.J. reports 1951, 142-143 
and see Ibid 70–71. 
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Based on this thinking, what constitutes the non-derogable character of rules that will 
be recognized as jus cogens rules is the belief of the international community in the 
importance of the interests that the rules protect. In other words, if the international 
community believes that the interests protected by such rules are very important to 
the international community, then they cannot be compromised by the interests of 
certain individual members of the group, thus rendering derogation from the rules 
protecting such interests invalid.  
 
After discussing the two elements of the second condition of the rule of recognition 
of jus cogens, ‘acceptance by the international community’ and the ‘non-derogable 
character’, it can be construed that the second condition is fulfilled when the majority 
of members of the international community, composed of all its essential 
components, accept that the rules in question protect interests which are so important 
that derogation from such rules cannot be permitted. 
 
Based on such a proposition, it does not require unanimous acceptance or recognition 
by the international community that certain rules are law with a peremptory character 
to elevate such rules to be jus cogens. This has two important legal implications. 
First, the majority, composed of essential components of the international 
community, can impose the binding effects of certain rules they accept as 
peremptory norms on those that do not give their consent to be bound by such rules, 
and this creates the universal character of jus cogens. Secondly, such a majority also 
constitutes the non-derogable character of jus cogens. The non-derogability of jus 
cogens constituted by the large majority will apply to those that do not give their 
consent to be bound by jus cogens rules and to those that give consent to be bound 
by such rules but do not accept them being peremptory norms.44 It is proposed by 
Alexidze that the minority are legally bound by jus cogens rules to which they 
dissent because jus cogens rules are generated by the common will of the 
international community as a whole, which bestows on them their absolute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Neuhold, ‘V61kerrechtlicher Vertrag und “Drittstaaten”’, 28 Berichte der Deutschen 









It is argued here that the binding effect of the content of jus cogens and their non-
derogability for dissenting states can be perceived as being based on the nature of the 
concept of jus cogens as peremptory norms which must necessarily apply to all states 
without exception. Therefore, in the case of customary international law, states 
which persistently object to the creation of certain customs will be held not to be 
bound by such customs. However, once such customs earn the status of jus cogens, 
those states cannot rely on the rule of a persistent objector to deny the binding nature 
of jus cogens rule. On this point, Rozakis explains: ‘a state can no longer be 
dissociated from the binding peremptory character of that rule even if it proves that 
no evidence exists of its acceptance and recognition of the specific function of that 
rule, or moreover, that it has expressly denied it’.46 One example to support this 
opinion is the situation where the claim of South Africa, based on its former racist 
policies, that it was a persistent objector to the prohibition of racial discrimination 
was widely rejected by the international community on the ground that, differing 
from ordinary customary international law, the persistent objector rule is not 
accommodated in the context of jus cogens. 47 
 
Given the rationale of jus cogens and the potentially paralyzing effects of a 
unanimity approach, a majority approach serves as a more realistic and logical 
alternative to interpret the rule of recognition of jus cogens in Article 53. However, 
the universality and non-derogable application of jus cogens rules imposed by a large 
majority of the international community on dissenting states leads to a more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 L.A. Alexidze, Some Theoretical Problems of International Law. Peremptory Norms Jus 
Cogens (1982) 178. (In Russian with English summary) and Alexidze, ‘Legal Nature of Jus 
Cogens in Contemporary International Law’, 172 Recueil des cours (1981 III) 219, 246– 
247, 258 as cited in ibid 50–51. 
46  Ch.L. Rozakis, The Concept of Jus Cogens in the Law of Treaties (North-Holland 
Publishing Company 1976) 78 as cited in Ibid  50. 
47 Jure Vidmar, ‘Norms Conflict and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a Vertical 
International Legal System’ in Erika De Wet and Jure Vidmar, Hierarchy in International 
Law: Human Right (OUP 2012) 26; Byers (n 4) 222; See also UNGA Res 33/183 (24 
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fundamental theoretical issue of the international legal system, which is dominated 
by positivist state-consent-based theory. Therefore, the next part will explore what 
the source of validity of jus cogens, if not state consent, is that constitutes the 
binding force of the norm formulated by the majority and imposed on the rest of the 
international community. 
 
2.2. Fundamental Shared Values of the International Community as a Source of 
Validity of Jus Cogens 
 
In the preceding section, the non-consensual character of the content of the rule of 
recognition for jus cogens was shown. Thus, a very important question to be 
answered concerns the source of validity of jus cogens that imposes non-derogability 
and universality on the entire international community. The notion of fundamental 
shared values as a source of validity of jus cogens will be proposed here. There are 
four sub-parts to this task. First, the inability of state wills as a source of validity of 
international law to accommodate the non-derogable and universal character of jus 
cogens will be addressed. After that, the shortcomings of the notion of natural law as 
a non-consensual source of validity will be discussed. Then, the concept of 
fundamental shared values of the international community and how it fits to serve as 
a source of validity of jus cogens rules will be addressed. Finally, the link between 
jus cogens rules and fundamental shared values of the international community will 
be established. 
 
2.2.1. State Wills as a Source of Validity of Jus Cogens  
 
Before the discussing the proposition put forward here that fundamental shared 
values of the international community serve as a source of validity of jus cogens, let 
us explore, in more detail, why state consent or state wills cannot be perceived as a 
source of validity of jus cogens. First of all, based on the majority approach to 
interpretation of the condition of acceptance by the international community as a 
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cogens is not persuasive for it cannot give a sound explanation on why a large 
majority of states of the international community can impose legal obligations on a 
dissenting minority.48 Further, Article 53 of the VCLT requires that, first, rules that 
will become jus cogens must exist as part of general international law, deriving either 
from customary international law or treaties, both of which, as state-will-based 
sources of international rules cannot accommodate the non-derogabilty and 
universality of jus cogens. With respect to treaties, in a scenario where treaties are 
signed by almost every state in the international community, by virtue of the pacta 
tertiis rule, such treaties are not binding on non-signatory states. Even in the case 
where all states have entered into certain treaties, some state parties states can always 
derogate from the obligations arising from such treaties by entering into a new 
agreement. 49 Turning to customary international law, the salient defect of construing 
customary international law as a source of jus cogens is attributable to the principle 
of the persistent objector, as this principle allows a state to opt out of being bound by 
customary international law. 50  Further, customary international law can be 
overridden by other customary international law or by treaties emerging later 
chronologically or, more specifically, in the light of lex specialis or lex posterior 
rules.51 Thus, customary international law cannot account for the universality and 
non-derogability of jus cogens.  
 
Accordingly, state will cannot properly serve as a source of validity of jus cogens 
rules which are universal and non-derogable in their character. On this issue, Mosler 
suggests: ‘fundamental rules whose observance is essential for the continuation of 
society, cannot be derived from the will of States …  but their “source”, their 
inherent force, must derive from elsewhere’.52  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Evan J. Criddle and Even Fox-Decent, ‘A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens’ (2009) 34 
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2.2.2. Natural Law as a Source of Validity of Jus Cogens  
 
Apart from state consent, there have been attempts to explain jus cogens as a 
remnant of natural-law theory. For example, during UNCLOT, the Italian delegate, 
Maresca, claimed that rules protecting the human person, ensuring the maintenance 
of peace and the existence and equality of States have the absolute character of jus 
cogens, explaining that ‘it was an example of jus naturalis, that was to say, the law 
which had its first source in mankind's awareness of the law’.53 Likewise, Janis 
argues: ‘Jus cogens therefore functions like a natural law that is so fundamental that 
states, at least for the time being, cannot avoid its force’.54 Contrariwise, in his 
proposal for the inclusion of the topic of jus cogens in the long-term programme of 
the work of the ILC, although noting, originally, the non-consensual source of the 
validity of jus cogens was perceived as deriving from natural law,55 Tladi argues that 
the jus cogens concept has been conceptualized and codified in a written positive 
law, basing the emergence of jus cogens rules on the acceptance of states as 
members of the international community. This, for him, reflects the deviation of jus 
cogens from its original theoretical basis of natural law.56 
 
In this discussion, it will be argued here that resorting to natural law to explain the 
non-consensual source of validity of jus cogens has certain shortcomings. First of all, 
it is noted by the ILC that, ‘it would clearly be wrong to regard even rules of jus 
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cogens as immutable and incapable of modification in the light of future 
developments’.57 The possibility of modifications to existing jus cogens rules and the 
emergence of new jus cogens are reflected in Articles 53 and 64 of the VCLT. The 
alterable nature of jus cogens clearly contrasts with the concept of natural law as 
universal unchanging law.58 As Ford argues, although, at any specific moment, 
theoretically, jus cogens rules serve as the supreme law of international law, their 
substance alters from time to time corresponding to the shaping of the ‘conscience of 
the international community’. Thus, the proposition to base jus cogens on the natural 
concept must be reconsidered.59 Secondly, according to Article 6460 of the VCLT, 
jus cogens rules do not have a retroactive effect,61 and therefore one may perceive 
that jus cogens are not rooted in natural law theory since, supposedly, the natural-law 
imperative shall apply timelessly, notwithstanding the point of time they are 
recognized.62 
 
As discussed above, natural-law theory cannot fully accommodate the legal character 
and effect of jus cogens rules; and therefore, logically, it is difficult to uphold that 
either state consent or natural law can be perceived as a source of validity of jus 
cogens. Alternatively, the notion of fundamental shared values as the source of 
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validity of jus cogens offers a more convincing approach. Based on this approach, 
the peremptory character of jus cogens is rooted in the fact that they protect the 
fundamental interests of the international community, which is the same thing that 
fundamental shared values are believed to foster. To elaborate more, the fact that the 
international community perceives the interests protected by certain values to be so 
crucial that the norms aim to promote and preserve such values should be deemed 
non-derogable generates the binding force of jus cogens rules on the dissenting 
minority. 
 
2.2.3. The Concept of Fundamental Shared Values of the International Community 
 
The aim of this section is to explain the concept of fundamental shared values of the 
international community and to put forward that they are the source of validity of jus 
cogen rules. As discussed, based on the rule of recognition regarding jus cogens 
rules, the basis for the higher and universal status of jus cogens rules is the 
perception of large majority of the members of the international community that 
certain rules protect something so important that such rules cannot be derogated from 
by any member. The notion of fundamental shared values of the international 
community, which pertains to the belief of members of the international community 
as to what is fundamental to the existence of international community, properly fits 
into such content of a rule of recognition for jus cogens.  
 
The notion of fundamental shared values of the international community contains 
two closely related concepts, ‘fundamental shared values’ and ‘international 
community’. To understand how fundamental shared values can serve as a source of 
validity of higher rules in the international sphere, the two concepts must be 
disentangled. Added to this, it is worth noting here that the concept of an 
international community does in itself reflect the social dimension of international 
constitutionalism. Therefore, an understanding of the interactions between the 
international community and its fundamental shared values, which can serve as a 
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interaction between the social dimension and the normative dimension of the 
international community. 
 
Regarding the concept of ‘values’ Rescher observes: ‘in the English language the 
word [value] is used in a somewhat loose and fluctuating way’.63 The term ‘values’ 
carries different meanings depending on how the term is employed in a specific 
context and discourse.64 Generally, the uses of this term can be divided into in an 
economic or monetary sense and a more normative sense. 65 Indeed the use of the 
term ‘values’ in this context pertains to the latter one.66 In the Oxford Advanced 
Learner’s Dictionary, the term ‘values’ is given many different meanings; however, 
two of the definitions provided, which are relevant to the normativity and the idea of 
a source of validity of norms, are as follows. First, values are defined as the ‘quality 
of being useful or important’; and secondly, they are defined as ‘beliefs about what is 
right and wrong and what is important in life’.67 Accordingly, values are closely 
associated with objective assessment regarding the quality of things or their ideality, 
whether they are useful, important, immoral or right, or not. This leads to criticism of 
the notion of values as a source of validity regarding their unchangeability, for values 
are rooted in the existence of objective truth.68  
 
With respect to a decision-making process, Rescher explains that ‘man’s values are 
both clues to guide another’s explanation of his actions and guide to his own 
deliberation in the endeavour to arrive at decisions’69.  According to him, ‘the 
fundamental role of a person’s values is not surprisingly, to underwrite the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Nicholas Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory (Prentice Hall 1969) 1. 
64 Otto Spijkers, The United Nations, the Evolution of Global Values and International Law 
(Intersentia 2011) 13 at footnote 2; See also Nicholas Rescher, ‘An Introduction To Value 
Theory’ (Prentice Hall 1969). 
65 Spijkers (n 64) 13–14. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Albert Sydney Hornby, ‘Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English’ 
1707–1708 (8th edn, OUP 2010) 
68 See e.g. Jean d’ Aspremont, ‘Reinforcing the (Neo-) Hobbesian Representations of 
International Law’ (2007) SSRN paper 10; Jan Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’ (2004) 1 
International Organizations Law Review 31, 51–52. 
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evaluation of his action —to support “practical reasoning”, that is, his purposeful 
thinking about action in their broadest ramifications.’ 70 and ‘if something is proper 
value, the consideration which establish this fact will have to be equally compelling 
for all’. 71Accordingly, the values shared by people involved which is shaped 
through the deliberative participation of each based on human’s rationalization can 
as serve as a guide of collective decision-making including the articulation of legal 
rules. At the global level, Spijkes argues that, in a normative dimension, generally, 
values serve as ‘the core of global morality’ based on ‘a shared vision of an ideal 
world’.72 Further, developed from the definition of values by Rokeach – the inventor 
the ‘Rokeach Value Survey’ – as ‘an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct 
or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or 
converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence’,73 Spijkes proposes his own 
definition of global value, in a normative sense: ‘A global value is an enduring, 
globally shared belief that a specific state of the world, which is possible, is socially 
preferable, from the perspective of all human beings, to the opposite state of the 
world.’74 
 
The term ‘fundamental’ is used here to modify the term ‘values’ to signify that 
values that can generate the validity for universal and higher rules must be so 
important that their deterioration endangers the survival of the international 
community. Also, they must be fundamental to the international community of 
mankind as a whole, not just any individual domestic society or groups of them 
holding particular social/ political/ cultural belief(s).75 That is to say, they must be 
values whose fundamental nature is based on the ‘overlapping consensus’ of 
members of the international community from different domestic societies as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Ibid 12. 
71 Ibid 11. 
72 Spijkers (n 64) 14. 
73 Milton Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values (Free Place 1973) 5. 
74 Spijkers (n 64) 20. 
75 According to Oxford Advanced Leaner’s Dictionary gives the meaning to the word 
‘fundamental’ means as 'serious and very important; affecting the most central and important 
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religious, political, cultural and belief systems. 76  The idea of fundamentality 
corresponds to the requirement of the rule of recognition for jus cogens that certain 
rules that will have the status of jus cogens must be perceived by the large majority 
of the international community as non-derogable in their character. The 
fundamentality criterion requires a list of the universal and higher rules that can be 
enforced against the will of states and that affect the social and cultural ways of life 
of their peoples as little as possible to minimize their negative effect on the diversity 
of the world which reflects the level of freedom of people. This can serve as a 
mechanism to protect the value approach from being abused as a tool to satisfy the 
disguised hegemonic or imperialist desires of the superpowers, which is a vital 
criticism of the hierarchization of international law, either a value-based one or in 
general.77 
 
With respect to the international community, it has frequently been referred to as ‘the 
repository of interests that transcend those of individual states ut singuli’.78 For 
instance, when discussing the legal development of the personification of the 
international community, Weil explains that it is the acceptance and recognition by 
the international community that certain international rules are essential for the 
protection of the fundamental interests of the international community that 
transforms ordinary international rules into higher peremptory rules. This, to some 
extent, signifies that the international community can possess its own fundamental 
interests.79 According to Tasioulas, the communitarian approach ‘denies the priority 
of the state over international  society’.80  Simma and Paulus explain that ‘the 
element which distinguishes a 'community' from its components is a 'higher unity, as 
it were, the representation and prioritization of common interests as against the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See Rawls’ idea of overlapping consensus in John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia 
University Press 2005) 134–172; see also Paulus (n 10) 329. 
77 See e.g. Weil (n 14) 441; Danilenko (n 27) 45–46. 
78 Bruno Simma and Andreas Paulus, ‘The ‘International Community’: Facing the Challenge 
of Globalization’ (1998) 9 EJIL 266, 268. 
79 Weil (n 14) 426. 
80 John Tasioulas, ‘In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the 
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egoistic interests of individuals.’81 Accordingly, the first key question to explore may 
be what grants a community higher unity according to such a notion. The answer 
may lie in the differentiation of communities from societies. 
 
Simma and Paulus suggest that whilst societies only assume the ‘factual 
interdependence’ of their members, a community must possess ‘certain interests 
common to all its members and a certain set of common values, principles and 
procedures’.82 For Abi-Saab, a prerequisite for the existence of a society is that:  
 
…it must first attain a certain degree or threshold of intensity and stability (or 
normality) in relations among its members, enabling them to be identified and 
distinguished from other subjects found in the same sphere. In other words, it 
must be possible to trace the boundary between the group and its environment. 
Only if this society is welded together by a sense of community, even to very 
different degrees, over a broad range of matters (that is to say of interests and 
values), can it be aggregately designated a 'community'. 83  
 
Likewise, Fassbender argues that what unites a community is ‘a set of shared 
values’, and what reflects its higher level of unity is the personification of the 
international community, resulting in the international community’s ‘distinct legal 
personality’.84 For Mosler, a psychological condition as ‘a general conviction that all 
these units [independent societies] are partners, mutually bound by reciprocal, 
generally applicable, rules granting rights, imposing obligations and distributing 
competences’ is one of the essential elements of a community.85 Thus, based on such 
opinions, what essentially distinguishes societies from communities is the higher 
level of the unity of the members within the society and what results from such unity 
is the existence of common values, interests and rules commonly held by the 
members.  
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82 Ibid. 
83 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘Whither the International Community?’ (1998) 9 EJIL 248, 249. 
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Community (MNP 2009) 71. 
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After dealing with the general concept of the international community, the question 
regarding membership of the international community is equally important in terms 
of generating an understanding of fundamental shared values as a source of higher 
rules and criteria to solve normative conflicts. The term ‘the international community 
of states’ in Article 53 generates another interpretive issue, i.e. whether it is only the 
beliefs of states that count towards the identification of fundamental values or if the 
beliefs of individuals also count, i.e. is membership of the international community 
exclusive to states? 
 
Although one might argue that, given the explicit phrase ‘of States’ in Article 53 of 
the VCLT, it is only states whose views should be considered when determining jus 
cogens rules, it is proposed here that what is articulated in Article 53 is a codification 
of the unwritten secondary rule,86 to which modification is possible, provided, based 
on Hart’s theory of secondary rules, that it is accepted by officials of the 
international legal system. One of the major developments of contemporary 
international law is the expansion of the international community to cover not only 
states but also non-state entities, as discussed earlier in Chapter III. The inclusion of 
other subjects of international law into the international community should mean 
that, in the context of jus cogens, apart from those of states, the views of other 
subjects of international law should count when considering what are the rules that 
the international community as a whole accepts as non-derogable rules.  For 
example, De Wet opines that although, at present, the international community is still 
highly dominated by states due to their chief role in the international law-making 
mechanism, their prominence should not be taken as being equivalent to exclusivity 
as the international community includes subjects apart from states, notably 
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international and regional organizations. 87  Further, individuals have also been 
accepted as members of the international community as they possess an international 
legal personality,88 for they are regarded as subjects of international law, both as 
right-holders in the light of international human rights and humanitarian law as well 
as duty-bearers in the regime of international criminal law.89  
 
Appertaining to the membership of individuals of the international community, 
Bryde put forward the idea that humanity has already become a new source of 
validity of international rules, arguing: ‘The central role of human rights in this legal 
system, as well as the recognition of an ever expanding concept of the “Heritage of 
Mankind” point to the nature of international law’s new source of legitimacy: not the 
ensemble of states but mankind. International law has to derive from the people.’90  
 
Trindade proposes that jus cogens rules that stand above the will of states and other 
subjects of international law derive from ‘human conscience’, for they can fill the 
gaps in ‘State voluntarism and unilateralism’ in the international legal system. 
According to him, jus cogens rules reflect the idea of an ‘objective justice’, 
fundamentally rooted in the municipal or international legal system, which entails 
fundamental values by which the aspirations of humankind as a whole can be 
achieved.91 
 
Given the reality which repeats in the history of mankind, the decisions of states do 
not always conform with the interests of their peoples. Thus, jus cogens rules may 
perform their duty more aptly if their content is not limited to the perceptions of 
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88 See e.g. Crawford (n 16) 121. 
89 R.A. Mullerson, Ordering Anarchy: International Law in International Society (MNP 
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states, especially in scenarios where there is no established legitimacy between the 
representative of states in the international forum and the people in such states. 
Equally importantly, stateless people would have no representative in the 
international forum and that would devalue the quality of international law as a 
constitutionalized legal system. Indeed, taking into consideration the opinions of 
other members of the international community would result in a stronger link 
between humanity as a constituent holder and jus cogens rules as constitutional 
primary rules of the international legal system.  
 
Supporting evidence for expansion of the scope of membership of the international 
community can be found in the Articles on State Responsibility of 2001, In the Draft 
Articles, linkage of the international community to states is deliberately omitted by 
the ILC, notwithstanding the fact that such a linkage to states in the definition of 
peremptory norms in Article 53 of the VCLT has been raised by certain states. Such 
a proposal, as in the phrase ‘international community of states as a whole’, was 
refused by the ILC, explaining that  
 
As a matter of terminology, it is sufficient to use the phrase “international 
community as a whole” rather than “international community of States as a 
whole”, which is used in the specific context of article 53 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention. The insertion of the words “of States” in article 53 of the 
Convention was intended to stress the paramountcy that States have over the 
making of international law, including especially the establishment of norms of 
a peremptory character.92  
 
Weiss comments that this decision, as taken, reflects the deliberate intention of the 
ILC to opt for a broader articulation of the term, as employed in the Barcelona 
Traction case and subsequent international agreements. He opines that this rejection 
of including the phrase ‘of States’ supports the view that the international community 
is now composed of both state and non-state actors. 93  The use of the term 
‘international community’ without the qualifying clause ‘of states’ also occurs in 
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other recent legal instruments, such as in the Preamble to Article 5 of The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998 and in the Preamble to the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 
1999.94 In its Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN, the 
GA refers to ‘non-governmental organizations, multilateral financial institutions, 
regional organizations and all actors of civil society’ as concerned actors of the 
international community.95 Therefore, as Fassbender proposes, ‘in contrast to the old 
society of states, the new international community includes all subjects of 
international law, and ultimately all human beings’.96  
 
Obviously, however, this proposition leads to another problem of how the views of 
all members of the international community can be obtained. On this point, arguably, 
states, especially those in the democratic system, shall be presumed to represent the 
beliefs of their people. Added to this, in fact, the idea of resorting to the conscience 
of the community to determine overriding rules also occurs in the context of notions 
of public morality and public policy in domestic legal systems. Patently municipal 
systems encounter the same problem of how to identify the content of public 
morality or public policy. Nevertheless, the notion of public policy or public morality 
does seemingly perform its duty properly in a municipal legal system. This position 
was shared by the delegate from the Philippines to UNCLOT, who argued that 
although the rules of jus cogens are not clearly elaborated, in domestic law, terms 
such as ‘good customs’, ‘morals’ and ‘public policy’ are not given a precise scope 
and meaning either. However, the application of those terms in specific situations has 
never led to insurmountable difficulties.97 Similarly, the Cypriot delegate held that 
the difficulty residing in the application is not unmanageable, given the fact that ‘the 
concept of public policy was not clearly defined and had been described as an 
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‘unruly horse’ but ways and means had been found to tame it.’98 By analogy with the 
application of the public-order concept in the domestic legal system it is, 
consequently, suggested that the only method for extracting the content of jus cogens 
is via judicial determination, and therefore it is left to the courts to identify the jus 
cogens rules dwelling within the international legal system by transforming 
fundamental social values into legal imperatives.99 Therefore, pragmatically, it is to 
be accepted that it is courts that implicitly determine the perceptions of the 
international community via the means available to them. In the domestic context, 
Friedman proposes that, in identifying the fundamental rules of the community, 
judges should consider ‘the general state of contemporary legislative policy’ to be 
the first place to seek information to identify such rules; however, he also argues also 
that judges should search beyond the legal dimension and delve into the social 
aspects of society, such as ‘the state of the organization’, ‘the groupings and pulls of 
major social forces’, ‘society’s pluralistic aspects’ and ‘the state of modern 
science’.100 Likewise, on the international plane, in searching for universal rules 
based on fundamental shared values of the international community, international 
tribunals shall consider the general state of international rules and other social 
aspects of the international community. International tribunals can search through the 
expression of either states or non-state members of the international community, 
whether individuals, international organizations or NGOs. Gathering the perceptions 
of both state and non-state entities on what the shared values of the international 
community are would enable international tribunals to identify more accurately the 
intentions of the international community. If courts are restrained to take into 
consideration only state wills, especially when disputes involve stateless persons 
whose interests are not genuinely represented by any state. This change in the use of 
the term ‘international community’ by officials of the international legal system 
without referring to the phrase ‘of states’ can be taken as an unwritten modification 
to the secondary rule regarding the international community, and this will empower 
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law-applying officials to seek individuals or other entities in the international 
community when determining the content of jus cogens rules. Further, at this point 
the broader meaning of official in the international legal system in which the law-
ascertaining role of international legal scholars has been recognized, comes in handy. 
The work of international legal scholars in their non-state capacity which is normally 
independent from states can help to identify the fundamental shared values of the 
international community which more genuinely reflects the view of international 
community of humankind. Moreover, the information regarding what constitutes 
fundamental shared values and the content of jus cogens rules generated by 
international legal scholars from different social and cultural backgrounds is 
assimilated and discussed and this will help to clarify the fundamental shared values 
of the international community in a broadly representative and less state-dominated 
fashion, which the courts can consult when decide the case regarding jus cogens. 101 
Currently the ILC has included the topic of jus cogens in its long-term programme of 
work.102 The work of ILC could help to clarify the substantive content of jus cogens 
rules based on the fundamental shared values of the international community, which 
is not articulated limitedly based on the states’ or state officials’ beliefs, and 
international courts are officially empowered to refer to the work of the ILC as a tool 
to ascertain the content of jus cogens based on the secondary rules of the 
international legal system as codified in Article 38 (1)(d), as discussed earlier. 
 
Bring together the idea of values and a communitarian approach at this stage. Based 
on the definition of values given before, it can be construed that when actors in the 
international society share a common belief or perception about what is useful or 
important to their life, or what is right or wrong, which would serve the common 
interest of everyone in society, such common values or common rules built on those 
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values will unite international society into a community. That is to say, fundamental 
shared values are an indicator of what are the fundamental interests of the 
international community via informal collective decision-making and the articulation 
of shared enduring beliefs regarding certain objective truth. Elaboration of the 
interplay between common interests, shared values and universal basic rules is 
helpful in creating an understanding of how shared values could serve as a source of 
validity of constitutional rules in the international legal system. The importance of 
fundamental shared values lies in the fact that the members of the community 
commonly believe that holding such values will protect the fundamental interests of 
the community, which is essential to the survival of a community and its members. 
With such importance, shared value-based rules will apply universally to all 
components of the community, with no exceptions. On the point of the universal 
application of basic norms, Tasioulas has observed that subjection to the basic norms 
is a compulsory matter, not depending on state will; moreover, as such, the basic 
rules entail ‘the fundamental aspects of the antecedent commitment to a world public 
order’ which countenances the notion of an international community. 103  This 
elaboration does not only help to create an understanding of how values can generate 
the supreme and universal character of rules, but also shows the interconnection of 
the social dimension of the constitutionalization of international society – the 
creation of an international community – and the normative dimension – the creation 
of international constitutional rules –. 
 
One might observe that, essentially and simply, the importance of shared values 
derives from the fact that they exist supposedly to protect common interests which 
are superior to individuals’ interests. Thus, the common-interest approach is also 
proposed as another way to explain the higher status of jus cogens, and one of the 
key arguments that supporters of common-interest theory employ to attack the value 
approach is based on its objective character. Denying the role of values as a 
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foundation of international law and resorting to common interest as an alternative,104 
d’Aspremont perceives global values as absolute and immutable, whilst he regards 
global interests as ‘fundamentally relative, context-dependent and ever-evolving’.105 
Based on the objectivity of truth that values rely on, he refuses the explanation of the 
binding force of international law based on global values, as he insists that the 
binding force of international law and the foundations of the international legal 
system are ‘not immutable and are subject to constant and contingent changes’.106  
 
However, the values that are proposed as a source of validity of international 
constitutional rules here are not immutable and absolute. Differing from the natural-
law notion, values are beliefs regarding objective truth, not as an objective truth 
themselves. Accordingly, although objective truth, if it exists, must be immutable 
and absolute, beliefs in it do not necessarily share the same character and such 
beliefs can change. However, because it is a belief based on an objective assessment 
of what is right or wrong, moral or immoral, important or not, such belief can 
generate the validity or legal force of law. This understanding of values is sustained 
by Spijkers, who defines a global value as an enduring belief regarding the socially 
preferable conditions of a world shared by all human beings.107 He explains that by 
referring to values as ‘enduring’ beliefs, this implies both the enduring quality of 
values and their evolving characteristics. He proposes that the list of global values is 
ever-changing, since it is not the case that a particular list of values has directed a 
course for the world since the beginning of time and will keep on doing so until the 
end of time, for some behaviours that are now generally deemed to be immoral were 
once very commonly morally acceptable in earlier days.108 The obvious examples 
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accessed 10 July 2015. 
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107 Spijkers (n 64) 20. 
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supporting this argument are human histories regarding slavery and colonialism.109 
The values perceived as good from the viewpoint of one generation are not 
necessarily good in the eyes of other generations, as values might simply be just an 
indication of the widespread adherence to certain influencing ideologies at a 
particular point in history.110Nevertheless, what has changed is not objective truth 
itself but rather the belief in it. The enduring character of values matches the 
character of the indelibility of constitutional rules; values as a source of validity of 
constitutional rules should not be prone to change as they establish the structure of 
society; however, they should not construct an eternal prison for future generations.         
 
If the value approach is dropped here and a common-interest approach is adopted 
instead, a resort to common interest alone might not suffice to explain the binding 
force of international constitutional rules to those who dissent from being bound by 
them. For example, the idea of a common interest might face difficulties in 
explaining why a dissenting minority, that has never consented to be bound by or 
disagrees with the non-derogable character of certain rules that earn the status of jus 
cogens on the ground that they are not in their interest which would be subjective in 
its nature, should respect such rules. However, as illustrated before, the belief that 
certain norms are fundamental to the survival of the international community 
generates a force of law from which members of the community cannot dissent, if it 
does not affect the fundamental interests of the dissenting minority. Although one 
might argue that the common-interest approach can explain the binding force of 
constitutional rules on a minority by simply arguing that the common interest is more 
important than the individual state’s or a group of states’ interests, this would also 
resort to an objective assessment of the importance of things as a driving force to 
make a minority abide by such rules, which is that the interest of the majority is more 
important than that of a minority. Added to this, in a scenario where international 
constitutional rules exist in the form of unwritten rules, like jus cogens, then, in some 
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situations, it is virtually impossible for an adjudicator to survey the opinions of all 
states to determine whether the norms in questions are in the common interest of 
every state or a majority of them. Hence, what courts actually do is to resort to values 
and where possible refer to the express wishes of states that are available to support 
the importance of such rules and to confirm that they serve the common interest. For 
example, in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case, the ICJ stated its 
opinion thus:  
 
[I]ts object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human 
groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles 
of morality. In such a convention the contracting States do not have any 
interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, 
namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison 
d'être of the convention.111 
 
 Likewise, in the South-West Africa Case, the Court expressed the view that: 
‘Humanitarian considerations may constitute the inspirational basis for rules of law, 
just as, for instance, the preambular parts of the United Nations Charter constitute the 
moral and political basis for the specific legal provisions thereafter set out.’112 
 
Accordingly, it will be argued here that the notion of values and the concept of 
common interest complement each other and explain the ground for the higher status 
of constitutional norms. Allot offers a very helpful illustration of the interactions 
among law, values and common interest. Allot regards values as an idea that can 
serve as a ground for choosing between possibilities; and accordingly, values help to 
‘enable consciousness to move from desire and obligation to will and action in 
conformity with the rest of consciousness’.113  Moreover, he explains the three 
functions of law, including international law, which show the interaction of law with 
values and common interest as follows: ‘(1) Law carries a structure and system of 
society through time. (2) Law inserts the common interest into the behaviour of 
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society-members. (3) Law establishes possible futures for society, in accordance with 
society’s theories values and purposes.’114 Further, for him, ‘Law requires that 
society have theories which explain and justify law within social consciousness (the 
public mind) and within individual consciousness … Such theories reflect and 
condition society’s values and purposes’.115 
 
Based on this caveat, values function as guidelines offering direction, whereby the 
law demands that the behaviours of its subjects conform, and it is these shared values 
that will shed light on what should be deemed to be the fundamental interest, which 
will be merged with the behaviours and consciousness of members of society. 
Accordingly, the notion of fundamental shared values of the international community 
can logically explain the higher and universal character of higher rules in the 
international legal system.  
 
2.2.4. Link between Jus Cogens and Fundamental Shared Values 
 
Fundamental shared values of the international community have been referred to in 
order to explain the limitations of state sovereignty without their consent, including 
jus cogens. To begin with, long ago, Verdoss proposed the existence of shared values 
and their importance to the international community arguing that ‘every positive 
juridical order has its roots in the ethics of a certain community, that it cannot be 
understood apart from its moral basis’.116 He explains: 
 
…the law of civilized states starts with the idea which demands the 
establishment of a juridical order guaranteeing the rational and moral 
coexistence of the members. It follows that all those norms of treaties which 
are incompatible with this goal of all positive law – a goal which is implicitly 
presupposed – must be regarded as void117  
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In light of the underlying reason for the existence of the international community, 
Retter proposes that it should be taken into consideration that states cannot simply 
exist as autonomous units as they are necessarily and inextricably dependent on each 
other. Accordingly, the international community is created by shared objectives 
requiring co-operation for the implementation of their common aims, which serves as 
a fundamental reason for the existence of the international community. 118 
 
Regarding the universal application and non-derogability of jus cogens, Hossain 
expounds that such a binding force derives from ‘the acceptance by the large 
majority of states’ of such a norm and this contributes to a universal legal duty on 
every member of the international community because jus cogens rules ‘are superior 
rules and bear the common values for the international community’.119 On this point, 
Conklin suggests argues that ‘without the peremptory norm, there would not be a 
(domestic or international) legal order of which the states are legal entities’120; thus, 
he emphasizes that the derogation of jus cogens is equivalent to the deterioration of 
the very survival of states.121 This train of thought explains the legitimacy of how a 
large majority of states in the international community might impose the binding 
nature of certain rules and their non-derogability on a minority. Jus cogens is a 
peremptory norm on condition that the majority of the international community 
believe that such rules serve its fundamental shared values and that such rules are 
fundamental to its survival, which equates to the survival of each and every state in 
it. Therefore, minority members of the international community are bound by the 
norms that the majority, composed of essential components of it and reflecting its 
conscience, deem to be fundamental to it, and such a minority cannot derogate from 
such rules that are so fundamental.  
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The link between jus cogens and fundamental values has been employed in judicial 
reasoning as a ground for the higher status of jus cogen rules at both international 
level and domestic levels. With respect to international jurisprudence, in Prosecutor 
v. Anto Furundžija, ICTY explains the higher status of jus cogens rules by referring 
to the importance of the values that such rules nurture: ‘[b]ecause of the importance 
of the values it [the prohibition of torture] protects, this principle has evolved into a 
peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the 
international hierarchy than treaty law and even “ordinary” customary rules.’122 At 
the domestic level, The U.S. 9th Circuit in the Siderman de Blake v. Argentina case, 
explicitly referring to fundamental values as a source of validity of jus cogens and 
arguing for the superiority of jus cogens rules over state-will based rules, ruled:  
 
In contrast, jus cogens "embraces customary laws considered binding on all 
nations”, and "is derived from values taken to be fundamental by the 
international community, rather than from the fortuitous or self-interested 
choices of nations,". Whereas customary international law derives solely from 
the consent of states, the fundamental and universal norms constituting jus 
cogens transcend such consent.123  
 
The proposition of fundamental shared values of the international community as a 
source of validity of jus cogens can avoid the shortcomings that arise in consent 
theory and natural theory. First, unlike consent theory, the shared-value model is 
more flexible in terms of state consent, as a large majority of states may be sufficient 
to satisfy the condition for the creation of jus cogens. Secondly, the shared-value 
model can accommodate modifications to jus cogens and its non-retroactive effect, 
which contradicts natural-law theory. 
 
Based on the notion of fundamental shared values as the source of the universal and 
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non-derogable character of jus cogens, when the condition of their acceptance as law 
with a peremptory character by the international community has been fulfilled, 
general international law with the character of jus dispositivum, the validity of which 
derives from state wills, will be transferred into universal international law with the 
character of jus cogens, the validity of which derives from the fundamental shared 
values of jus cogens. For instance, the belief in the essentiality of the peaceful 
coexistence of states to the survival of the international community generates the 
validity of the jus cogens status of the rule prohibiting the use of force and 
humanitarian rules. Likewise, the importance of the protection of fundamental 
human rights accounts for the validity of the jus cogens status of rules pertaining to 
the right to life, the right to self-determination, the prohibition of torture and the 
prohibition of genocide. 
 
Given the notion proposed here, that jus cogens rules earn their validity from the 
shared values of the international community, if the fundamental shared values that 
are a source of validity of jus cogens can be identified, this might shed some light on 
the substance of jus cogens, or at least their categories. Equally importantly, it will 
shed light on the contribution of jus cogens rules to the constitutionalization of 
international law. When speaking of universal international law grounded in the 
existence of the international community, Lauterpacht explains this as ‘the reason of 
the thing’ expressive of the necessity of securing the co-existence and peaceful 
intercourse of States and of safeguarding, as yet to an imperfect degree, the 
fundamental rights of the individual who is the ultimate subject of all law’.124 Based 
on this explanation, the peaceful co-existence of states and the protection of 
fundamental human rights are values that constitute international universal law, i.e. 
jus cogens. A number of scholars including, to name but a few, Retter, Criddle, Fox-
Decent, McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman, also share the legal opinion that peaceful 
coexistence and the protection of human rights are among such shared values or 
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objectives that demand coordination for their fulfilment.125 Thus, at the very least, 
the peaceful co-existence of states and the protection of fundamental human rights 
serve as fundamental shared values, as a source of the validity of jus cogens. Hence, 
two categories of jus cogens may be articulated: jus cogens rules that aim for the 
peaceful co-existence of states and those aiming for the protection of fundamental 
human rights. 
 
A. Jus Cogens Rules Aiming for the Sustaining Peaceful Co-Existence of States 
 
In this category, the prohibition on the use of force is a conspicuous example of 
international norms having the character of jus cogens, as referred to by the ICJ.126 
In his separate opinion in the Palestinian Wall case, Judge Elaraby indicates that:  
 
The prohibition of the use of force, as enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 4, of 
the Charter, is no doubt the most important principle that emerged in the 
twentieth century. It is universally recognized as a jus cogens principle, a 
peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted.127  
 
Further, Orakhelashvili considers that the right to self-defence of a state, which is 
part of the prohibition on the use of force as its exception, is perceived as jus cogens, 
basing his argument on the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons Case128 where the court ruled 
that the right to resort to self-defence is the fundamental right of every state to 
survival, and the Court, according to Orakhelashvili, ‘hesitated to qualify the right 
even by reference to non-use of nuclear weapons’.129 In addition, with respect to 
humanitarian law which can be categorized as rules protecting the peaceful co-
existence of states, in the Kupreškić case, the ICTY affirmed that the obligations 
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arising from international humanitarian law are absolute and non-derogable.130  
 
Apart from the rules relevant to the use of force and armed conflict, certain rules 
dealing with the idea of the common property or common heritage of the 
international community can be regarded as falling into this category, as they prevent 
the emergence of grave economic conflicts which often serve as the main reason 
behind the use of force or armed conflict. Added to this, in his 1967 Article, 
Scheuner also suggested a rule whereby outer space shall be devoted for peaceful 
purposes beneficial to all humans should be incorporated into jus cogens in the 
future.131 The legal regime of the common heritage of mankind can be perceived to 
fall into this category as well. Regarding the legal regime of the seabed, developing 
countries claim that the principle of the common heritage of mankind has the status 
of jus cogens.132Take for instance, the letter sent from the Group of 77 to the 
President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, protesting 
against relevant unilateral legislation and limited agreements among developed states 
claiming the right of unilateral exploitation of the seabed. It is stated that: ‘Given that 
the principle of the common heritage of mankind is a customary rule which has the 
force of peremptory norm, the unilateral legislation and limited agreements are 
illegal, and are violations of this principle.’133  Nonetheless, there was a clear 
objection regarding this proposal from a very few Western countries.134 Another 
debate regarding the peremptory character of the common heritage of mankind 
regime focuses on Article 311 (6) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
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Law of the Sea which provides that ‘States Parties agree that there shall be no 
amendments to the basic principle relating to the common heritage of mankind set 
forth in article 136 and that they shall not be party to any agreement in derogation 
thereof.’ Such a limitation on amendments to the rule regarding the status of the Area 
as the common heritage of mankind can of course be used to support the non-
derogable character of such a rule. The status of the principle of a common heritage 
of mankind as a jus cogens rule is compatible with the idea behind the Declaration of 
the Preparatory Commission for the Seabed Authority which insists on the illegality 
of exploitation of the seabed conflicting with rules stipulated in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.135 
 
Nevertheless, one argument against this notion is based on the fact that during the 
negotiation process the reference to the term ‘jus cogens’ was taken away from the 
wording of Article 311.136 Therefore, as Harrison argues, the intention of state 
parties to attribute a peremptory status to the relevant rules cannot simply be 
extracted on a textual basis.137 Added to this, according to the ILC, it is incorrect to 
say that ‘a provision in a treaty possesses the character of jus cogens merely because 
the parties have stipulated that no derogation from that provision is to be permitted, 
so that another treaty which conflicted with that provision would be void.’138 Thus 
the peremptory character of this rule is still debatable and what should be the 
determining question is whether or not the peremptory character of the principle of a 
common heritage of mankind has been accepted by a large majority of the 
international community, which represents its essential components. 
 
B. Rules Aiming for the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights 
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Despite the fact that detailed contours of jus cogens are difficult to map out, it is hard 
to reject the part of human rights within it due to ‘an almost intrinsic relationship 
between jus cogens and human rights’.139 The perception of human rights as intrinsic 
to jus cogens rules can be traced back to even prior to the adoption of the VCLT.140 
This perception can be seen in Judge Tanka’s dissenting opinion, where he 
articulates:  
 
If we can introduce in the international field a category of law, namely jus 
cogens, recently examined by the International Law Commission ,.. surely the 
law concerning the protection of human rights may be considered to belong to 
the jus cogens.141 
 
Arguably, not every right in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, or other important human rights instruments such as the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, has the status of jus cogens.142 Regarding this point, Scheuner 
explains that although certain human rights provisions place obligations on states, 
not all of them have the same level of importance. However, those protecting ‘human 
dignity, personal and racial equality, life and personal freedom’ certainly belong to a 
peremptory category.143 Higgins is of the opinion that ‘there certainly exists a 
consensus that certain rights – the right to life, to freedom from slavery or torture –
are so fundamental that no derogation may be made’.144 Prohibitions on genocide, 
slavery and piracy were listed as examples of jus cogens in Draft Articles on the Law 
of Treaties with commentaries in 1966.145 With respect to piracy, Scharf opines that 
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‘[p]iracy often consists of heinous acts of violence and depredation’146and in U.S. vs. 
Smith case, the US Supreme Court justified the universal jurisdiction over crimes of 
pirarcy based on piracy being hostis humani generis [enemies of all humankind].147 
 
In the Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite case, the ICJ 
explicitly confirmed that ‘the prohibition of torture is part of customary international 
law and it has become a peremptory norm (jus cogens)’,148 whilst in the Kupreškić 
case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia149 expressly 
stated that the prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm of international law.150 
With regard to crimes against humanity, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
confirmed its status of jus cogens.151 
 
Discussing the right of people to self-determination seems to secure its part in jus 
cogens; in its Resolution 35/118, the GA reaffirmed the non-alienability of the rights 
of peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.152 
Further, the jus cogens status of the right against discrimination has been confirmed 
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Juridical Condition and Rights of 
the Undocumented Migrants case, ruling that:  
 
[T]he principle of equality before the law, equal protection before the law and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146  Michael P. Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change 
Recognizing Grotian Moments (CUP 2013) 92. 
147 United States v. Smith, United States Supreme Court, 18 U.S. 5 Wheat. 153 (1820), 156. 
148 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), 
Judgment, 20 July 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, para. 99. 
149 Hereinafter, ‘ICTY’. 
150  Kupreškić Case, para. 520, see also Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (Trial Chamber), May 
21, 1999, para. 88: [T]he crime of genocide is considered part of international customary law 
and, moreover, a norm of jus cogens. 
151  Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Judgment of September 26, 2006 (Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Series C ) No. 154 (2006), 
para. 99. See also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003) where the 
US court of appeals affirms the status of jus cogens of crimes against humanity. 
152 Plan of Action for Full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
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non-discrimination belongs to jus cogens, because the whole legal structure of 
national and international public order rests on it and it is a fundamental 
principle that permeates all laws.153 
 
After discussing the content of current rules that qualify as jus cogens rules, one 
important point that needs to be made here is that those rules are primary rules that 
create an obligation, and none of them are secondary rules. Simma argues that 
because the rules of peremptory norms derive their special character from the 
‘substantive’ importance of the interests protected by the rule; therefore, ‘not all 
rules which are important or even indispensable, for the existence and working of 
international law belong to that category [jus cogens]’.154  For example, when 
discussing this issue, Czapliński and Danilenko argue that the pacta sunt servanda 
rule, despite being of fundamental importance to the law of treaties and international 
law as a whole, does not constitute such a peremptory rule. There reason is that if it 
were jus cogens, every agreement infringing the pacta sunt servanda rule would be 
void or nullified in light of Article 53; however, Article 30 of the Vienna Convention 
of 1969 stipulates its legal effect in the case of successive treaties, i.e. lex posterior 
prevails over earlier one(s). Hence, it can be inferred that pacta sunt servanda does 
not belong to jus cogens.155 
 
2.3. Rule of the Non-derogability of Jus Cogens and the Hierarchical Structure of 
the International Legal System 
 
In the preceding section, the link between fundamental shared values of the 
international community and jus cogens was established to provide a theoretical 
explanation for the non-derogable character of jus cogens rules. This section will 
discusses a secondary rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens to shed light on the 
details of the hierarchical structure constructed by it. It will begin with acceptance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-
18/03, September 17, 2003, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Series A) No. 18 (2003), para. 101. 
154 Simma (n 40) 288. 
155 W. Czapliński and G. Danilenko, ‘Conflicts of Norms in International Law’ (1990) 21 
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the rule of non-derogability of jus cogens by officials of the international legal 
system, to confirm the hierarchical structure, and then move on to consider its effect 
and scope to provide details of the hierarchical structure. 
 
2.3.1. Acceptance of the Secondary Rule of the Non-derogability of Jus Cogens by 
Officials as a Secondary Rule of the International Legal System 
 
In this section, acceptance of the secondary rules of jus cogens by officials of the 
international legal system will be elaborated to confirm their status as a secondary 
rule of the international legal system. This is vital for the establishment of a 
constitutionalized international legal system since the acceptance of the secondary 
rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens would confirm the hierarchical legal 
structure of the international legal system.  
 
First of all, based on the notion that jus cogens came into being before UNCLOT,156 
the codifying of the rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens in the 1969 VCLT 
itself, as well as the 1982 Vienna Convention on Treaties Between States and 
International Organizations or Between International Organizations, reflects, of 
course, acceptance of the rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens by states as 
officials in the international legal system. The growing acceptance of the notion of 
jus cogens is also reflected in the fact that states, which are both subjects and 
officials of the international legal system, increasingly rely on the concept of jus 
cogens in their official legal arguments; and on a law-making point, states attempts 
to achieve fundamental and radical alternation to the existing international law via 
their jus cogens-related claims.157 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156  For example, Mr. Yasseen, the Iraqi delegate to UNCLOT, commented that ‘the 
international legal order already recognized a hierarchy of international rules. Those were 
rules which took priority over others, so that it could be said that the system provided for in 
article 50 (Currently 53) was already a part of positive international law’, UNCLOT (Second 
Session), 20th Plenary Meeting, 103 (see also the similar opinions of the delegates from the 
US and Ecuador). 
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With respect to international tribunals, there is an array of cases in which the notion 
of jus cogens has been referred to or applied by different tribunals. By way of 
illustration, in the Nicaragua case, the court affirmed jus cogens as an accepted rule 
in international law, relying on the status of the prohibition on the use of force as jus 
cogens when deciding the case.158 Whilst in the Questions Relating to the Obligation 
to Prosecute or Extradite case, the ICJ explicitly affirmed that the prohibition of 
torture is part of customary international law and has become jus cogens,159 in 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the court confirmed the status of 
humanitarian law as jus cogens.160  Likewise, in the Kupreškić case, the ICTY 
affirmed that the obligations found within international humanitarian law have an 
absolute and non-derogable character,161 and in the Furundžija case, ICTY affirmed 
the jus cogens character of the rules on the prohibition of torture.162 However, 
despite a number of cases where international tribunals apply or refer to the concept 
of jus cogens, it is very difficult to find ones where the court renders norms invalid 
on the ground of violation of the rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens. This 
might be because it is very unlikely that states will enter into treaties that conflict 
with jus cogens.163 However, in his dissenting opinion in the Wimbledon case, Judge 
M. Schücking construed that by permitting the passage of a ship carrying contraband, 
Germany would have violated the duties of a neutral state, which constitutes an 
offence under international law, and Article 380 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, 
obliging Germany to permit such passage, was not enforceable, explaining:  
 
It cannot have been the intention of the victorious States to bind the Reich, by 
means of the Versailles Treaty, to commit such offences as against third States. 
It would, moreover, have been impossible to give effect to such an intention, 
because a legally binding contractual obligation cannot be undertaken to 
perform acts which would violate the rights of third parties. For this reason it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Merits) Case, para. 190. 
159 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), 
Judgment, 20 July 2012, para. 99. 
160 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, para. 83. 
161 Kupreškić case, para. 511. 
162 Furundžija case, paras 137–139, 144, 151, 153–154 and 160. 
163 Markus Petsche, ‘Jus Cogens as a Vision of the International Legal Order’ (2010) 29 
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seems difficult to admit a right, as between neutral States, enforceable at law to 
trade in and to transport contraband, whereas the same interests are unprotected 
as against a belligerent.164  
 
As the duty of a neutral state to forbid the movement of troops or convoys of either 
munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral state can be perceived as 
a rule with jus cogens character,165 this can be seen as an example of officials 
applying the rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens to invalidate a conflicting 
norm. 
 
Added to this, the concept of a peremptory norm of general international law has also 
been referred to in Articles 26, 40 and 50166 of the 2001 Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, demonstrating that the 
concept of jus cogens is accepted as the basis for further development of 
international law. 
 
As illustrated before, there exists evidence for the official acceptance of the 
secondary rule of jus cogens, and this would confirm the status of the secondary rule 
of non-derogability of jus cogens as a secondary rule of the international legal 
system. 
 
2.3.2. Scope of the Application and Legal Consequences of the Rule of the Non-
derogability of Jus Cogens 
 
To start with the scope of application of the rule of the non-derogability of jus 
cogens, as only the case of treaties conflicting with jus cogens has been expressly 
codified in the VCLT, one might question whether or not non-derogability also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Dissenting Opinion by M. Schücking, S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Japan), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A) No. 1 (Aug. 17), paras 86–93 
165 Markus Petsche (n 163) 248; See Egon Schwelb, ‘Some Aspects of International Jus 
Cogens as Formulated by the International Law Commission’ (1967) 61 American Society 
of International Law 946, 950. 
166 See Articles 26, 40, and 50 of the 2001 Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for 
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applies to scenarios where other types of norms conflict with jus cogens. 
Appertaining to customary international law and unilateral acts conflicting with jus 
cogens, although not expressly governed by written treaties, there exists a widely 
agreed legal opinion that secondary rules for the non-derogability of jus cogens 
should be able to nullify not only conflicting treaties but also international customary 
law and unilateral acts.167 One convincing reason offered by Zemanek is that ‘[t]he 
concept of peremptory norms would not make sense if such norms affected only one 
source of legal rights and obligations, and not the other’.168 Also, Art. 41(2) of the 
ILC’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States provides: ‘no State shall 
recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of an obligation arising 
under a peremptory norm of general international law’.169  
 
With respect to the consequences of violation of the rule of non-derogation, the 
VCLT deals with two different scenarios in which a treaty conflicts with jus cogens. 
First, if new treaties conflict with existing jus cogens the conflicting treaty will 
become void, and by virtue of Article 44(5) the rule of the separability of provisions 
does not apply. Secondly, Article 63 construes that any existing treaty conflicting 
with a new peremptory norm becomes void and terminates. Nonetheless, as the rule 
of separability is not expressly prohibited by the VCLT from applying to this case, 
there is room for the possibility that the rule of separability may apply to it. Crawford 
argues that even in the case of supervening jus cogens, where only one single 
provision of a treaty conflicts with newly emerging peremptory norms, the whole 
treaty is void or nullified. His reason is that Article 64 clearly stipulates that an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 325 , 
Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, para. 100 and also Paulus (n 10) 310–311 
and 317; Simma (n 40) 288. 
168 Karl Zemanek, “The Metamorphosis of Jus Cogens: From an Institution of Treaty Law 
to the Bedrock of the International Legal Order?”, in The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna 
Convention, ed. Enzo Cannizzaro (Oxford, New York: OUP, 2011), 394. 
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‘existing treaty’ in conflict with jus cogens becomes void and terminates. 170 
However, a different opinion can be found in the ILC’s commentary on Article 63 
(now Article 64),171 which states that in the case of certain provisions of a treaty 
conflict with emerging jus cogens: ‘If those provisions can properly be regarded as 
severable from the rest of the treaty, the Commission thought that the rest of the 
treaty ought to be regarded as still valid.’172 Likewise, Pauwelyn propounds that 
application of the rule of separability to a treaty conflicting with supervening jus 
cogens does not undermine the importance and primacy of jus cogens because, if it 
did, Article 44 of the VCLT would expressly state the non-applicability of the rule of 
separability in this case.173 In addition, he also contends that in the case where a 
treaty exists as a framework agreement composed of myriad agreements, such as the 
WTO, the proposition that where only one provision conflicts with supervening jus 
cogens the whole set of agreements shall be invalidated might be disproportionate.174 
The position taken here is that the rule of separability shall apply to treaties 
conflicting with supervening jus cogens. The reason is that as international law-
making power is allocated to states due to the respect for their peoples and 
international law should not intervene in matters not involving the serious interests of 
the international community; applying the rule of separability would not jeopardize 
the purpose of the rule of non-derogbility of jus cogens. Further, this would prevent 
the absurdity of a situation where newly emerging jus cogens rules have a 
retrospective effect to cancel whole international agreements in parts that do not 
conflict with such jus cogens rules. For other types of norms, apart from treaties, 
their conflict with jus cogens shall result in the invalidity of such norms. 
Hannikainen, for instance, suggests that unilateral acts of states conflicting with jus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 James Crawford, Second Report on State Responsibility by Mr. James Crawford, Special 
Rapporteur, Addendum 2, A/CN.4/498/Add. 2, para. 306 and footnote 593. 
171 Pauwelyn (n 13) 281. 
172 ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries 1966, 261. 
173 However, theoretically, Pauwelyn argues that the rule of separability should be applied to 
both cases of conflicts of norms with existing jus cogens and emerging jus cogens, as it is 
more suitable to the exceptional nature of the invalidity of norms that derives from the 
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cogens shall also be deemed void.175 With respect to the retroactive effect of the rule 
of the non-derogability of jus cogens, on examining article 64, which deals with 
conflicts of treaties with supervening jus cogens, the words ‘becomes void and 
terminates’ send an unambiguous message that the drafters considered that the 
emergence of a new rule of jus cogens is not to apply retroactively to the validity of a 
conflicting treaty and that invalidity is to operate subsequent to the emergence of 
newly-established jus cogens.176  
 
2.3.3. The Supremacy of the International Primary Rules Protecting Peace and 
Fundamental Human Rights Created by the Secondary Rule of Non-derogability of 
Jus Cogens. 
 
Given the effect of the rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens that invalidates 
state-based primary rules that conflict with shared-value-based primary rules, the 
rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens functions as a secondary rule that resolves 
normative conflicts. In case of conflicts, it gives superiority to community-value-
based primary rules in light of the essentiality of the community’s interests and the 
survival of the international community, which shared-value-based primary rules 
protect. The rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens also functions as part of a 
unifying rule of recognition for the international legal system, as it arranges the order 
of sources of validity for primary rules by giving superiority to fundamental shared 
values over state wills, and this creates a hierarchy of international law between laws 
with different sources of validity. 
 
From the constitutionalization of international law aspect, the conflict-solving effect 
of the rule of the non-derogabilty of jus cogens plays its part in constitutionalizing 
international law. This secondary rule attributes jus cogens rules the status of higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law (Helsinki 
Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Co., 1998), 6 as cited in Simma (n 40) 288. 
176 Reports of the International Law Commission on the second part of its seventeenth 
session and on its eighteenth session, in ILC, Yearbook of the International Law 
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law in the international legal system and this has led to the jus cogens rules having 
the status of a constitutional rule in the sense that based on the importance of the 
values they protects, in cases where ordinary general international rules conflict with 
jus cogens rules, this results in the invalidity of ordinary international rules as a 
lower norm of the international legal system. Mani claims that the concept of jus 
cogens is an ‘important normative development that would contribute to universal 
constitutionalism in the realm of the evolution of a truly global legal framework’ and 
argues that despite a number of questions remaining unanswered, jus cogens can be 
regarded as ‘the first stepping-stone towards the eventual build-up of international 
constitutionalism’.177 Similarly, Byers is of the view that jus cogens is the most 
obvious example of constitutional rules in international law. He explains that, unlike 
other international rules, jus cogens rules have a legal effect that restricts the 
international law-making power of states and prevents them from engaging in acts 
not in conformity with the peremptory rules of the international community.178 As 
Bryde has observed, the existence of jus cogens shows that ‘the “higher law” concept 
of constitutionalism has been transferred to international law’.179Thus, now it would 
be incorrect to perceive the notion of the constitutionalization of international law as 
just an ambiguous idea or dreamy thoughts of legal academics, for it has been 
accepted and codified as a positive international legal rule.180 
 
However, based on the cosmopolitan paradigm, international constitutionalism has 
an underlying purpose to establish international self-governance with a mandate for 
international peace and the protection of fundamental human rights. Given the state-
centred character of international law, in which state will is one source of validity of 
primary rules, this will never be achieved if the primary rules that generate the 
obligation for the protection of international peace and fundamental human rights are 
not elevated to a higher law which is not subject to the will of states to alter or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 V.S. Mani, ‘Centrifugal and Centripetal Tendencies in the International System: Some 
Reflections’ in Ronald St John Macdonald and Douglas M Johnston (eds), Towards World 
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derogate from them as they wish. The exploration of current primary rules that have 
the status of jus cogens has shown that they can be divided into two categories: those 
seeking the peaceful co-existence of states and those aiming for the protection of 
fundamental human rights. The jus cogens rules on prohibition of the use of force, 
humanitarian law and the common heritage of mankind fall into the first category, 
whilst peremptory rules on the prohibition of slavery, torture, piracy and crimes 
against humanity, and those protecting specific fundamental human rights, such as 
the right to life, the right to self-determination and rights against discrimination, fall 
into the second category. Thus, jus cogens rules and the relevant secondary rules 
have created a hierarchical structure of rules in the international legal system that put 
international peace and the protection of fundamental human rights at the heart of the 
system.  
 
III.  The Secondary Rule of the Primacy of the UN Charter  
 
Apart from the secondary rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens, the rule of 
primacy of the UN Charter is another candidate for conflict of norm rules that have 
established the hierarchy of international primary rules. Therefore, the subject of 
study in this section is the UN Charter. It begins with a discussion of the link 
between the UN Charter and fundamental shared values of the international 
community, which are a higher source of validity of rules in the international legal 
system, to determine the status of the UN Charter as constitutional rules of the 
international legal system. Then, the scope and consequences of the secondary rule 
of the primacy of the UN Charter will be discussed in order to determine the 
contribution of the UN Charter and relevant secondary rules to the hierarchization of 
the international legal system. 
 
3.1. Article 103 of the UN Charter and the Primacy of the UN Charter 
 
Before discussing the link between the UN Charter and fundamental shared values, a 
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character of the primary rules within the UN Charter as it is a written provision 
expressly claiming priority of the UN Charter over other international agreements.  
 
Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that: ‘In the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their 
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the 
present Charter shall prevail.’  
 
In the words of Kolb, ‘this provision is replete with a plethora of uncertainties, 
ranging from the root of its meaning, to points on interpretation’.181 As Liivoja 
observes it, Article 103 can be read in many ways: some simply regard it as an 
ordinary conflict clause in a treaty without ‘any conceptually ground-breaking 
qualities’; some think of it as ‘legal prose’; those with more ambitious perspectives 
take this article as a ‘supremacy clause’ reflecting the status of the UN Charter as, 
effectively, the constitution of the international community.182 In the context of 
conflicts of norms, Pauwelyn treats Article 103 as a conflict clause with special 
qualifications.183 Pertaining to the special qualifications of the UN Charter, he 
explains that, generally, the conflict clause claiming priority over subsequent treaties 
cannot restrain states from exercising their freedom of contract. This allows states as 
masters of their will to alter their minds in the future, subject to the condition 
provided in the rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens and Articles 41/58 of the 
VCLT.184In other words, a conflict clause claiming priority over subsequent treaties 
has to be subject to the lex posterior rule.185 Nevertheless, denying the higher 
hierarchy of the UN Charter,186 the mere ground that Pauwelyn offers to distinguish 
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the special character of Article 103 from other conflict clauses is the fact that Article 
30(1)187 of the VCLT explicitly construes that Article 103 of the UN Charter is an 
exception to lex posterior.188 Pauwlyn does not offer any further clarification of why 
Article 30(1) treats Article 103 as an exception, and differently from other conflict 
clauses. Conforti argues that the explanation for the special treatment of Article 103 
is that although, from ‘a strictly formal point of view’, the Charter is a treaty, ‘the 
principle contained in Article 103 is considered by the whole international 
community to be a principle going beyond the law of treaties, and it has come to be 
regarded as a customary rule’.189 However, he does not elaborate further on the 
special legal effect of a rule contained in the principle of Article 103 going beyond 
the law of treaties; merely the fact that the rule in Article 103 has become a 
customary rule does not explain its special character as an exception to the lex 
posterior rule. Thus, the reasoning behind the position of Article 103 as an exception 
to lex posterior holds the mystical key to understanding the reasons behind the 
special character of Article 103 and the Charter itself and needs to be discussed here. 
 
Scrutinizing the draft history of Article 30(1) of the VCLT does not give a clear 
answer to the question of special treatment of Article 103 of the UN Charter, as the 
ILC just refers to the importance of the Charter, explaining that:  
 
[T]he position of the Charter of the United Nations in modern international law 
is of such importance, and the States Members of the United Nations constitute 
so large a part of the international community, that it appeared to the 
Commission to be essential to give Article 103 of the Charter special mention 
and a special place in the present article.190  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not represent an 'inherently higher law' as the priority of the UN Charter is based on the 
agreement of the UN members; Pauwelyn (n 13), p 337 
187 Article 30(1) of the VCLT provides that: ‘Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the rights and obligations of States Parties to successive treaties relating to 
the same subject matter shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.’ 
188 Pauwelyn (n 13) 337. 
189 Benedetto Conforti, ‘Consistency among Treaty Obligations’ in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.), 
The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (OUP 2011) 189. 
190 ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries 1966, Yearbook of the 
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Considering the historical articulation of Article 103 of the UN Charter, originally 
there was no primacy clause in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.191 Later, in the 
United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO)192, certain states 
proposed to include such a clause in their discussions.193 During UNCIO, there was 
general agreement that members should not in future undertake obligations 
inconsistent with the Charter.194 The delegate from the USSR expressed the view 
that it was questionable whether a provision regarding obligations inconsistent with 
the Charter, calling into question the validity of all past as well as future treaties, 
should be incorporated in the Charter. The delegate views that if such a provision 
was included, it might be difficult for certain states when deciding whether to ratify 
the Charter. Further, given the probability that an obligation inserted in the Charter 
would be binding on members in terms of observing its provisions generally, the 
incorporation of a special provision relating to treaties seemed unnecessary.195 As 
the discussion developed, certain delegates rejected the insertion of such a clause; 
however, others agreed to the insertion, although they could not agree on the content. 
Therefore, these issues were referred to the relevant Subcommittee. 196  After 
considering the issue, the Subcommittee unanimously agreed that a provision 
governing conflicts or inconsistencies between the obligations of members and the 
Charter itself is necessary, because ‘omission of such a provision could give rise to 
inaccurate interpretations’. Moreover, it would be ‘inadvisable to provide for the 
automatic abrogation by the Charter of obligations inconsistent with the terms 
thereof’.197 The draft history of Article 30 of the VCLT and Article 103 of the UN 
Charter does not seem to shed much light on the rationality behind Article 103 being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Spijkers (n 64) 75. 
192 Hereinafter, ‘UNCIO’. 
193  See e.g. Belgian Amendments, Norwegian Amendments, Egyptian Amendments, 
Philippines Amendments, Australian Amendments, and Ethiopian Amendments in United 
Nations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (22 
volumes), vol. III, 343-344, 371, 463, 540, 553 and 561(The collection will be referred 
hereinafter as UNCIO vol. (n)) 
194 UNCIO vol. XIII, 592. 
195 Ibid 598. 
196 Ibid, 602–603. 
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an exception to the lex specialis rule, apart from highlighting the importance of the 
Charter. 
 
The study of Article 103 and its drafting history does not help us to understand the 
primacy of the UN Charter, especially because its international-agreement origin 
contradicts the idea of the supremacy of the Charter over states from which the 
validity of international agreement derives. However, based on the ‘importance’ 
clue, one logical way to explain the primacy of the Charter is that such importance 
might be generated from the status of the UN Charter as a constitution of the 
international community.198 This approach is used by Bernhardt, who claims that to 
understand the scope of application of Article 103, the character of the Charter as the 
constitutional document of the international community must be taken into 
account.199 Thus, the status of the UN Charter as a constitution of the international 
community will be examined in the hope of figuring out what accounts for the 
special position of Article 103 and the UN Charter. 
 
3.2. The UN Charter and the Fundamental Shared Values of the International 
Community 
 
As shown in the jus cogens section, based on the unifying rule of recognition of the 
international legal system, the source of validity of higher international rules is 
fundamental shared values of the international community, i.e. constitutional law 
derives from the belief of the international community as an origin of international 
constituent power. Thus, to attribute a constitutional character to the UN Charter, a 
link between the UN Charter and the higher source of validity of international rules – 
fundamental shared values of the international community – must be established.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 E.g. Michael W Doyle, ‘A Global Constitution? The Struggle over the UN Charter’ 
(2010); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United 
Nations Revisited’ (1997) 1 Max Planck UNYB 1; Blaine Sloan, ‘The United Nations 
Charter as a Constitution’ (1989) 1 Pace International Law Review 61; MacDonald (n 86). 
199 Rudolf Bernhardt, ‘Article 103’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the 
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The word ‘value’ is not explicitly used anywhere in the text of the Charter; however, 
the UN Charter is patently articulated based on certain principles and for specific 
purposes.200 The purposes stipulated in the Charter are ‘aims of action’ that obligate 
the UN and its members to perform actions in an attempt to actualize certain 
purposes which can be seen as ‘expressions of the world’s most fundamental 
values.’201 The UN Charter was intended to be a document that constitutes a global 
world order202  and a set of guidelines for future global decisions and further 
development of the international community.203  The first General Counsel and 
Director of the Legal Department of the UN, A. H. Feller, called the Charter ‘the 
constitutional instrument which governs the organizational structure of a world 
community’, explaining that:  
 
[T]he Charter is not just a legal text intended to describe with precision the 
rights and duties of parties like a conveyance or a contract of sale; it is a 
political document designed to embody statements of ideals, of principles, and 
of moral sentiment … [S]uch is the nature of constitutions, at least of those 
constitutions which live in the minds of people and are adaptable to growth 
along with the societies they are intended to govern.204 
 
From a historical perspective, the negotiation and drafting history of the Charter may 
be defined as a world dialogue regarding global values.205 According to Spijkers, the 
communication that occurred was not only concerned with particular states which 
sent their representatives to attend, but rather the future of the international 
community as a whole. The collective scourge of the Second World War, which 
states had just experienced, generated a shared will to prevent the recurrence of such 
events, based on ‘a sense of urgency, a shared awareness that there was a need to 
define global values and global obligations to act on them’.206 This sentiment was 
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201 Ibid 72. 
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also reflected in the opening address of the San Francisco Conference by President 
Truman: ‘We represent the overwhelming majority of all mankind … We hold a 
powerful mandate from our people … We must prevent, if human mind, heart, and 
hope can prevent, the repetition of the disasters from which the entire world will 
suffer for years to come.’207 It was proposed that the phrase ‘we the peoples’, at the 
very beginning of the Preamble, would signify that the Charter entails and reflects 
‘the ideas of the peoples of the world’, and is conferred the mandate of all 
peoples.208  
 
Considering its origin, the insistence that the Charter was intended to be a document 
aiming to establish a legal order and global guidance for its members is of course 
subject to debate, but it does not come up without reasonable ground. Although the 
representatives attending the drafting process of the UN Charter and joining in the 
forum came from most regions of the world, certain countries did not have 
representatives participating in those processes.209 Thus, at the time of its inception, 
it would not be entirely accurate to claim that the content of the Charter reflected the 
opinion of the full international community. Nevertheless, currently, the almost 
universal membership of the UN Charter210gives more weight to the legitimacy of 
the claim that the UN charter reflects the fundamental shared values of the 
international community.  In Draft Articles on State Responsibility of 2001, ILC 
make a comment that ‘the special importance of the Charter, as reflected in its 
Article 103 derives from its express provisions as well as from the virtually universal 
membership of States in the United Nations’.211  Accordingly, two factors that 
generate the special character of the Charter is the substantive importance the Charter 
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rules entail and its representability of the international community, at least in the 
sense of international community ‘of states’.  
 
Thus, the intention of member states which can represent the view of the 
international community to create the Charter not as an ordinary international 
agreement based on compromise and the exchange of states’ interests but as higher 
rules that protect fundamental shared values and shape the international legal system. 
This would logically explain why Article 103 needed to be incorporated into the 
Charter. It also clarifies the importance that the Charter possesses which made 
Article 30 of the VCLT expressly stipulate that Article 103 is not subject to the rule 
of lex posterior due to the importance of the Charter. The link between the UN 
Charter as a constitution of the international community and fundamental community 
values has been supported by Tomuschat who is of the view that  
 
…the international community can indeed be conceived of as a legal entity, 
governed by a constitution … The international community and its constitution 
were created by States. Over centuries up to the present time, buttressed in 
particular by the UN Charter, the idea of a legal framework determining certain 
common values as the guiding principle States are bound to observe and 
respect… .212 
 
Accordingly, the historical aspect and textual basis can serve as a ground to read the 
UN Charter as a document that is intended by its members that it can legitimately 
claim to represent the international community, to serve as a reflection of what they 
believe to be fundamental shared values of the international community. Thus, the 
next issue that should be addressed is what are the fundamental shared values of the 
international community that are reflected in the Charter. The Charter does not 
clearly list the fundamental values on which it is based, or which it aims to foster and 
protect. Nonetheless, such values can be extracted from the purposes and 
fundamental principles of the Charter. Articles 1, 2, 55 and 56, which entail the 
purposes and fundamental principles of the Charter, seem to be an ideal place to 
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identify the fundamental shared values that the Charter holds dear.213 Exploring 
these relevant articles, one might come to the conclusion that, essentially, the 
purposes and fundamental principles of the UN Charter hinge on two fundamental 
shared values, namely, peaceful co-existence between states and respect for 
fundamental human rights. 
 
The fundamental shared value of the peaceful coexistence of states is reflected in the 
purposes of the UN Charter to maintain peace and security (Article 1 para. 1), to 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and the self-determination of peoples (Article 1 para. 2) and to achieve 
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural or humanitarian character (Article 1 para. 4). Such purposes are 
complemented by the principle of sovereign equality (Article 2 para. 1), the principle 
of duty regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 2 para. 3) and the 
prohibition on the use of force (Article 2 para. 4). Further, Articles 55 and 56 oblige 
the UN and its members to promote the economic welfare of the people, solutions for 
international issues and respect for human rights in order to create conditions of 
stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations 
among nations. The value of the protection of fundamental of human rights is clearly 
reflected in the purpose of the UN Charter to promote and encourage respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion (Article 2 para. 3).214 In the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law, Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations,215 the General Assembly216 reaffirms the 
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utmost importance of the maintenance of peace and security and reiterates the 
principles in Articles 1 and 2,217 and it regards them as one of the fundamental 
principles of the international legal system.218These two values of the peaceful co-
existence of states and the protection of fundamental human rights are the same as 
those values that, as shown in the preceding part, jus cogens rules aim to protect.  
 
Further, apart from the fact that the substantive rules in the UN Charter rules reflect 
the fundamental shared values of the international community, another linkage 
between the UN Charter and fundamental shared values of the international 
community is in that the UN Charter also establishes the UN and its organs. The 
Charter imposes on them duties relevant to the implementation and protection of 
fundamental shared values and allocates power to them to achieve assigned tasks, 
e.g. the GA as a global forum, the SC as an executive body and the ICJ as a judicial 
guardian to identify, shape, implement and protect the fundamental shared values of 
the international community. Therefore, the UN Charter has both a substantive link 
and an institutional link to fundamental shared values; however, such an institutional 
structure to fulfil fundamental values established by the Charter is very relevant to 
the institutionalization of international constituted power; therefore, that issue will be 
discussed in the next chapter. The whole UN Charter can thus be perceived as an 
attempt by the international community to identify fundamental shared values and to 
implement such values in the form of written basic legal instrument. This is reflected 
in the dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry in the Lockerbie case, in that ‘[t]he 
entire law of the United Nations has been built up around the notion of peace and the 
prevention of conflict’.219 
 
As shown in the jus cogens section, fundamental shared values of the international 
community are recognized by the unifying rule of recognition of the international 
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legal system as a source of validity of the constitutional/ higher rules of the system. 
The link between fundamental shared values and the Charter can serve as a ground 
for the status of the Charter as a written constitution of the international community, 
i.e. the source of the legally binding nature of the UN Charter as a constitution of the 
international community derives from fundamental shared values. The status of the 
UN Charter as a constitution of the international community would provide a logical 
explanation for the supremacy of the Charter as reflected in Article 103, which could 
not be accommodated if the UN Charter existed as an ordinary treaty. According to 
Fassbender, in a case where a treaty has earned the status of a constitution, ‘the 
instrument will subordinate the constituent units to the new creation and will govern 
each of them irrespective of their continuous individual consents’; therefore, albeit 
contractually established, the new body is non-consensual or autonomous in 
character.220 Such a difference is also supported by Gardbaum, who when discussing 
the differences between treaty-based regimes and constitution-based regimes 
proposes that  
 
…treaty-based regimes impose legal obligations on states that are both fixed at 
the outset and consensual, constitutional entities have the capacity to impose 
obligations on states that are neither. Such new obligations may be imposed by 
a governance structure with autonomous lawmaking powers acting by some 
version of majority vote, and may be enforced by an adjudicatory body with 
compulsory jurisdiction.221  
 
This difference between the nature of a constitutional instrument and an ordinary 
treaty can explain the special status of Article 103 in Article 30(1) of the VCLT. To 
elaborate further, the UN Charter were a state-will-based rule and Article 103 were a 
will-based conflict clause which allows states to set up how conflicts are to be solved 
when there is a conflict between state-will based rules; then, logically, Article 103 
would be subject to the lex posterior rule as states are still masters of their own will, 
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and so they can change their mind in the future.222 Nonetheless, since the Charter as 
the constitution of the international community derives its validity from the 
international community, it is not subject to the individual wills of states or groups of 
them.  Consequently, this turns the UN Charter into a higher rule of the international 
system. Thus, Article 103 is not a conflict clause that is executed based on the will of 
relevant states but rather a declaration or codification of the secondary rule of the 
primacy of the UN Charter. However, the independence of the power constituted by 
the Charter or even the Charter itself is not absolute, as it must be curtailed by the 
constituent power holder, aka the international community. Added to this, referring 
to the case of jus cogens, when general international law has earned the status of jus 
cogens, transforming from state-will-based into community-value-based rules, not 
only does such a norm earn the status of higher law, it also attains a universal 
character, which means it is binding on states not giving their consent to such norms. 
Applying such an effect to the UN Charter, then, as a community-value-based rule, it 
is binding on non-member states as it is a law created by the community’s will. To 
some extent, Article 2(6) of the Charter can be interpreted as generating an 
obligation for non-member states; therefore, to some extent, it might be seen as 
supporting evidence for universal application of the UN Charter. However, the legal 
effect of Article 2(6) will be discussed in detail later, in the section regarding the 
application of Article 103 to non-UN-member states. 
 
3.3. Secondary Rules of the Primacy of The UN Charter and the Hierarchical 
Structure of the International Legal System 
 
This section will discuss the hierarchical structure of the international legal system 
established by the rule of primacy of the UN Charter, based on the constitutional 
character of the Charter, to reveal the hierarchical legal structure of international law 
shaped by the secondary rule of the primacy of the Charter.   
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3.3.1 Acceptance of the Secondary Rule of Primacy of the UN Charter by Officials 
as a Secondary Rule of the International Legal System  
 
First of all, it can be confirmed that there is acceptance by the officials of the 
international legal system that the secondary rule of primacy of the Charter has 
become part of the international legal system. To start with, Article 103 by itself 
would, of course, indicate official acceptance of the secondary rule of the primacy of 
the UN Charter by member states which are both subjects and officials of 
international law. This is because upon becoming members of the UN, those states 
express their acceptance of the Charter, including Article 103. Added to this, 
apparently, official acceptance of the secondary rule of the primacy of the UN 
Charter can be seen in the way that other treaties govern their relations with the UN 
Charter, demonstrating their acceptance of the UN Charter as higher law within the 
international community. For instance, Article 107 of the NATO Treaty 1949 
provides that, ‘[t]he Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, 
in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are 
members of the United Nations… .’ In Article 131 of the Charter of the Organization 
of American States 1948, it is stated: ‘None of the provisions of this Charter shall be 
construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Member States under the 
Charter of the United Nations.’ Article 1, paragraph C, of the Statute of the Council 
of Europe stipulates: ‘Participation in the Council of Europe shall not affect the 
collaboration of its members in the work of the United Nations and of other 
international organisations or unions to which they are parties.’ Likewise, this pattern 
in the relationship between the UN Charter and other treaties is also shared by 
Article XXI of The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) and 
Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998. 
Further, in its Friendly Relations Declaration 1970, the GA recognizes the utmost 
importance of the Charter in the promotion of the rule of law among states, for the 
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relations and co-operation among states.223 Further, the indication of Article 30 (1) 
of the VCLT and Article 30 (6) of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between International Organizations, that Article 103 is an exception to the 
lex posterior rule, is clear acceptance of the secondary rule of the primacy of the 
Charter. 
 
The ICJ’s acceptance of the rule of primacy of the Charter as a secondary rule of the 
international legal system governing the conflict of norms can be found in the 
Lockerbie case, in which the ICJ accepted the priority of the obligation under the UN 
Charter over the obligation under a later treaty, the 1971 Montreal Convention, by 
expounding that: ‘in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of 
the Parties in that respect prevail over their obligations under any other international 
agreement, including the Montreal Convention’. 224  Thus, this shows that the 
secondary rule of primacy of the Charter has been accepted as part of the 
international legal system. 
 
3.3.2. Scope of Application of the Secondary Rule of Primacy of the Charter 
 
A. Scope of the term ‘Conflict’ 
 
As the wording of Article 103 explicitly deals with conflicts between obligations 
under the Charter and obligations under other international agreements, but does not 
refer to rights, this has generated an interpretative issue regarding the scope of 
conflicts that this Article covers.225 However, based on the correlativity between 
obligations or duties and rights in a limited sense as claim rights,226 the norms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and Co-Operation 
Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
224 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising 
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), 
Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, para. 45. 
225 Pauwelyn (n 13) 340–342. 
226 Hohfeld argues that only rights in a limited sense as claims are correlative to duties, and 
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creating claim rights for one party of the jural relation correlatively create duties for 
another. Thus where a conflict involves obligation, it always involves claim rights. 
Thus, based on correlativity, the text of Article 103 can, legally, be logically 
interpreted as including scenarios where claim rights are involved. Further, going 
beyond the textual interpretation, Paulus and Leiß support a wider definition to cover 
incompatibilities involving liberties and no rights (both exempting and permissive 
norms) should be adopted. They argue that this is because the aim of Art. 103 is to 
‘ensure the effectiveness of the Charter system as well as to remove obstacles in 
‘ordinary’ treaty norms for the implementation of obligations under the Charter’ and 
‘to promote the effectiveness of the international system of peace and security’. 227 
Moreover, if the strict definition of conflict which only revolves around obligations 
and claim rights228 is adhered to, this reduces the benefit of Article 103 as a conflict 
rule that can be applied to resolve normative conflicts and create legal certainty for 
the international legal system, simply because certain normative conflicts do not fall 
within the scope of the definition.229 Thus, a broad understanding of conflicts which 
include all the incompatibilities caused by legal normative effects, not limited to 
incompatibilities revolving around obligations and their correlative claim rights, 
would be preferable, given the specific purpose of Article 103 and for the sake of 
certainty in the international legal system in general. Moreover, based on the 
constitutional status of the Charter defended here, the aim of Article 103 is to reflect 
the secondary rule of primacy of the UN Charter as constitutional rules. Therefore, it 
should cover all possible incompatibility scenarios involving norms that create rights 
and duties and those that create liberties and no rights, power and liability, as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (Walter Wheeler 
Cook ed, The Lawbook exchange, LTD 2010) 36; See Ibid 341. 
227 Andreas Paulus and Johann Leiß, ‘Article 103’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The 
Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary Volume II (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 2123. 
228 E.g. Jenks proposes: 'conflict in the strict sense of direct incompatibility arises only 
where a party to the two treaties cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under 
both treaties', C Wilfred Jenks, ‘Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’ (1953) 30 BYIL 401, 426. 
229 Paulus and Leiß (n 227) 2123; Erich Vranes, ‘The Definition of “Norm Conflict” in 
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immunity and disability.230 For example, the wider definition of conflict of norms 
proposed by Pauwelyn where conflict refers to the situation in which ‘[e]ssentially 
two norms are, therefore, in a relationship of conflict if one constitutes, has led to, or 
may lead to, a breach of the other’231 can provide a helpful to provide a scope of 
conflict in the light of this article 
 
In reality, the ambiguity of the term leads to a dispute regarding whether Article 103 
may exclusively apply in cases of incompatibilities between obligations or not. 
In the Lockerbie Case, Libya contended that Article 103 of the Charter, which refers 
only to obligations, may not apply to rights under international agreements or under 
general international law.232  Libya believed that the UN Charter prevails over 
conflicting obligations, but that is not the case for inconsistent explicit rights.233 In 
response to Libya's claim, the UK riposted:  
 
The obligation to comply with Security Council decisions applies fully both to 
decisions affecting the rights and to those affecting the obligations of States. 
The relevant provisions of the Charter are phrased broadly and are intended to 
be broad in effect. They must be in order to assure the effectiveness of the 
régime of Chapter VII and in interpreting this aspect of the Charter, this Court 
has not recognized any distinction between "rights" and "obligations" … 
Suppose a bilateral treaty gives the nationals of each party the right to invest in 
the territory of the other. Surely the Charter gives the Security Council the 
power in a Chapter VII situation to require that one party prohibit investments 
by its nationals in the territory of the other, notwithstanding these treaty 
provisions.234 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 See the definitions and interactions between these eights fundamental legal concepts in 
Hohfeld (n 226). 
231 Pauwelyn (n 13) 176; Likewise, Kelsen’s definition of conflict is '…conflict between two 
norms occurs if in obeying or applying one norm, the other one is necessarily or possibly 
violated'. Hans Kelsen, ‘Conflicts between Obligations under the Charter of the United 
Nations and Obligations under Other International Agreements - An Analysis of Article 103 
of the Charter’ (1948) 10 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 284. 
232 Mr. Crook, UK Statement, Public sitting held on Wednesday 15 October 1997, at 10 
a.m., CR 1997/19, para. 3.35. 
233 Pauwelyn (n 13) 340. 
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Regrettably, due to the withdrawal of the case by the disputed states, the ICJ did not 
have a chance to decide on this issue.235 However, it will be absurd if a claim similar 
to that of Libya is upheld in any court since that would mean that the effect of Article 
103 could be circumvented simply by articulation of the obligation in conflict with 
the Charter as its correlative right, and this would create a big loophole and virtually 
disable Article 103. 
 
B. Obligations under the Present Charter 
 
The phrase ‘obligations under the present Charter’ has been interpreted as including 
two kinds of obligations: first, obligations that are generated directly from the text of 
the Charter, such as the duty to settle international disputes by peaceful means 
(Article 2(3)) and the duty to restrain from the use of force (Article 2(4)); secondly, 
obligations deriving from the binding decisions of UN organs.236  At the San 
Francisco Conference, it was explained that conflicts within the meaning of Article 
103 may be based on obligations directly created by the Charter or obligations to 
comply with a decision of UN Charter organs:  
 
It is immaterial whether the conflict arise because of intrinsic inconsistency 
between the two categories of obligations or as a result of the application of the 
provisions of the Charter under given circumstances: e.g. in the case where 
economic sanctions were applied against a state which derives benefits or 
advantages from previous agreements contrary to said sanctions.237  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 See ICJ Press Release 2003/29 http://www.icj- 
cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=168&code=lus&p1=3&p2=3&p3=6&case=89&k=82. 
236 Liivoja (n 182) 585–587 and 591; Paulus and Leiß (n 227) 2124–2125 However, for a 
contrary view, see Separate Opinion of Judge Rezek, Questions of Interpretation and 
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, 152. 
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The obligation to comply with a decision of the SC by virtue of Article 25 of the 
Charter is construed as an obligation in the second category.238 The application of 
Article 103 of the Charter to SC resolution has been confirmed in the Lockerbie case, 
in which the ICJ ruled:  
 
Whereas both Libya and the United States, as Members of the United Nations, 
are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with Article 25 of the Charter; whereas the Court … in accordance 
with Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of the Parties in that respect 
prevail over their obligations under any other international agreement, 
including the Montreal Convention… .239  
 
Nevertheless, as Bowett suggests, a binding decision of the SC is not per se an 
obligation under the Charter. It is a duty to comply with such a decision which is an 
obligation under the Charter.240 Accordingly, the obligations created by binding 
decisions of the organs are not per se obligations under the Charter, but the duty to 
comply with such a decision is an obligation under the Charter. This means that 
Article 103 may apply to obligations arising from binding decisions of UN organs 
only when such decisions do not conflict with the Charter.241 For example, the 
decisions of UN organs which are ultra vires are not protected by Article 103. 
 
Based on the wider interpretation of the scope of conflict under this Article, the 
decisions of UN organs protected under this Article should not be limited to 
decisions that create an obligation, but also those that create authorization/ 
permission, as a conflict can be created by a conflict between the authorization of 
UN organs for certain actions and the prohibition of such actions by other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Article 25 of the Charter provides that: ‘The Members of the United Nations agree to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.’ 
239 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising 
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), 
Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, para. 45. 
240  Derek Bowett, ‘The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement 
Procedures’ (1994) 5 EJIL 89, 92. 
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international rules.242 This wider interpretation is reflected in the Al Jeda Case, in 
which the UK House of Lords ruled that interpretation of Article 103 also covers 
authorization for the sake of effectiveness of the UN system.243 Although, on this 
matter, the European Court of Human Rights does not explicitly discuss the scope of 
Article 103 over an authorization, arguably, the court impliedly admits this notion, as 
it expressly stated that SC Resolution 1546 authorised the United Kingdom to take 
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq. However, 
it did not rule that Article 103 was not applicable to the case but went on to 
determine whether a conflict existed or not, and ruled that in the absence of a binding 
obligation to use internment, there was no conflict between the United Kingdom’s 
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and its obligations under Article 
5 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.244 Given the fact that when 
applying Article 24 of the Charter the SC tends to authorize state members to use 
force rather than obliging them to do so, if Article 103 is not to apply to such 
authorization, this might undermine the effectiveness of the collective security 
system.245 
 
During consideration of the report of the Special Committee on Decolonization on 
the situation concerning Territories under Portuguese administration, the Fourth 
Committee decided that the term obligation should be construed as going beyond the 
text of the Charter and the binding resolutions or decisions of UN bodies,246 
including an obligation arising from the headquarters agreement.247 Thus, it might be 
inferred that apart from the text of the Charter and the binding resolutions or 
decisions of UN bodies, obligations generated by the agreement entered into by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 Paulus and Leiß (n 227) 2122 and 2125–2127. 
243 R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Defence 
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Rodger), para. 135 (Lord Carswell) and para. 152 (Lord Brown).  
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245 Ibid 2122–2123; see further discussions in Robert Kolb (n 181). 
246 Liivoja (n 182) 587. 
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UN fall within the scope of the term ‘obligations under the present Charter’248 since, 
as Bernhardt suggests, such agreements were established to enable the UN to achieve 
its aims effectively.249 
 
However, in the Nuclear Test case, a legal question of whether or not obligations 
arising from an optional clause to submit a dispute to the ICJ are under the protection 
of Article 103 and trump conflicting obligations created by the General Act of 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1928 was raised.250 Despite the fact 
that the Court ruled that there was no objection to the jurisdiction without addressing 
this issue, in a Joint Dissenting Opinion, four judges addressed this matter and 
rejected the application of Article 103, explaining:  
 
The Charter itself places no obligation on member States to submit their 
disputes to judicial settlement, and any such obligation assumed by a Member 
under the optional clause of the Statute is therefore undertaken as a voluntary 
and additional obligation which does not fall within the purview of Article 
103.251  
 
Nevertheless, the reasoning discussed in this joint dissenting opinion is not against 
the notion that obligations under the Charter should be given a relatively wide 
meaning, taking into account the established practices and aims of the UN.252 
 
C. Article 103 and International Rules Deriving from other Sources of International 
Law Apart from Treaties 
 
Article 103 explicitly refers to situations where the rules of the UN Charter conflict 
with international rules deriving from international agreements, which is interpreted 
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249 Bernhardt (n 199) 1296. 
250 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, 253. 
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to cover not only all kinds of international agreements under international law253 but 
also contracts, licences and permits between states under domestic law.254 The ILC 
noted that ‘there is nothing troubling in viewing agreements between States 
subjected to municipal law as international agreements for present purposes’.255 
However, as the text does not address conflicts between the Charter and international 
rules deriving from other sources of international law, this leads to debates about the 
relationship between the Charter and other sources of norms apart from treaties.  
 
There exists a legal opinion that denies the primacy of the Charter over norms which 
are not international agreements. Based on the text of Article 103, Bowett and 
Orakhelashvili comment that Article 103 by itself cannot accommodate the 
superiority of the Charter over norms which are not treaties.256 Strictly relying on the 
text of Article 103 alone, such a comment is correct. However, this does not prevent 
one from arguing that the unwritten secondary rule regarding the primacy of the 
Charter that is reflected in Article 103 may go beyond the wording of Article 103 
and account for the primacy of the Charter over norms which are not treaties. 
Further, MacDonald argues that for protection of the non-derogability of jus cogens 
rules, states shall not be capable of agreeing a clause in a treaty in order to derogate 
or violate jus coegens rules, which exist as part of customary international law. 
Therefore, Article 103 does not apply to conflicts between the Charter and 
international customary law. 257  Rather, such arguments focus on the special 
character of jus cogens. Thus, as for the relationship between the Charter and jus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA) 
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cogens, both of which, arguably, have a status of higher law in international law, this 
should be seen as being distinguished from that between the UN Charter and 
ordinary customary international law. 
 
On the other side, some scholars favour the effect of the primacy of the chapter to 
cover norms deriving from other sources of law. Basing their arguments on the 
constitutional status of the Charter, Dupuy is of the opinion that its omission as to the 
relationship between the Charter and customary international law does not 
necessarily undermine the interpretation of Article 103 in light of the constitutional 
character of the Charter.258 Likewise, Bernhardt claims that Article 103 must be 
interpreted by taking Article 25 and the character of the Charter as a constitution of 
the international community into consideration, and this means that the underlying 
purpose Article 103 shall extend to cases of conflict between the Charter and 
international rules, other than those stemming from treaties.259 Similarly, the ILC 
argues that: ‘…given the character of some Charter provisions, the constitutional 
character of the Charter and the established practice of States and United Nations 
organs, Charter obligations may also prevail over inconsistent customary 
international law’.260 The acceptance of the superiority of the Charter over norms 
rather than treaties is reflected in SC Resolution 1343 (2001). In this resolution, the 
SC called on all States and relevant international organizations to comply with the 
resolution, ‘notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations entered 
into, or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of adoption of this 
resolution’.261 This resolution differs from the preceding practice of UN organs in 
the context of the primacy of the UN Charter, since the words ‘conferred or imposed 
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by any international agreement or any contract’ are omitted.262 
 
The effect of becoming a constitution of the international community can go beyond 
the text of Article 103, as the rule of primacy of the Charter represents a hierarchy of 
the international community not just an ordinary conflict clause. The will of the 
international community to protect the shared values of the international community 
will never be fulfilled unless the secondary rule of the primacy of the Charter applies 
to every will-based rule, no matter whether it is a treaty or a custom. Explained in 
light of the value-based consitutionalization of international law, community-value-
based rules can be perceived as constitutional rules of the international community. 
Thus, the obligation of the UN Charter as a written constitutional rule shall prevail 
over other obligations deriving from non-constitutional rules generated by any state-
will-based sources of norms. Therefore, the secondary rule of primacy of the Charter 
shall be applied to customary international law and unilateral acts. 
 
D. Non-member States 
 
The application of Article 103 to agreements between UN members is 
unquestionable.263  However, a highly problematical situation arises when non-
member states are involved in either a case of conflict between the Charter and a 
treaty concluded by member states and non-member states, or one between the 
Charter and a treaty concluded only by non-member states.  Although the fact that 
virtually all states in the world have become a member of the United Nations makes 
this issue of ‘little practical value’ to discuss 264 , this issue is theoretically 
fundamental to the status of the UN Charter as a constitution of the international 
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As far as the wording of the article is concerned, to apply Article 103, at least one 
party to the international agreement in conflict with the Charter is to be a UN 
member state. Thus, literally, Article 103 might be applicable to treaties between 
member states and non-member states, but not those between non-member states.265 
During the drafting process of the UN Charter, the relevant committee gave its 
opinion on this issue:  
 
The Committee is fully aware that as a matter of international law it is not 
ordinarily possible to provide in any convention for rules binding upon third 
parties. On the other hand, it is of the highest importance for the Organization 
that the performance of the members' obligations under the Charter in specific 
cases should not be hindered by obligations which they may have assumed to 
non-member States. The Committee has had these considerations in view when 
drafting the text. The suggested text is accordingly not limited to pre-existing 
obligations between members.266  
 
Thus, the travaux préparatoires of the Charter also suggest that Article 103 does not 
restrictively apply to a scenario involving inter-se agreements between UN 
members.267Nonetheless, considering the pacta tertiis rule, non-member states are 
not bound by Article 103 as they do not give their consent to the Charter.268 
Therefore, based on the law of treaties, Article 103 may apply to neither international 
agreements between member states nor those between non-member states. Mus, 
however, argues that the reason for the inclusion of Article 103 into the UN Charter 
and the reference to it in paragraph 1 of Article 30 of the VCLT is ‘to stress the 
importance of the UN Charter above other treaties and international instruments in 
the international community, even for states which are not member states of the 
UN’.269 Accordingly, Mus seems to imply that Article 103 also applies to those 
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treaties concluded by non-member states due to the importance of the Charter.  
 
In the Reparation for Injuries Case, the ICJ opined that:  
 
[T]he vast majority of the members of the international community, had the 
power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity 
possessing objective international personality, and not merely personality 
recognized by them alone, together with capacity to bring international 
claims.270  
 
According to this advisory opinion, the UN had legal personality not only vis-à-vis 
Member States, but also in relation to non-Member States. Of course, it should be 
noted that the composition and the width of the membership of international 
organizations are not a necessary condition for the creation of an objective 
personality for an international organization which binds all states, as the legal 
personality of any international organization does not rely on its factual recognition 
by states or the international community but rather on the secondary rule of the 
international legal system that establishes a legal personality for an international 
organization.271 However, this message hints that, in the opinion of the court, due to 
its vast membership, the UN represents the will of the international community and 
this serves as a ground for the special character of the relationship between the UN 
and non-member states which are also part of the international community. 
Seemingly, Mus’s notion of the importance of the Charter and the UN’s 
representativeness vis-à-vis the international community in the view of ICJ are 
compatible with the idea of a taxonomy of state-will-based rules and community-
value-based rules based on their source of validity.  
 
As illustrated before, the linking of the Charter to the fundamental shared values of 
the international community earns the Charter the status of community-value-based 
rules and, similar to jus cogens rules, the UN Charter would not only be a higher but 
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also a universal law, due to the importance of the values it protects. If the Charter is a 
universal rule, then its provisions, including article 103, should be applied to all 
states in the international community. Thus, the next step is to examine the 
universality of the Charter and its ability to accommodate the universal application of 
the rule of primacy of the UN Charter, as reflected in Article 103.  
 
The kernel of the discussion about the universality of the Charter hinges on Article 
2(6), which states: ‘The Organisation shall ensure that states which are not Members 
of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be 
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.’   
 
However, this proposition that Article 2(6) imposes an obligation on non-state 
members is quite problematic, as it is not exactly accommodated by the text of the 
Article itself. Tomuschat argues: ‘Article 2(6) invites the Organization to use its best 
efforts with a view to inducing non-member States to adapt their conducts to the 
exigencies of the Charter, but does not directly address these States’.272 Accordingly, 
this provision does not endeavour to obligate non-members; rather, it imposes an 
obligation on the UN.273  For instance, several times, Switzerland, prior to its 
membership of the UN, insisted that it took part in the enforcements imposed by the 
SC at its liberty or executed similar sanctions imposed autonomously.274 However, 
after reading such an argument, one might be curious as to whether or not the fact 
that this article has obligated the UN to ensure that non-member states act in 
accordance with the Charter might be interpreted as meaning that it also impliedly 
imposes an obligation on non-state members. Otherwise, liability could accrue to the 
UN and state members that enforce the UN Charter rules or SC resolutions on non-
member states. For example, when the SC authorizes or demands the member states 
to implement economic or military measures against non-member states which might 
result in violations of relevant international rules. Therefore, Article 2(6) should be 
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regarded as not only imposing a duty on the UN, but also as conferring a right on the 
UN to demand that non-member states comply with relevant rules. An interpretation 
to the contrary would mean that the Charter to some extent obliged the UN to 
commit violations of international rules, which would not have been the intention of 
the drafters. Thus, examining the drafting history of Article 2 (6) of the Charter 
might shed some light on this issue. 
 
Historically, the idea behind this article can be traced back to the Dumbarton 
Proposal as an affirmation of the power of the UN to impose obligations on third-
party States, insofar as it is necessary for the maintenance of peace.275 It was 
explained that: ‘The Charter now being drawn up is not a special covenant but a 
general one which will, some day, we hope, be universal … it will stand out as the 
will of most of the civilized States – some, indeed, will call it the collective 
conscience of humanity.’276 The relevant Rapporteur expressed the view that ‘the 
paragraph was intended to provide a justification for extending the power of the 
Organization to apply to the actions of non-members’.277 The delegate from Belgium 
stated that for him this was a most important provision, explaining: 
 
…for the Organization should not be paralyzed by having a state invoke 
provisions such as the Hague Agreements, neutrality agreements etc. … the 
Organization could ignore the claim made by non-members because it would 
be the authorized expression of the international legal community.278  
 
In the same vein, the Australian delegate posited that despite the difficulty regarding 
its enforcement, this article is essential and ‘[t]he Organization would have to see 
that everything possible would be done to suppress an aggressor’.279During the 
drafting process, the word ‘should’ was replaced by the word ‘shall’, which 
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emphasizes the obligation imposed on the UN by this Article.280 It is also noted by 
the relevant Subcommittee that:   
 
[T]he vote [which adopts Article 2(6)]was taken on the understanding that the 
association of the United Nations, representing the major expression of the 
international legal community, is entitled to act in a manner which will insure 
the effective cooperation of non- member states with it, so far as that is 
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.”281  
 
This reflects that the intention of the drafters not only to impose the obligation on the 
UN but also to confer on the UN the right to demand the non-member states. This 
right of the UN to demand non-member states to comply with relevant rules and 
sanctions is correlative to the duty of non-member states to comply with the UN’s 
demand. Further, this also hints the thought that the universality of the UN Charter 
comes from the fact that it represents the will of the international community. 
However, the phrase ‘so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international 
peace and security’ was intended to limit the relevant obligations and rights 
generated by Article 2(6) to issues falling within the scope of the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 282  Of course, while having some persuasive 
authority in interpreting the relevant text, the drafting history does not serve as a 
decisive determining factor. 
 
The practice of the SC may be a reflection of the acceptance by officials of the 
universality of the Charter. Arguably, the SC seemingly believes that its resolutions 
can have a legally binding effect, not only on member states but also on non-member 
states.283 In resolution 101, the SC reminded the Governments of Israel and Jordan, 
which were not yet members of the UN, of their obligations under its resolution.284 
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This SC dropped its early distinctive approach when it made demands on member 
states regarding its binding decisions in operative paragraphs and when it urged non-
state members or called upon non-members. The Resolution 418285 was the first time 
the SC addressed a binding resolution affecting all states, including non-member 
states, and at that moment, more than ten states did not have UN membership.286 
Since then, in adopting Chapter VII-based resolutions, the SC constantly addresses 
relevant resolutions to all states, rather than only to UN state members.287 Further, 
not only has the SC requested that non-member states implement sanctions on other 
states, but it has also enacted enforcement measures against them, for example 
against Rhodesia288 and against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro).289 Nonetheless, none of them denied the legality of such sanctions 
based on the fact that they were not members of the UN.290  
 
However, Tomuschat argues that as the relevant Charter principles exist as part of 
currently existing customary international rules, the UN, of course, has legitimacy to 
warn non-member states regarding their customary obligations. 291 Likewise, Liivoja 
maintains: ‘…there would be nothing to prevent the UN, and its Members for that 
matter, from using all legally available avenues for securing the cooperation of non-
Members’.292 However, can the practice of the UN be comfortably seen as an act 
reminding non-members of their obligations or securing their co-operation? The 
practice of the SC since 1977 has been that, in adopting Chapter VII-based 
resolutions, it regularly addresses relevant resolutions to all states, rather than only to 
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UN state members,293 which seems to suggest a negative answer to this question. 
Nonetheless, in contrast, Liivoja offers an explanation opposing the binding 
character of SC resolutions on non-member states, in that, despite the non-binding 
nature of the Charter and SC resolutions on non-member states, the UN may call 
upon such states to make efforts for the fulfilment of its resolutions.294 However, 
Liivoja does not offer any reason why such a practice should be interpreted in that 
fashion. One observation that needs to be made here is that if the addressing to and 
imposing of sanctions on non-member states by the SC, via its binding resolutions, 
are interpreted as, at best, a call by the SC for co-operation, why then, so far, have 
there been no states, especially those with sanctions imposed on them, claiming non-
membership as a ground for refusing to comply with such decisions? Further, 
arguably, the fact that there have been no objections made by non-member states 
regarding the bindingness of SC resolutions addressing or sanctioning on them on the 
ground of non-membership can also be taken as the acquiescence of such states to 
the universal application of the Charter to all states.295 In other words, this illustrates 
the acceptance by the international community of the universality of the Charter as 
an effect of the UN Charter being a value-based norm that protects the fundamental 
values of the international community and that it is to be regarded as a higher law 
and a universal law in order to fulfil its aims. This also reflects the status of the 
Charter as the written constitution of the international community. The phrase ‘so far 
as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security’ not 
only puts a limitation on this Article but also signifies that the power of the UN 
Charter to create an obligation on the part of non-member states is generated by the 
importance of the shared values that the Charter protects, which is the maintenance 
of peace and security. In certain situations, the maintenance of peace and security 
can be interpreted as including the protection of fundamental human rights, which is 
essential for the creation of peace. Accordingly, shared fundamental values of peace 
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and fundamental human rights are a source of, and at the same time a limitation on, 
the bindingness of the UN Charter vis-à-vis non-member states. The universality of 
the UN Charter makes Article 103 applicable to non-member states. Through the 
lens of the constitutionalist, Article 103 shall function as a rule in relation to the 
hierarchy of the international legal system and be applicable to all members of the 
international community. 
 
3.3.3. Legal Consequences of the Secondary Rule of the Primacy of The UN Charter 
 
In the case of a conflict falling within the scope of application of Article 103, the 
legal consequence designated is that ‘obligations under the present Charter shall 
prevail’. Although the term ‘prevail’ has a clear meaning, that obligations arising 
from the Charter shall be enforced,296 this does however leave some uncertainty over 
what happens to superseded obligations, whether they are ‘void, voidable, 
suspendable or unenforceable’.297 In other words, is Article 103 a secondary rule of 
priority or of validity?298  Also there is the question of to ‘what extent other 
arrangements should be superseded or nullified’.299  
 
ILC suggests that ‘the word “prevail” does not grammatically imply that the lower-
ranking provision would become automatically null and void, or even suspended’.300 
It is argued that the use of the word ‘prevail’, instead of the stronger term ‘abrogate’, 
as employed in the Covenant of the League of Nations, signifies that a normative 
conflict falling under this article shall have less serious legal consequences, other 
than abrogation.301 Kelsen, however, proposes that the word ‘prevail’ instead of 
‘abrogate’ was preferred because ‘[t]he term "abrogate" usually refers only to the 
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subsequent norm’. Hence, ‘It may be that the term "prevail" instead of "abrogate" has 
been chosen to cover the invalidation by the Charter of inconsistent, preceding as 
well as subsequent, treaty obligations’.302  Therefore, interpretation of the term 
‘prevail’ does not give a clear-cut answer to the question. 
  
Three alternatives for the consequences of the application of Article 103 are 
suggested by academics. The first proposition is that the result of this Article is the 
invalidity of a conflicting norm.303 Fassbender, in particular, argues that the UN 
Charter is a constitutional rule and therefore the effect of Article 103 leads to the 
same legal consequence as the rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens rules, which 
is the invalidation of conflicting rules.304 The second alternative is that Article 103 
does not invalidate or nullify the conflicting rule but gives priority to the Charter and 
temporarily suspends the conflicting rule until the conflict disappears.305 The third 
alternative, proposed by Bernhardt, articulates that the consequences of violation of 
Article 103 can be divided into two scenarios, namely, conflicts of norms with the 
provisions of the Charter and conflicts of norms with the binding decisions of UN 
organs. In the first scenario, where a normative conflict involves an obligation 
generated directly by the provisions of the Charter, the violating norm shall be 
unenforceable and void. However, in the second scenario, which is not per se in 
conflict with Charter rules but in conflict with the chapter VII-based SC resolution, 
the superseded norm shall be temporarily suspended as long as the resolution is still 
in force.306 
 
In cases of conflict of other international rules with a binding decision of the SC 
Chapter VII resolutions, the interpretation of Article 103 as a rule of priority is 
patently more preferable. As Klabbers observes, such conflicts tend to happen in ‘a 
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short-term scenario’ since SC sanctions are likely ‘to be temporary in design’.307 
Therefore, it might lead to an absurd consequence if a conflict with only temporary 
and specific decisions of the SC were to nullify a whole conflicting treaty which, at 
the abstract level, does not conflict with UN Charter rules. Take for example the 
Lockerbie case, in which there existed a conflict between an SC resolution and the 
Montreal convention. The SC resolution in dispute could be implemented given just 
a temporary suspension of a conflicting provision of the Montreal Convention, 
showing that this provision conflicted with the Charter in a concrete or ad hoc 
manner but not at an abstract level. 308 Thus, the option to nullify either only the 
conflicting provision(s) or the whole Montreal Convention rather than temporary 
suspension would have been illogical. Accordingly, the first alternative that renders 
the conflicting norm invalid in both cases of conflict with the Charter rule and the 
decisions of UN organs is not to be taken as a proper choice. The problem with the 
second alternative would be that, given the constitutional character of the Charter, 
the conflict with constitutional law should be interpreted as resulting in the invalidity 
of the conflicting norm for it conflicts with the supreme law of the system. For the 
third alternative it can be argued that there exists no textual basis for a distinction 
between the results of cases of conflict with Charter rules and the decisions of UN 
organs. However, there exists a substantive difference between cases of direct 
conflict with the substance of the UN Charter and conflicts with obligations created 
by the SC resolution. The former directly conflict with the UN Charter and are not 
temporal in nature whilst the latter occur at a specific level and are not per se in 
conflict with the substance of the Charter but are in conflict with the chapter VII-
based SC resolution and temporal in their nature. This distinction could provide a 
reasonable ground for the Court to interpret the consequences of such cases 
differently, and although there is no solid textual basis for this distinction, the 
unclear content of such an article does indeed leave some room for interpretation by 
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the Courts to develop secondary rules regarding this matter.   
 
With regard to the extent to which a colliding agreement should be declared void or 
suspended, the proposition taken here is that in the case of a conflict of norms with a 
direct obligation directly arising from Charter law, resulting in the invalidity of 
violating norms, due to its proximity to the protection of the shared values of the 
international community, it can be modelled on Articles 53 and 64 of the VCLT in 
the case of norms conflicting with jus cogens. Accordingly, the rule of separability 
should apply to violating norms precedent to the Charter, but not to those subsequent 
to the Charter. However, in the case of norms conflicting with an obligation not 
directly arising from the Charter, the rule of primacy of the Charter should suspend 
only a specific provision that conflicts with the decision of the UN organ,309 i.e. the 
rule of separability shall apply, no matter whether the conflicting norm is precedent 
or subsequent to the relevant UN organ’s decision. Otherwise, it will result in an 
absurd situation where the conflict of only one provision of a certain treaty which 
does not conflict with Charter rules but only with a decision of a UN organ 
unnecessarily leads to suspension of the whole treaty. 
 
3.3.4. Supremacy of International Primary Rules Protecting Peace and Fundamental 
Human Rights Established by the Secondary Rule of Primacy of the UN Charter  
 
It has been shown that the secondary rule of the primacy of the UN Charter reflects 
the elevation of substantive rules of the Charter into higher primary rules of the 
international legal system and reflects the status of the UN Charter as a written 
constitution of the international community. Apart from those with the status of jus 
cogens, if other international rules, in whatever form of international law they exist, 
conflict with the provision of the UN Charter, this will result in their invalidity, 
whilst if they do not conflict with the provisions of the UN Charter but rather with 
the binding decisions of UN organs, their application will be temporarily suspended 
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until the conflict disappears. The status of the UN Charter as the constitution of the 
international community is, theoretically, based on its link to the fundamental shared 
values of the international community, and the acceptance of the rule of primacy of 
the UN Charter, reflected in Article 103 of the Charter, has created a hierarchical 
structure of the primary rules in the international system. Exploring the underlying 
purpose of the Charter, the Charter rules serve the international community’s 
fundamental shared values, which are the protection of international peace and 
fundamental human rights. Similar to the non-derogability of jus cogens, the primacy 
of the UN Charter elevates international primary rules that protect those two values 
into higher rules of the international system and similarly provide a limitation on the 
law-making power of states, since if states enter into agreements that conflict with 
the UN Charter, such agreements are not enforceable. This has again confirmed, via 
the most important written legal instrument of the international community, that the 
protection of peace and fundamental human rights are values fundamental to the 
survival of the international community and these need to be protected by the higher 
and universal rules of the international legal system. The secondary rule of the 
primacy of the UN Charter also plays a role in limiting the law-making power of 
states with respect to peace and fundamental human rights. Thus, together with the 
secondary rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens, the secondary rule of the 
primacy of the UN Charter has contributed to the establishment of a hierarchical 
structure of the international legal system that confers higher status on international 
primary rules protecting peace and fundamental human rights, which is one of the 
necessary conditions for turning international law into a constitutionalized legal 
system. However, as the substantive rules of the Charter and the jus cogens rules are 
not the same set of rules, and each has its own process of creation and change, there 
exists the possibility that rules from these two sets of higher rules will conflict with 
each other, and so this is an issue that will be dealt with in the next section. 
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As it is proposed here that both jus cogens rules and the substantive rules of the UN 
Charter exist as constitutional primary rules of the international legal system, this 
leads to one of the most complicated issues regarding conflicts between them. 
 
Based on the unifying rule of recognition of the international community, the validity 
of primary rules derives from fundamental shared values of the international 
community and the rules of jus cogens and the Charter exists as a higher law, as they 
are rules perceived by the international community as protecting the fundamental 
shared values of the international community. At a particular moment, the 
international community holds only one set of content of fundamental shared values. 
Therefore, jus cogens and the Charter rules must earn their validity from the same 
content of values, and this leads to the notion that if these two set of norms are to 
have a higher status at the same moment, the contents of the two norms should be in 
harmony. Indeed, fundamental shared values of the international community can 
conflict with each other. However, such conflicts of fundamental values shall be 
resolved by a collective decision of the international community and the content of 
community-value-based rules will reflect such compromises between fundamental 
values in term of general rules and exceptions. Thus, rules which can be deemed as 
accurately reflecting the content of fundamental shared values must also reflect any 
compromise between fundamental values which exist in the form of general rules 
and exceptions. Accordingly, jus cogens and the Charter will be in harmony if they 
reflect such content. In other words, where overlaps between the contents of the UN 
Charter and jus cogens rules occur, and both accurately reflect the beliefs of the 
international community regarding fundamental shared values, the written rules of 
the Charter must be an expression of the content of jus cogens. However, this does 
not necessarily mean that every unwritten jus cogens rule will have a counterpart 
written rule in the UN Charter.310 For example, a rule for the common heritage of 
mankind does not appear in the Charter. 
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A number of scholars agree with the academic opinion that sustains that, at least 
currently, the Charter is the expression or confirmation of pre-existing unwritten 
fundamental rules of the international community, i.e. jus cogens rules.311  Exploring 
the current content of the UN Charter, conflicts between two sets of norms cannot be 
identified, while conflicts that have materialized and been brought before the court, 
such as in the Yussuf case and Kadi case are between jus cogens rules and SC 
resolutions, rather than involving the Charter.  
 
However, this does not rule out the possibility of conflicts because they are two 
separate sets of rules and can change according to relevant secondary rules of 
change. To elaborate more, based on Article 53 of the VCLT, the contents of jus 
cogens can be modified and, likewise, based on Articles 108–109 of the UN Charter, 
the Charter can be amended. In possible conflict scenarios due to the change in their 
contents, certain scholars are of the view that jus cogens rules will prevail over the 
Charter.312 The ILC is also in favour of jus cogens, articulating:  
 
[I]f United Nations Member States are unable to draw up valid agreements in 
dissonance with jus cogens, they must also be unable to vest an international 
organization with the power to go against peremptory norms. Indeed both 
doctrine and practice unequivocally confirm that conflicts between the United 
Nations Charter and norms of jus cogens result not in the Charter obligations’ 
pre-eminence, but their invalidity. In this sense, the United Nations Charter is 
an international agreement as any other treaty.313  
 
Nevertheless, in contrast, Fassbender disagrees with the higher position of jus 
cogens, arguing that ‘those peremptory norms, all of which are based on the rules 
and values of the Charter, could not exist independently of the Charter’314 and that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311 MacDonald (n 86) 145; Fassbender (n 84) 164; Spijkers (n 64) 72–73; Dupuy (n 198) 
13–14; Hossain (n 8) 85. 
312  Anne Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of 
Fundamental International Norms and Structures’ (2006) 19 LJIL 579, 598; Orakhelashvili 
(n 256). 
313 ILC Report on Fragmentation of International Law, para. 346. 
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jus cogens rules are ‘a logical prolongation of the Law of the Charter’.315 However, 
these arguments seem to possess certain shortcomings. Indeed, as illustrated before, 
despite, in the context of jus cogens, the lack of development of institutional rules to 
implement and enforce jus cogens rules, the non-derogability of jus cogens can still 
be enforced outside the UN system. Thus, the claim that jus cogens rules are 
independent of the UN Charter is not sustainable. Even if it were true, the more 
developed structure of the UN system could not be a compelling reason to grant the 
UN Charter superior status, since what gives both norms a special status pertains to a 
substantive point and the link to fundamental values of the international community. 
Moreover, there are certain jus cogens rules which are not codified in the UN Charter 
and new jus cogens might develop outside the UN system. Thus the claim that jus 
cogens is a logical prolongation of the UN Charter does not reflect such a fact or 
possibility. On the contrary, the UN Charter shall be deemed as an attempt to provide 
an institutional structure to implement jus cogens rules 
 
It will be argued here that jus cogens is superior in a case of conflict with the 
Charter. The reason is that, as proposed here, what constitutes the special character 
of jus cogens and the UN Charter is the importance of the values they protect. Given 
the rule of change of jus cogens, according to Article 53, jus cogens rules can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character of jus cogens. According to the rule of recognition of jus cogens, 
subsequent norms can have jus cogens character only when the international 
community accepts them as being non-derogable, i.e. they protect fundamental 
shared values of the international community. Thus, jus cogens rules which can exist 
as unwritten rules will always correspond to the content of the fundamental shared 
values of the international community. Hence, changes to jus cogens are always 
based on a change to the content of fundamental shared values. Differently, changes 
to the UN Charter do not always reflect the content of fundamental shared values 
since, according to Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter, the process of modification 
only requires a two-thirds vote of members of the UN, including all permanent 






	   	  
218	  
members of the SC.316 Thus, such procedures are based primarily on the community 
of states’ view and this does not necessarily represent the view of the essential 
components of the international community of humankind. This is where, based on 
the insistence that the current content of jus cogens and the Charter are in harmony, 
future conflicts of these two sets of norms would fit into two scenarios. First, there 
are changes in jus cogens that conflict with the current Charter. This happens when 
new jus cogens rules emerge and modify the current jus cogens rules and emerging 
jus cogens rules conflict with the current content of the UN Charter. In this case, jus 
cogens shall prevail as the new emerging jus cogens rules reflect changes to the 
content of fundamental shared values. This is because the current content of the 
Chapter does not correspond to changes in the content of fundamental shared values, 
thus depriving the constitutional status of the UN Charter. The second scenario is 
when the Charter is modified and such modification does not represent changes to 
the content of fundamental shared values of the international community. 
Consequently, the new content of the Charter can conflict with jus cogens rules 
which are based on the unaltered content of fundamental shared values. In a case 
where new content of the Charter conflicts with jus cogens, this would mean that it 
departs from the current content of fundamental shared values and cannot retain its 
constitutional character. However, when applying Article 53 of the VCLT, this 
should be interpreted as a conflict between an amendment to the Charter and jus 
cogens rules, and so making such an amendment or alteration should be deemed void 
and the content of the Charter left unmodified. Thus, it can be said that an 
amendment to or alteration of the Charter is subject to jus cogens rules, unless it 
reflects the view of the international community and establishes a new jus cogens 
rule. This is comparable to a situation in the domestic system where modification to 
a written constitution cannot be made in contravention of basic unwritten 
constitutional rules or written provisions expressing such unwritten rules.317 For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 See Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter. 
317 See the case-law of constitutional courts accepting the existence of implicit substantive 
limits on the constitutional amendment in Kemal Gözler, Judicial Review of Constitutional 
Amendments A Comparative Study (Ekin Press 2008) 84–97; see also the hierarchy among 
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example, The Turkish Constitutional Court, in its decision of 26 September 1965, 
No. 1965/40, 144, affirmed that ‘the constitutional amendments which ... destroy the 
basic rights and freedoms, rule of law principle, in one word, demolish the essence of 
the 1961 Constitution ... cannot be made in application of the Article 155’.318 The 
superiority of jus cogens rules over the Charter can also be seen as a limitation on the 
power of an ensemble of states as a representative of the international community to 
design, change or modify the written constitution of the international community.  
The majority will of the community of states might not always represent the view of 
the international community of humankind composed of all essential components, 
especially given the protection of the benefits of stateless persons who are a minority 
without a genuine representative in inter-state forums as well as the minority groups 
that can be under-represented by state agents. 
  
With respect to the legal consequences of a conflict between the UN Charter and jus 
cogens, it is suggested that the rule codified in Articles 53 and 64 of the VCLT may 
apply to such a conflict, as the UN Charter can still be seen as a treaty,319 especially 
when it departs from the shared values of the international community that created its 
special status. However, one might argue that Articles 53 and 64 of the VCLT cannot 
be applied to the relation between jus cogens and the Charter, which entered into 
force before the VCLT, in light of the rule of non-retroactivity in Article 4320 of the 
VCLT.321 Nonetheless, Hossain's view is that, despite the fact that the VCLT entered 
into force after the Charter, the rules embraced in Articles 53 and 64 of the VCLT 
can be applied as customary rules and the rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens 
rules as an unwritten rule was accepted as a rule of the international legal system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 4 AMKD 290 (1965),  as cited in Gözler (n 317) 96. 
319 Vidmar (n 47) 22. 
320 Article 4 of the VCLT provides that, ‘Without prejudice to the application of any rules 
set forth in the present Convention to which treaties would be subject under international law 
independently of the Convention, the Convention applies only to treaties which are 
concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard to such 
States.’ 





	   	  
220	  
before the creation of the Charter.322 Therefore, by virtue of the unwritten secondary 
rule codified in Article 53 of the VCLT, Charter rules will become void if they 
conflict with jus cogens rules. Added to this, based on an unwritten secondary rule 
codified in Article 64 of the VCLT which will apply in a case where the UN Charter 
conflicts with jus cogens rules, which have been altered, based on a change in the 
content of the shared values of the international community, the rule of separability 
shall apply and only a specific provision in the conflict will become void. 
 
Further, as the rule of primacy of the UN Charter also elevates the SC’s Chapter VII-
based resolution, conflicts between SC resolutions and jus cogens rules is the next 
issue to be discussed. The decisions of the SC are protected by Article 103 of the 
Charter and because the obligation of member states to comply with SC decisions 
according to Article 25 falls within the scope of Chapter VII, such an obligation falls 
within the scope of Article 103, as discussed before. Normally, if an SC resolution 
conflicts with jus cogens rules, it is very likely to conflict with the UN Charter. In 
such a case, the bindingness of SC resolutions can be rejected on both the ground of 
violation of the Charter, which is the basis of the power of the SC, and on the ground 
of violation of the rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens. However, there can be a 
situation where SC resolutions do not conflict with the Charter but are incompatible 
with jus cogens, since the provisions of the Charter are quite general in character and 
the Charter empowers the SC with some discretion to design measures under Chapter 
VII. In such a case, if the UN Charter is inferior to jus cogens in a case of conflict, 
this is also the case for SC decisions which are only an extension of the Charter. 
However, conflict avoidance should be resorted to first before applying conflict 
rules. For example, Rodley suggests that based on the wording of Article 1(3)323 of 
the Charter, an SC resolution should be interpreted on the presumption that, ‘the 
Security Council did not intend that actions taken pursuant to its resolutions should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Hossain (n 8) 88. 
323 Article 1(3) of the UN Charter provides: ‘To achieve international co-operation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, 
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms 
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violate human rights’, and ‘in any event, there was no intention that a peremptory 
norm of international (human rights) law (jus cogens) should be violated’.324 
 
The subjection of SC resolutions to jus cogens rules was explained in Judge 
Lauterpacht’s separate opinion in the Bosnia Genocide case, in that:  
 
The concept of jus cogens operates as a concept superior to both customary 
international law and treaty. The relief which Article 103 of the Charter may 
give the Security Council in case of conflict between one of its decisions and 
an operative treaty obligation cannot – as a matter of simple hierarchy of norms 
– extend to a conflict between a Security Council resolution and jus cogens. 
Indeed, one only has to state the opposite proposition thus – that a Security 
Council resolution may even require participation in genocide – for its 
unacceptability to be apparent.325  
 
The Court of First Instance of the EC took this approach in the Yusuf case, as the 
Court ruled that: ‘…there exists one limit to the principle that resolutions of the 
Security Council have binding effect: namely, that they must observe the 
fundamental peremptory provisions of jus cogens’.326 A similar approach was taken 
in the Kadi case in the ruling of the CFI.327 However, the ECJ turned around the 
decision of the CFI on the issue of the power to review the validity of SC solutions, 
ruling that it has no jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of a resolution adopted by 
an international body. However, the ECJ ruling on that issue is based on ‘the 
separateness’ of the EU from the international legal system328 in light of its sui 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck v. Belgium, Communication No. 1472/2006, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008). CCPR/C/89/D/1472/2006, Individual opinion of 
Committee member Sir Nigel Rodley (concurring), 36–37. 
325 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 325, 
Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, para. 100. 
326 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 21 September 2005 in Case T-306/01, Ahmed 
Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities, paras 280–281. 
327 Judgment of The Court of First Instance (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) of 21 
September 2005 in Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council And Commission, paras 229–230. 
328  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
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generis character in the sense that the EU is beyond being an international 
organization and on its way to developing into a state system. Accordingly, it should 
not serve as a precedent for international adjudicators.  
 
Regarding the legal consequence, SC resolutions which are in conflict with jus 
cogens rules will be void.329 Further, Orakhelashvili suggests that, arguably, the non-
severability effect on legal acts conflicting with jus cogens rules has not yet been 
accepted as part of customary international law. As a result, the rule of separation 
may apply to SC resolutions in conflict and protect the validity of other clauses 
which are in conformity with jus cogens rules.330 However, it is argued here that 
based on analogical reasons to the case of treaties in conflict with jus cogens, only 
SC resolutions that conflict with newly emerging jus cogens rules enjoy the benefit 
of the rule of separation, not those in conflict with pre-existing jus cogens rules. 
 
Thus, to conclude, since jus cogens rules need to be neither codified nor changed by 
a written instrument, they more promptly correspond to the content of fundamental 
shared values of the international community than the UN Charter that needs to be 
modified via a designated process. In possible future conflicts between jus cogens 
rules and the UN Charter, jus cogens will prevail. With regard to clashes between jus 
cogens and SC resolutions, normally, if an SC resolution conflicts with jus cogens 
rules, it is very likely to conflict with the UN Charter, and the bindingness of SC 
resolutions can be rejected on both the ground of violation of the Charter, which is 
the basis of the power of the SC, and on the ground of violation of the rule of the 
non-derogability of jus cogens. However, there can be situations where SC 
resolutions do not conflict with the Charter but are incompatible with jus cogens, 
since the provisions of the Charter are quite general in character and the Charter 
empowers the SC with some discretion to design measures under Chapter VII. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
International Legal System as a Constitution’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman 
(eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance 
(CUP 2009) 105. 
329 See the discussion about the legal consequences of a breach of jus cogens by SC 
resolutions in Orakhelashvili (n 256) 78–84. 
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V. Conclusion: The Existence of The Hierarchical Structure with the 
Supremacy of International Primary Rules Protecting Peace and Fundamental 
Human Rights in International Law 
 
A hierarchical structure that provides supremacy for international primary rules 
protecting peace and fundamental human rights, i.e. as constitutional primary rules, 
is essential to fulfilment of the constitutionalized international legal system’s limited 
mandate for peace and the protection of fundamental human rights. The international 
legal system recognizes the power of states to make international law due to, from 
the cosmopolitan paradigm, the respect for the constituent power-holders of the state, 
aka the people, as reflected in the principle of state equality.  This is to create 
international peace and prevent states from being forced, against their will, to enter 
into a legal relationship. Nonetheless, the unlimited international law-making power 
of states will pose a threat to peace and the protection of fundamental of human 
rights, since states will be able to opt out from international law creating an 
obligation to protect peace and fundamental human rights or even enter into an 
agreement whose purpose opposes peace and the protection of fundamental human 
rights. Primary constitutional rules will impose, apart from substantive coherence, 
limitations on the law-making power of states regarding peace and fundamental 
human right issues. This will contribute to more legitimacy for states to exercise their 
international law-making power. Based on the content of the unifying rule of 
recognition of the international legal system that accepts fundamental shared values 
as a source of validity of higher rules of the system, two sets of primary rules are 
elevated into constitutional primary rules of the international legal system – jus 
cogens rules and the UN Charter by the secondary rule of the non-derogability of jus 
cogens and the secondary rule of primacy of the Charter, because of their links to 
fundamental shared values. However, jus cogens rules and the substantive rules of 
the UN Charter exist as separate sets of rules in the same legal system and a change 
to one set of rules does not always result in a change in another. Therefore, conflicts 
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prevail since jus cogens are more closely linked to fundamental shared values of the 
international community which are a source of validity of both sets of rules’ 
constitutional status. 
 
As illustrated in this chapter, the fundamental values that are protected by those two 
sets of constitutional primary rules are peace and fundamental human rights. That is 
to say, it is the belief of the international community in the utmost importance of 
these two values to its survival that generates the universal and higher character of 
jus cogens rules and the Charter and elevates them into constitutional primary rules 
of the international legal system. Therefore, this reflects the international community 
having recognized the importance of these two values and the necessity of attributing 
constitutional status to the primary rules that protect peace and fundamental human 
rights in order to limit the legal power of states to opt out or derogate from them. 
Thus this belief of the international community is the driving force for and the 
rationale underlying the hierarchical structure of primary rules for the supremacy of 
the international primary rules protecting peace and fundamental human rights which 
have been already established in the international legal system.  
 
In this chapter, it has been shown that the hierarchical structure of international law 
conferring constitutional status on the international primary rules that protect peace 
and fundamental human rights exists in international law. However, although the 
hierarchical structure of international law as well as the systematic element of 
international law sustained in the preceding chapter has been affirmed, it does not 
suffice to confirm the quality of international law as a constitutionalized legal system 
with an aim of the establishment of international self-governance with a limited 
mandate over peace and fundamental human rights. Without the institutionalization 
of international constituted power which can be exercised against state wills to 
protect the hierarchical structure of the international legal system established to 
enforce the constitutional obligation to protect peace and fundamental human rights, 
the aim of international constitutionalism cannot be fulfilled. Thus, in the next 
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institutionalization of international constituted power with regard to the matter of 
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Chapter V: Institutionalization of International Constituted Power 




In Chapters III and IV, two out of three necessary conditions for a constitutionalized 
international legal system — the systematic quality and hierarchical structure of 
international primary rules with the supremacy for rules protecting peace and 
fundamental human rights were affirmed.  In this chapter, the final necessary 
condition for the emergence of constitutionalized international legal system, which is 
the institutionalization of international constituted power, will be discussed. 
 
In his famous political writing ‘What is the third estate’, Sieyès writes: ‘[i]n each of 
its part, a constitution is not the work of a constituted power but as a constituent 
power.’1 Loughlin argues that the concept of constituent power ‘helps us locate the 
source of modern political authority, and therefore identify the base upon which the 
structure of legal authority rests’.2 According to Negri, constituent power is ‘the 
source of production of constitutional norms’, aka ‘the power to make a 
constitution’, and therefore it is ‘the power to dictate the fundamental norms that 
organize powers of the States’ (or within communities), and it can also be explained 
as ‘the power to establish a new juridical arrangement, to regulate the juridical 
relationships within a new community’.3 Thus, the constituent power is ‘absolutely 
free in scope’ whilst constituted power is ‘limited by the terms of constitution’.4 In 
other words, constituted power can be explained as ‘the legal basis on which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Emmanuel Sieyès, ‘What Is the Third Estate?’ in Michael Sonenscher (tr), Sieyès: Political 
Writings: Including the Debate Between Sieyès and Tom Paine in 1791 (Hackett Publishing 
2004) 136. 
2 Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP 2003) 100. 
3 Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State (Theory Out of 
Bounds) (Maurizia Boscagli tr, University of Minnesota Press 2009) 2. 
4 Paolo Carrozza, ‘Constitutionalism’ Post-Modern Opening’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil 
Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional 
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authority is exercised within a legal framework’, whilst constituent power is ‘the 
exercise of political power and the ultimate source of legitimate authority’.5Applying 
the idea of a nexus between constituted power and constituent power to the 
international sphere, Donoghue explains that:  
 
Within international law, constituent power is identified with those who grant 
to political actors the legitimacy and authority to create customary international 
law, treaty law, binding decisions and resolutions, and other characteristics of 
the exercise of constituted power. Constituted power, on the other hand, is held 
by those within the system that exercise and are constrained by the authority 
granted to them.6 
 
Thus, the best place to look for international constituent power holder and 
constituted power holder would be the unifying rule of recognition of the 
international legal system as it is a rule that governs the source of validity of 
international rules including international constitutional rules. The identification of 
source of validity of international rules will help us reveal the entities holding either 
international constituent power that can be used to make international constitutional 
rules or international constituted power that can be used to make ordinary 
international rules. 
 
As illustrated in Chapter III, the unifying rule of recognition of the international legal 
system embraces state wills and fundamental shared values of the international 
community as a source of international rules. As fundamental shared values of the 
international community are a source of validity of international constitutional rules, 
this suggests that the international community is the origin of international 
constituent power and individuals as part of humanity are a collective international 
constituent power-holder.  State wills are regarded as a source of validity of ordinary 
international rule. The international secondary constitutional rule such as the rule of 
pacta sunt servanda, the rule of recognition of customary international law and the 
rule of recognition of general principles recognize state wills as a source of validity; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Aoife O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (CUP 2014) 9. 
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in other words, the constitutional secondary rules also allocate international law-
making power to states. Thus, states are bestowed international constituted power. 
However, the source of such power comes from within states, either its people or 
other forms of sovereignty as the case may be and the power of states pre-existed 
both the international community and the international constitutional system, the 
existence of which is sought to be affirmed in this thesis. Hence, such power is not 
originally constituted by the international constitution, thus not deriving originally 
from international constituent power-holder. However, when the international 
community and its legal system emerge, the international legal system respects and 
accepts the power of states. Based on the cosmopolitan paradigm, the international 
legal system must respect the domestic constituent power-holders of democratic 
states and must not intervene the development of domestic constitutionalism through 
internal enlightenment unless peace and fundamental human rights are at risk.  
Accordingly, the international legal system allocates international law-making power 
and allows states to create international rules based on their consensual will as long 
as it does not violate the community-value-based rules which are created by the 
constituent power-holder of the international legal system. Nevertheless, in light of 
mutually complementing relationship between the international legal system and 
domestic legal systems, the international legal system does not exist as a legal system 
which is hierarchically superior to domestic legal systems; rather, international law is 
a legal system which holds those systems together. Hence, the international legal 
system can intervene in the power of domestic legal systems only over matters of 
peace and fundamental human rights because it is only within domestic legal systems 
that a genuine link between governments and people can be robustly established; 
therefore, other matters at both international and domestic levels should be left for 
relevant states to decide. 
 
However, international constituted power, the allocation and limitation of which this 
chapter seeks to affirm is international constituted power which can be exercised 
against state wills which is necessary to the enforcement of primary constitutional 
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supremacy of peace and fundamental human rights. Thus, the scope of the 
institutionalization of constituted power discussed here is limited to international 
constituted power, which can force against state wills. In other words, the aim of this 
chapter is to determine whether or not international constituted power superior to 
state wills has been allocated to any actor in the international legal system and if so, 
whether or not it is limited by the nexus to the international community of 
humankind to affirm the existence of the international self-governance with mandate 
for peace and fundamental human rights. 
 
In search for international constituted power which can be exercised against state 
wills, the verticalization of international law by the secondary rules of the non-
derogability of jus cogens signifies the existence of such international constituted 
power that is superior to the power of states. The identifying of a hierarchical 
structure of international primary rules done in the last chapter not only reveals the 
existence of constitutional primary rules in the international legal system but also 
identifies a pattern for the allocation of powers to international actors that hold 
international constituted power that can be used against the will of states. Such 
verticalization of power signifies a shifting of power away from state-centred 
international law. 7  This will help us to trace the source of such power, aka 
constituent power, since, as Donoghue suggests, the indication of constitutional rules 
is vital to the task of revealing who possesses constituted power and constituent 
power.8 
 
Accordingly, the task of this chapter is to identify, within the regimes of jus cogens 
and the UN Charter, the actors to which international constituted power that can be 
used to enforce constitutional primary rules and protect the international hierarchical 
structure has been allocated. Once the allocation of international constituted power in 
each regime identified, it is time to see whether the exercising of such power is 
limited based on the nexus to the international community of humans as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid 50–51. 
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international constituent power-holder. It should be noted here that, as discussed in 
the last chapter, in case of conflict of jus cogens rules with substantive UN Charter 
Rules or SC Chapter VII resolutions, jus cogens rules will prevail. Therefore, jus 
cogens rules can serve as a limitation on the exercising of the international 
constituted power allocated by the UN Charter and thus it will be discussed first.  
 
II. Jus Cogens and the Institutionalization of International Constituted Power 
 
The unifying rule of recognition of the international legal system embraces both state 
will as a source of state-will-based primary rules and the shared values of the 
international community as a source of validity of community-value-based primary 
rules, including jus cogens. However, fundamental shared values are recognized as a 
superior source of rule validity. This means that the unifying rule of recognition of 
the international legal system reveals that there exists an international constituted 
power superior to the will of states and this international constituted power derives 
from the international community of human kind which can be seen as the origin of 
international constituent power. 
 
Nevertheless, constituted power must be institutionalized; in other words, it must be 
allocated to actors in the legal system and limited by a link to constituent power in 
order to create international self-governance via the secondary rules of the system. 
On exploring the jus cogens context, there seems to be a lack of development in the 
institutionalization of international constituted power. Although Articles 44, 53, 64, 
66 and 71 of the 1969 VCLT and their counterparts in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations, or between 
International Organizations 1986, entail a rule of recognition, a rule of change and a 
rule of adjudication for jus cogens, and a rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens, 
none of them create or empower international actors to exercise international 
constituted power to enforce and protect jus cogens rules. The only international 
actors that seem able to exercise such international constituted power are 
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that empower any court to have compulsory jurisdiction over a dispute regarding jus 
cogens rules.  This lack of compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, even in the case of jus 
cogens rules, is clearly expressed in the Armed Activities case. In referring to the 
distinction between obligation erga omnes and the rule of consensual jurisdiction in 
its past jurisprudence,9 the court ruled:  
 
The same applies to the relationship between peremptory norms of general 
international law (jus cogens) and the establishment of the Court’s jurisdiction: 
the fact that a dispute relates to compliance with a norm having such a 
character, which is assuredly the case with regard to the prohibition of 
genocide, cannot of itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court to 
entertain that dispute. Under the Court’s Statute that jurisdiction is always 
based on the consent of the parties.10 
 
In the context of international criminal law, the International Criminal Court has 
criminal jurisdiction over jus cogens rules concerning crimes of genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression. However, the only 
situation in which the court has jurisdiction over non-party states’ nationals for a 
crime committed in a non-party’s territory is when crimes are referred to the 
Prosecutor by the SC according to Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.11This scenario is more relevant to the power of the SC 
based on the UN Charter, which is another higher rule in the international legal 
system, and this will be dealt with later. Accordingly, as far as jus cogens rules and 
relevant secondary rules are concerned, the constituted power deriving from the 
international community is insufficiently institutionalized. Thus, as far as jus cogens-
related legal mechanisms are concerned, the fulfilment of the underlying purpose of 
an international constitutional legal system to create international peace and protect 
fundamental of human rights may only scarcely be achieved. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, para. 29 
10 Armed Activities on the Territory of The Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic 
Republic of The Congo v. Rwanda) Jurisdiction of The Court and Admissibility of the 
Application, I.C.J. Reports 2006, para. 64. 
11  See e.g. Dapo Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over 
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Although the jus cogens regime does not contribute much to the development of the 
institutionalization of international constituted power, as it does not specifically 
allocate international constituted power to enforce jus cogens rules, it provides a 
clear illustration of how international constitutional rules derive from the constituent 
power held by all individuals in the international community as the international.  
This discussion will be very helpful when jus cogens rules play the role of a legal 
mechanism that limits the international constituted power allocated by the UN 
Charter to its organs. With respect to international constituent power, the unifying 
rule of recognition of the international legal system embraces fundamental shared 
values as a source of validity of higher rules of the system. This signifies that 
international constituent power is held by the international community, i.e. members 
of the international community whose beliefs count towards the articulation of 
fundamental shared values are the holders of constituent power. Through a 
cosmopolitan lens, an international constitutional legal system exists, inter alia, to 
create cosmopolitan rights, aka human rights, for every individual dwelling on this 
earth, and these shall be enforced irrespective of territorial issues. This is how an 
international constitutional system will fix the inherent defects of the domestic 
constitutional system which cannot include all possible individuals that might be 
affected by constitutional rules and other rules of the system as its constituent power-
holders.  Accordingly, the current international legal system cannot qualify as a 
constitutionalized international legal system unless every human being is a 
constituent power-holder, i.e. every human being is a member of the international 
community. The cosmopolitan idea has its roots in stoicism,12 one of the important 
philosophical contributions of which is the idea of the community of humankind. For 
instance, Seneca wrote that ‘[t]he first thing philosophy promises us is the feeling of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Derek Heater, ‘Does Cosmopolitan Thinking Have a Future?’ (2000) 26 Review of 
International Studies 179; Tony Burns, ‘Aristotle, Stoicism and Cosmopolitan Political 
Thought’ (2007), A Paper Presented to a Conference on the Theme of Cosmopolitanism: 
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fellowship, of belonging to mankind and being members of a community’.13 Seneca 
also argued that:  
 
We must grasp that there are two public realms, two commonwealths. One is 
great and truly common to all, where gods as well as men are included, where 
we look not to this corner or that, but measure its bounds with the sun. The 
other is that in which we are enrolled by an accident of birth – I mean Athens 
or Carthage or some other city that belongs not to all men, but only to a limited 
number.14 
 
Based on Seneca’s thoughts, Donoghue proposes that, according to stoic philosophy, 
there are two communities, ‘one assigned at birth’ which is ‘their home state’, and 
‘another that embraces all men’ which is ‘“[the] kingdom of reason”, a much broader 
supposition with almost universal membership’.15  When discussing the idea of 
community, it is explained that, to have a community, there must exist a 
commonality that unites the members of the community. For the international 
community of humankind, what should serve that function is the rationality of each 
individual, as Aurelius explains:  
 
If to understand and to be reasonable be common unto all men, then is that 
reason, for which we are termed reasonable, common unto all. If reason is 
general, then is that reason also, which prescribed what is to be done and what 
not, common unto all. If that, then law. If law, then are we fellow-citizens. If 
so, then are we partners in some one commonweal. If so, then the world is as it 
were a city.16 
 
To interpret the international community as a community of mankind based on a 
common rational character should alleviate the excluding effect of the binary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Seneca’s ‘Fifth Letter to Lucilius as cited in Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Many 
Faces of Philosophy Reflections from Plato to Arendt (OUP 2003) 8–9. 
14 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Seneca: Moral and Political Essays (J.F. Procope ed., John M. 
Cooper tr., CUP 1995) 175. 
15 O’Donoghue (n 5) 202. 
16 Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Volume IV (Meric 
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dimension of the international community17 that can exclude certain individuals from 
being a constituent power-holder of the international constitutionalized system. 
 
As Franck argues, ‘[t]his emergent sense of global community is often, but should 
not be, seen as alternative to, or competing with, the basic community which is the 
state. Communitas can be concentric and overlapping’, 18  the international 
community can coexist with state communities and does not necessarily terminate 
state communities, reflecting a ‘stoic multidimensional’ understanding of 
community.19  The duality of the international community on the one hand and state 
community on the other reflects the idea of a world with multilevel governance. The 
co-existence of international community and state communities can serve as the 
social dimension of the complementarity between an international constitutional 
system and domestic constitutionalism connecting together by the individuals being 
members of both the international community and the state community. When every 
individual human is taken to be a member of the international community that holds 
the constituent power curtailing the exercising of the constituted power in the 
constitutionalized international legal system, Kant’s idea cosmopolitan rights can be 
effectively achieved. Based on the textual basis of Article 53, the term “international 
community” is modified by the phrase “of States”. However, on such a textual basis, 
to fit the idea of humanity as a source of international constituent power, the 
international officials that have the rule-ascertaining power have to treat the state as 
representative of and constituted by its people; and beliefs that contribute to the 
determination of the content of fundamental shared values are those of the peoples of 
states. Nevertheless, even if states in this context are interpreted as a vehicle for the 
people’s will, there is still a shortcoming regarding stateless persons for whom there 
are no representatives so that a state can protect their interests and express their 
beliefs at the international level. Also, it is very likely that the minority in certain 
states will be underrepresented in via state agents. Thus, interpreting the international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See the discussion of binary and commonality element of the community concept in 
O’Donoghue (n 5) 59–77. 
18 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (OUP 1998) 13. 
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community, which is a locus of international constituent power as an ensemble of 
states – as either the ultimate member or representative of its peoples – cannot meet 
the aim of international self-governance of humankind.  Thus, the more recent use of 
the term ‘international community’, without the modifier ‘of states’, has the potential 
to accommodate the idea of humanity as a source of constituent power of the 
constitutionalized international legal system. This would allow international courts to 
seek the opinions of non-state actors in order to determine the content of the 
fundamental shared values of the international community, which is facilitated by the 
role of legal scholars and domestic courts as law-ascertaining officials.  
 
Move to the legal mechanism that limits the exercising of the international 
constituted power by the nexus over humanity as the source of international 
constituent power-holder. As the international constituted power with regard to jus 
cogens has not been insufficiently allocated to relevant actors, which makes resorting 
to the secondary rule of the non-derogability of jus cogens very limited, a limitation 
on such power is also rarely seen in the current international legal system. However, 
based on current secondary rules relevant to jus cogens, the nexus of the international 
constituted power and the international constituent power seems to be in the hands of 
international adjudicators.  Despite lacking compulsory jurisdiction, international 
adjudicators will have the power to create a link between the content of jus cogens 
rules and the beliefs of humanity. International tribunals can search for opinions 
outside the statist international forum which represents the essential components of 
humankind, especially specially affected minorities and stateless persons. However, 
this again opens up the usual debate over what happens if courts are the ones that 
abuse their power. However, given the very passive role at the international level and 
the lack of its own legal mechanism to enforce its decisions, this problem of 
international law is less severe compared to those in domestic regimes. 
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In the last section, the hierarchy of international primary rules created by the 
secondary rule of non-derogability of jus cogens showed the existence of 
international constituted power above state wills; however, it also revealed that the 
institutionalization of such power is not sufficiently developed in the regime of jus 
cogens. Nevertheless, unlike jus cogens, the UN Charter establishes the UN and its 
organs and allocates power to those entities in order to achieve the task assigned to 
them.  Accordingly, not only does the UN Charter play a substantial critical role in 
the international value system, it also serves as a crucial document in constructing a 
system that fosters and protects the fundamental shared values of the international 
community as it creates a ‘structural linkage of the different communities through 
universal State membership’.20  The structural contribution of the Charter to a value-
based international legal system can be seen through the role of the organs 
established by it, which have institutionalized and implemented the world’s desire to 
promote and protect fundamental values. Thus, a study of the role and power of the 
UN organs allocated by the Charter in order to implement and protect the 
fundamental values held dear by the Charter will help to reveal the allocation of 
international constituted power within the UN system. When the allocation of 
international constituted power can be identified, the task to identify the limitation of 
such power based on the nexus to the international constituent power will be 
pursued.  However, it would be unrealistic to address all the functions and powers of 
all UN organs in this piece of work. Thus, this section will selectively discuss the 
main functions and power of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the 
Economic and Social Council 21  and the ICJ which is closely linked to the 
articulation, protection and implementation of the fundamental shared values of the 
international community, which are peace and fundamental human rights and which 
would be a good trail to follow for the international constituted power allocated by 
the Charter. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Erika De Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 International and 
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3.1. The Role and Power of the UN Organs in a Value-based International Legal 
System 
 
3.1.1. The General Assembly 
 
Regarding its institutional function in the value-based international legal system, the 
GA can be seen as a global forum where shared values of the international 
community are identified and shaped. As Spijkers argues, since values exist as a 
form of belief, not as facts, fundamental shared values cannot be scientifically 
identified but need a discussion, which is as inclusive as possible, in the sense that 
the entire international community can participate. 22  The GA is a ‘standing 
international conference in which any UN member State can raise any international 
issue it regards as deserving global attention’.23 It serves as ‘the unique forum of 
choice’ for articulating global values and norms and the arena where contested norms 
can be ‘debated and reconciled’.24 However, it should be borne in mind that although 
the GA represents the entire United Nations membership and operates on the basis of 
one state, one vote, the GA represents governments and not peoples, and certain 
governments are not elected to represent their people. Even in the case of those 
democratically elected, governments have ‘their own logic’.25 Thus, the GA might 
be able to represent the views of states, but it cannot be said that it always represents 
the views of the international community of humankind.26  Nonetheless, an effort to 
establish consultative NGOs might mitigate this defect in the genuineness of the GA 
as an agent of the international community.27 Regarding the NGO’s participation in 
the GA, unlike NGOs’ participation in ECOSOC based on Article 71 of the UN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Otto Spijkers, The United Nations, the Evolution of Global Values and International Law 
(Intersentia 2011) 42. 
23 MJ Peterson, ‘General Assembly’ in Thomas G Weiss, Sam Daws (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook on the United Nations (OUP 2007) 98. 
24 Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the 
Responsibility to Protect (CUP 2006) 62. 
25 Bruno Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ (1994) 
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Charter, the GA has no legal framework for NGO participation. However, the GA 
has made its forum accessible to NGOs on many occasions, e.g. the +5 Special 
Sessions and the informal Civil Society Hearings in the run-up to the 2005 World 
Summit.28 
 
Therefore, to some extent, it can be perceived that shared values of the international 
community are identified, shaped, articulated or clarified in the GA. The abstract 
substance of such shared values is made tangible in GA resolutions, especially in its 
declarations which ‘contain general norms and principles’ ‘elaborat[ing] the general 
purposes and principles of the Charter’.29 One specific example of where the GA 
expressly states that it attempts to identify or clarify the shared values of the 
international community is its Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations.30 
The aim of the Global Agenda is ‘to learn, uncover and examine assumptions, unfold 
shared meaning and core values and integrate multiple perspectives through 
dialogue’ among civilizations.31  
 
Although not establishing a legal binding obligation in itself, Judge Lauterpacht 
regards the GA’s resolution as ‘one of the principal instrumentalities of the formation 
of the collective will and judgment of the community of nations represented by the 
United Nations’.32 Either via the GA or by convoking international conferences, the 
UN helps to shape the values of the international community and to translate ‘the 
concept of the 'international community' from an abstract notion into something 
approaching institutional reality’.33  Although, the GA resolutions are not binding in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Jens Martens, ‘The Future of NGO Participation at the United Nations after the 2005 
World Summit’ (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2006) Dialogue on Globalization Briefing Paper 2. 
29 Spijkers (n 22) 82. 
30  Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations, General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/56/6 of 9 November 2001. 
31 See Article 1 of the Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations. 
32 Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, 122, Voting Procedure on Questions relating to 
Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion of 7 
June 1955, I.C.J. reports, 67. 
33  Bruno Simma and Andreas Paulus, ‘The “International Community”: Facing the 
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themselves, they might serve as evidence of opinio juris on the creation of customary 
international law.  On this point, the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapon Advisory Opinion 
explains that  
 
‘General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes 
have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence 
important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio 
juris. … it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its 
adoption’.34 
 
Also, the discussions in the GA can serve as a valuable source of information when 
international adjudicators have to identify acceptance by the international community 
of the non-derogable character of certain rules according to Article 53, bearing in 
mind that the GA can only represents the views of states.  
 
With respect to the international constituted power allocated to the GA, as illustrated 
before, the GA functions as an international forum where the will of the international 
community regarding shared values forms and is expressed; furthermore, in its 
composition and role, the GA can be compared to a ‘world parliament’.35 This 
logically leads to the question of whether the GA has global legislative power.  
As beyond the “‘house-keeping’ domain”36  – budgetary and procedural – GA 
resolutions have no legally binding effects, the GA does not possess global 
legislative power.37 Thus, the GA is not allocated international constituted power in 
the sense of a world parliament. However, albeit non-binding, GA resolutions can 
serve as a valuable source of information when international adjudicators have to 
identify acceptance by the international community of the non-derogable character of 
certain rules according to Article 53, bearing in mind that the GA can only represent 
the views of states.  
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35 Simma (n 25) 262–263. 
36 Ibid 263. 
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Apart from the legislative power, another type of international constituted power that 
might potentially be allocated to the GA is the power to interpret the UN Charter, 
which can be perceived as the power to interpret constitutional rules. In UNCIO, the 
relevant special committee was asked the question: ‘How and by what organ or 
organs of the Organization should the Charter be interpreted?’ 38  The Special 
Committee replied:  
 
In the course of the operations from day to day of the various organs of the 
Organization, it is inevitable that each organ will interpret such parts of the 
Charter as are applicable to its particular functions. This process is inherent in 
the functioning of any body, which operates under an instrument defining its 
functions and powers. … Accordingly, it is not necessary to include in the 
Charter a provision either authorizing or approving the normal operation of this 
principle39  
 
This seems to suggest that the Charter does not allocate international constituted 
power to interpret the Charter authoritatively to any specific organ. However, The 
Special Committee believed that certain GA resolutions can serve as the authoritative 
interpretation of the Charter, explaining that:  
 
…resolutions of the General Assembly could possess legal force, depending, 
however, on the intention and the numbers of States voting in favour. Since the 
Charter of the United Nations was a treaty binding on all Member States, it 
followed that a General Assembly resolution interpreting Charter principles, 
such as resolution 2131 (XX) [Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their 
Independence and Sovereignty] could be binding on Member States as an 
authentic interpretation… .40  
 
According to Schacht, GA resolution 2625 (XXV) (Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 UNCIO vol. XIII, 668. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States, 3rd Report, Annex to the Official Record of 22nd Session of 
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accordance with the Charter of the United Nations)41 is ‘the international lawyer's 
favorite example of an authoritative UN resolution’. 42 The declaration addresses 
seven essential principles of the UN Charter, namely, the prohibition on the use of 
force, the principle that states should settle their disputes peacefully, the non-
intervention principle, the principle of sovereign equality of states, the duty to 
cooperate, the principle of good faith and the principle of the self-determination of 
peoples. The drafting time consumed almost ten years, as the ‘drafters wanted a 
consensus on every single paragraph in the declaration’.43 The delegate of Venezuela 
to the Special Committee viewed this resolution as ‘the most up-to-date expression 
of the scope and interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations, the basis of 
international law as it was understood and practised by the civilized nations of the 
world today’.44 In his article, Rosenstock, US delegates argues:  
 
The generality of the language used in the Declaration does not deprive this 
instrument of its significance the most important single statement representing 
what the Members of the United Nations agree to be the law of the Charter on 
the seven principles.45  
 
Nevertheless, not every GA resolution will serve as an authoritative interpretation of 
the Charter.  To determine the quality of GA resolutions as an authoritative 
interpretation of the Charter, Sahović, Yugoslavian delegate to the Special 
Committee, proposes that, inter alia, the historical and procedural points should be 
taken into consideration.46 The historical point focuses on the political importance 
which results in the creation of the resolution as well as the significance of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), adopted 24 October 1970.  
42 Oscar Schachter, ‘United Nations Law’ (1994) 88 AJIL 1, 3. 
43 Spijkers (n 22) 117. 
44 Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co- operation among States, 6th Report, Supplement No 18 to Official Record of the 25th 
Session of General Assembly (1970) (A/8018), para. 109.   
45 Robert Rosenstock, ‘The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations: A Survey’ (1971) 65 American Society of International Law 713, 714. 
46 Milan Sahovic, ‘Codification des principes du droit international des relations amicales et 
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resolution in question itself.47 The procedural issue examines the intention of the 
drafters, whether or not the resolutions are intended to be an interpretation of the 
Charter.48 Spijkers also suggests that the consensus element attained by the relevant 
resolution can also serve as a determining factor of its quality as an authoritative 
interpretation of the Charter. According to him, the consensus element shows the 
universal participation and serious commitment of the international community of 
states.49Hence, based on the historical, procedural and consensus aspects, it seems to 
suggest that the perception of the international community that accepts certain GA 
resolutions as an authoritative interpretation of the Charter is an underlying 
determining factor in considering whether or not certain GA resolutions serve as 
authoritative interpretations of the Charter.  Accordingly, it is difficult to say that the 
GA is allocated international constituted power that can be used to interpret the 
Charter authoritatively; however, as the world forum, it is the place where the will of 
the international community regarding the elaboration of the Charter can be formed 
and reflected.  
 
To sum up, the GA does play a very important role in the value-based international 
legal system as an international forum where shared values are shaped and 
articulated; however, it is not attributed international constituted power, at least not 
in the sense that there is a clear procedure to trigger the exercise of such power. 
Nonetheless, although lacking legislative power and authoritative interpretative 
power, the GA as the international forum has in its hands methods to condemn 
publicly, ‘naming and shaming’50 those responsible for non-compliance with its 
resolutions. The public condemnation tools are perceived by Judge Alavrez that in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Milan Sahovic, ‘Codification des principes du droit international des relations amicales et 
de la coopération entre les Etats’ (1974), 255–284 as cited in Spijkers (n 22) 120. 
48 Milan Sahovic, ‘Codification des principes du droit international des relations amicales et 
de la coopération entre les Etats’ (1974), 285–299 as cited in Spijkers (n 22) 120. 
49 Spijkers (n 22) 121–123. 
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case that it earns public support, it can generate ‘more force than if it had been a 
mere breach of a convention of minor importance’.51 
 
3.1.2 The United Nations Economic and Social Council 
 
ECOSOC focuses on progress in international economic, social, cultural, 
educational, health and related matters and respect for fundamental human rights and 
freedoms,52 leading to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which 
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.53 With respect to the 
shared values of the international community, based on Article 62 of the Charter, 
ECOSOC has four functions and powers, which are:  
(I) To initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, 
cultural, educational, health and related matters,  
(II) To make recommendations related to matters mentioned in (I) and promoting 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,  
(III) To prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly and 
(IV) To call for international conferences on matters falling within its competence.  
 
Thus, ECOSO is assigned functions that are both directly relevant to peace and 
fundamental human rights and relevant to other shared values which will facilitate 
the creation and protection of peace and fundamental human rights. However, one of 
its masterpieces is the translation of fundamental values into very important 
documents in international law.  Boyle and Chinkin opine: ‘one of ECOSOC’s most 
prominent responsibilities for international law-making has been the elaboration of 
international human rights law through subsidiary commissions’54. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51  Alvarez, Separate Opinion in the ICJ’s Reservations to the Genocide Convention 
Advisory Opinion, 28 May 1951, 52. 
52 Article 62 of the UN Charter. 
53 Article 55 of the UN Charter. 
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Rights (ICESCR) were drafted by the Commission on Human Rights, one of the 
ECOSOC’s subsidiary commissions. 
 
Although, unlike the GA, its membership is limited to fifty-four UN members 
elected by the GA, the advantage of the ECOSOC mechanism is that it 
systematically provides a stage for non-state actors to participate in its mechanisms.    
By virtue of Article 71 of the Charter, ECOSOC is entitled to make an arrangement 
to establish the consultative status of NGOs.  The aim of creating a consultative 
relationship with NGOs is to provide help for ECOSOC as well as its subsidiary 
committees in fulfilling their functions.55  In the current international society, in light 
of their expertise, NGOs greatly facilitate the negotiation and a making of 
international agreements.56  They have acted as ‘important pressure groups as they 
can usually operate with greater flexibility and less bureaucracy’ 57  and as a 
‘representative of civil society’, to protect those interests which might be ignored by 
states.58  Hobe argues that Article 71 is ‘a good example of how important the 
involvement of civil society in international affairs has become in the era of 
globalization and how dispensable NGOs in consultative status are in the UN 
system’. Added to this, ECOSOC, by virtue of Article 68 of the Charter, has set up 
expert bodies whose members serve in a personal capacity, namely the Committee 
for Development Policy, the Committee of Experts on Public Administration, the 
Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and a Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues.  Accordingly, ECOSOC provides a channel for non-state actors, either NGOs 
or individuals, to play a role in the UN system. The participation of those non-state 
actors via such channels will allow the product of the UN system to reflect a 
collective will which is not exclusively based on states’ view. However, although 
ECOSOC provides a channel for non-state actors to play some role in the articulation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Stephen Hobe, ‘Article 71’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary Volume II (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1801. 
56 Ibid 1814. 
57 Ibid 1814–1815. 
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of shared values, this organ of the UN does not have any power potentially to be 
regarded as an international constituted power superior to state wills. 
 
3.1.3. The Security Council  
 
With respect to the role of the SC in the UN international value system, the Charter 
confers on the SC the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security,59 and in discharging these duties the SC shall act in accordance 
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 60  To fulfil such a 
responsibility, and according to Article 39, the SC shall determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, any breach of the peace or any act of aggression and shall 
make recommendations, or decide to take economic or military measures, in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42 in order to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. Such measures have legal binding force on state members in light of 
Article 25. Together with the principle of the non-use of force in state relations, the 
power of the SC to issue a resolution obliging UN member states to cope with a 
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression establishes the 
international community’s collective security.61 The decision to trigger the UN 
Charter’s security arrangements is entrusted to the discretion of the SC, which must 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression.62 In this sense, based on the mandate conferred on it by the Charter, the 
SC acts as an executive body representing the international community to protect the 
value of the peaceful coexistence of states via its power to execute collective 
security.  
 
However, in many cases, the SC does not strictly attach the term ‘threat to peace’ to 
scenarios carrying the risk of international armed conflict as it also considers internal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Article 24 (1) of the UN Charter.  
60 Article 24 (2) of the UN Charter. 
61 See discussions in e.g. Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Place of Law in Collective Security’ 
(1996) 17 Mich JIL 455, 456–460. 
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armed conflicts and other situations of violence arising within the territory of 
member states as a threat to peace.63 Responding to the situation of South Africa’s 
apartheid policy, the SC reaffirmed that ‘a policy of apartheid is a crime against the 
conscience and dignity of mankind and seriously disturbs international peace and 
security’.64 On many occasions, the SC has called for humanitarian intervention in 
internal armed conflict scenarios,65  such as in the cases of Iraqi/ Kurdistan,66 
Somalia,67 Rwanda68 and Haiti69. Again, it is breaches of fundamental human rights 
that are employed as a ground for the SC to assert the existence of a threat to peace 
where the scenarios in question do not involve international armed conflict.70 In its 
Resolution 794, the SC validated the UN’s humanitarian intervention in Somalia by 
determining that, ‘the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in 
Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security’,71 
Also, in Resolution 940, the SC explains that the situation in Haiti which entailed 
‘the significant further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Haiti, in 
particular the continuing escalation by the illegal de facto regime of systematic 
violations of civil liberties, the desperate plight of Haitian refugees and the recent 
expulsion of the staff of the International Civilian Mission’.72 Thus, it decides that 
such a situation constituted a threat to peace and security in the region.73 With such 
an extended interpretation of the term ‘threat to peace’, it is perceived that the SC is 
willing to deal not only with scenarios involving international armed conflict but also 
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65 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations 
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those posing a threat to other fundamental interests of the international community, 
particularly breaches of fundamental human rights.74 However, if the SC asserts that 
there exists a threat to peace in a case where there is no threat of force, arguably it 
will lead to the problem of an ultra vires act.75  
 
Given its extended interpretation of a threat to peace, the SC functions as an 
executive of the international community and executes its collective security system 
to protect the value of the peaceful co-existence of states, and in the case that a link 
to a threat to peace can be established, the protection of fundamental human rights. 
In terms of international constituted power, based on its power granted by Chapter 
VII of the Charter, the SC has international constituted power which can be exercised 
to issue measures necessary for enforcing the constitutional primary rules protecting 
peace and fundamental human rights. The decision to issue a Chapter VII measures 
requires ‘an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the 
permanent members’.76 However, all members are obligated to implement such 
decisions of the SC, despite its limited membership, in light of Article 25. Also, it 
was argued in the last chapter that due to Articles 2(6) and 103 of the Charter, which 
reflect the constitutional status of the UN Charter, Chapter VII SC measures are 
binding on non-member states as well. Added to this, member states and non-
member states cannot opt out of an obligation created by SC resolutions due to the 
effect of the secondary rule of primacy of the Charter as codified in Article 103. 
Thus, the Charter as a constitution of the international community allocates 
international constituted power to the SC to enforce international constitutional 
primary rules and protect fundamental shared values of the international community.  
 
Although the executive power of the SC based on Chapter VII is widely accepted, 
the scope of SC power granted by Chapter VII is equivocal, due to the fact that the 
SC issues certain resolutions which have a general effect rather than specific 
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situation-based measures, leading to an issue regarding the legislative power of the 
SC. A prime example which is used to argue for the legislative power of the SC is 
when the SC adopted Resolution 1373 (2001). This resolution characterizes terrorism 
as a threat to international peace and security and obliges member states to adopt far-
reaching measures to prevent future terrorist acts, including a requirement to ‘ensure 
that terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws’.77 
Likewise, SC Resolution 1540 (2004) determines Weapons of Mass Destruction to 
be a threat to international peace and security and obliges member states to take 
action against their proliferation, including the adoption and enforcement of 
appropriate effective laws which prohibit relevant acts.78 Nonetheless, the power of 
the SC to act as a global legislator is very debatable. With respect to a legal text as a 
basis for the legislative power of the SC, there exist divergent opinions. On the one 
hand, some scholars perceive that Article 41 of the UN Charter is ‘broad enough to 
cover any type of action not involving the use of force, which is addressed in Article 
42’.79 This view seems to be supported by the ruling of the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY in the Tadic case, stating that: ‘It is evident that the measures set out in Article 
41 are merely illustrative examples which obviously do not exclude other measures. 
All the Article requires is that they do not involve "the use of force." It is a negative 
definition.’80 Thus, in cases where the SC determines that there exists a particular 
situation threatening international peace and security, it has not only been entitled to 
exercise broad discretion to opt for the proper measures, including enacting general 
abstract norms, but also obliged to do so according to its primary responsibility to 
maintain international peace and security.81 On the other hand, although the SC has 
been endowed by Article 24 of the UN Charter with the duty to sustain international 
peace and security, no provisions specifically allocate power to the Council to enact 
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general legislation or to adopt a decision which has a general law-making effect.82 
Added to this, Marschik is of the opinion that Article 2(7) of the UN Charter can be 
argued as implicitly excluding law-making powers for the SC as it ‘prohibits the UN 
from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, 
except for “enforcement measures under Chapter VII”’.83 Arguably, the enactment 
of generally binding norms by the SC does not fall under the term ‘enforcement’ and 
is therefore prohibited. However, Marschik notes that ‘the term ‘enforcement’ is not 
defined in the Charter and the practice of the Council would rather imply that any act 
legally adopted under Chapter VII can pierce the domaine réservé of the States 
irrespective of its nature’.84 Nevertheless, he proposes that even though the UN 
Charter might not accommodate legislative powers for the SC and such an act might 
be deemed ultra vires, the defect could be fixed if the Council has been conferred 
such a power in light of ‘the concept of subsequent practice’. Such subsequent 
practices can appear in a form of ‘formal statements’, ‘cooperation between States’ 
and ‘the domestic implementation of resolution’.85 The support for the measures and 
procedures of Resolution no. 1373 could be considered as evidence of acceptance of 
the competence to enact general, abstract and binding rules, at least in the area of 
terrorism.86 The idea of the UN Charter as a ‘living tree’ or ‘living document’ has 
also been applied to legitimatize the legislative power of the SC. According to such a 
notion, Resolution nos. 1373 and 1540 reflect the evolution of the Charter, allowing 
the Council to function as a global legislator which, under certain circumstances, 
may adopt resolutions which respond to new global threats by establishing legal 
norms, thus imposing obligations designed to cope with those new threats,87 similar 
to the case of the SC's authorization of peacekeeping operations.88  
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Such a position seems to offer greater efficiency to the international legal system to 
deal with matters of international security. Further, one might argue that the five 
most powerful nations in terms of military capacity should have a privileged role in 
the maintenance of international peace based on the political reality in exchange for 
such efficiency, and for that the five superpowers will play their games on the stage 
of the UN.89  Nevertheless, as Ulfstein observes, the acceptance of the allocation of a 
special law-making power to ‘an organ with limited membership, and where three 
out of five permanent members are Western states’ is problematic.90  
 
It is argued here that the legislative power of the SC could raise a more serious issue 
regarding its legitimacy, which is already highly criticized due to its composition and 
veto system. This would be against the idea of the horizontal separation of powers in 
terms of function.  Added to this, later in this chapter, it will be illustrated that SC 
resolutions are also under the protection of Article 103. Hence, if the SC does have 
legislative power, then a small group of countries, which have already been invested 
with the power to call for the use of force, also have the power to enact a rule which 
overcomes the wills of other states. Thus, this would lead to a very unhealthy 
interpretation of the Charter and a very despotic scenario. Therefore, an 
interpretation of the Charter as accommodating the legislative power of the SC 
would be against the idea of international constitutionalism. However, the issue of 
the legislative power of the SC is left unsettled but the exercising of Chapter VII 
power by the SC in a legislative fashion can be challenged under the limitation on 
the international constituted power of the SC, which will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
3.1.4.The International Court of Justice 
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In the section, regarding the institutionalization of international constituted power in 
the context of jus cogens, it is argued that no secondary rules in the jus cogens 
regime allocate international constituted power which can be used against state wills 
to any international court, including the ICJ, to summon states compulsorily to settle 
their disputes regarding jus cogens before the Court without the prior consent of 
disputed states.  In this section, it is now pertinent to explore the role of the ICJ in the 
UN system and to see whether the ICJ has been allocated any international 
constituted power. 
 
Essentially, the ICJ provides a peaceful dispute settlement forum with a general 
jurisdiction and an enforcement mechanism, 91  helping to foster the peaceful 
coexistence of states. As the jurisdiction of ICJ is not limited to specific international 
rules and is open to all states in the international community, notwithstanding their 
membership of the UN, the ICJ is regarded as ‘a general court of the international 
community’.92 Accordingly, with this role for the ICJ, one cannot help but wonder 
whether or not the ICJ possesses international constituted judicial power. Based on 
the Charter, the ICJ possesses two types of jurisdiction – contentious jurisdiction and 
advisory jurisdiction. The contentious jurisdiction of the ICJ covers inter-state 
disputes but it is not open for international organizations.93 According to Article 94 
(1) of the Charter, a member of the UN shall comply with a decision of the ICJ in 
any case to which it is a party, and in case of non-compliance, the ICJ can make a 
recommendation to the SC. Then, In case where the SC deems it necessary, it may 
issue recommendations or measures to enforce relevant judgments. Likewise, Article 
59 of the ICJ statute stipulates that a decision of the Court “has no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case”, indicating the rule 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Article 94(2) of the UN Charter provides that, ‘If any party to a case fails to perform the 
obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may 
have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make 
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment’. 
92 Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Article 92’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary Volume II (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1912. 
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of res judicata and that ICJ decisions are final and binding relevant states parties.94 
The second category of jurisdiction of the ICJ is its advisory jurisdiction. In the case 
of advisory opinions of the ICJ, the GA and the SC, as well as other organs of the 
UN and specialized agencies with the authorization of the GA, can request an 
advisory opinion from the ICJ according to Article 96 of the Charter. However, 
advisory opinions are not binding in their nature.95  
 
With respect to the allocation of international constituted power to the ICJ, although 
the decisions of ICJ are binding on states which are a party to a case, and even if the 
outcome of a case is not satisfactory for them, disputed states in the case need to 
comply with it. However, this is not because the ICJ possesses international 
constituted power which can compel states to act against their will. The binding 
nature of ICJ decisions vis-à-vis states is generated by the consent of such states, 
which can be given to the ICJ through many channels, including the compromissory 
clause and optional clause under Article 36 (2) of the ICJ, by which states can give 
their consent in advance as well as through a special agreement which is reached 
after disputes arise.96 The jurisdiction of the ICJ to which consent is given in 
advance is sometimes mistakenly termed compulsory jurisdiction. For example, in 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, whilst using the term 
‘compulsory jurisdiction’, the ICJ accepted the non-compulsory character of its 
jurisdiction in the case of an optional clause, explicating that:  
 
Declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court are 
facultative, unilateral engagements, that States are absolutely free to make or 
not to make. In making the declaration a State is equally free either to do so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94  Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Article 94’ in Bruno Simma, Andreas Paulus and Nikolai 
Wessendorf (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary Volume II (3rd edn, 
OUP 2012) 1959–1960. 
95 E.g. in Interpretation of Peace Treaties, the Court ruled “The Court's reply is only of an 
advisory character: as such, it has no binding force”; Interpretation of Peace Treaties, 
Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1950, 71. 
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unconditionally and without limit of time for its duration, or to qualify it with 
conditions or reservations.97  
 
Lowe with Collier comment that using the term ‘compulsory jurisdiction’ in this 
context is ‘misleading’ as ‘[i]t is optional for States to make such jurisdiction 
compulsory’. 98  In Nottebohm case, although also misleadingly using the term 
‘compulsory jurisdiction’ for its compromissory-clause-based jurisdiction, the ICJ 
correctly explains ‘[t]he characteristic of this compulsory jurisdiction is that it results 
from a previous agreement which makes it possible to seise the Court of a dispute 
without a Special Agreement’. 99  Alexandrov has expounded that the ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction is compulsory only ‘in the sense that consent to jurisdiction 
is granted by the States in advance, with respect to all or certain categories of 
disputes, and once a dispute arises, the State then does have a binding obligation and 
must submit to the Court’s jurisdiction’.100  
 
Thus, the ICJ does not possess international constituted power to initiate a binding 
judicial procedure without the consent of relevant states. However, the Court can 
play a key role in limiting the international constituted power given to the SC, which 
is another face of the institutionalization of international constituted power.  
 
To conclude this section, although many of the UN organs have been assigned a 
function to operate the UN system to protect and implement the values that the UN 
charter holds dears, only the SC has been empowered with international constituted 
power which can be exercised against the wills of states. However, although the GA 
and ECOSOC have not been given international constituted power, they can serve as 
a channel in which states and non-state actors can participate and express their will. 
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98 John Collier and Vaughan Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law  : 
Institutions and Procedures (OUP 2000) 140. 
99 See Nottebohm case (Preliminary Objection) Judgment of November 18th, 1953: I.C.J. 
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Their forums serve as a space where the collective will of the international 
community and its fundamental shared values are formed and shaped. In contrast, 
albeit while not possessing international constituted judicial power in the sense of 
global compulsory jurisdiction, the ICJ will play a vital role in limiting the 
international constituted power allocated to the SC. 
 
3.2. Limitations on the International Constituted Power allocated by the UN 
Charter. 
 
Based on what has been discussed in the preceding section, currently the SC is the 
only organ which is equipped with international constituted power to be used against 
the will of states.  Thus, this section focuses on the limitations on international 
constituted power possessed by the SC based on the nexus to humanity as the 
international constituent power-holder.  This section is divided into two parts. The 
first will discuss the limitations of international constituted power allocated through 
the rule of law, separation of powers, democratic legitimacy and the protection of 
fundamental constituent power-holders, which is modelled on statist 
constitutionalism. Then, the second part will discuss the mechanism of vertical 
checks and balances between international constituted power and states which is 
based on the multi-level and pluralist structure of international governance.  
 
3.2.1. Limitations of International Constituted Power Through the Rule of Law, 
Separation of Powers, Democratic Legitimacy and the Protection of Fundamental 
Rights of Constituent Power-Holders. 
 
With its international constituted power, the SC’s composition of five permanent 
members vested with a veto right and ten non-permanent members101 generates the 
perception that it represents a powerful minority rather than the international 
community as a whole.102 This leads to much criticism regarding its legitimacy.  At 
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the San Francisco Conference, the veto right was one of the most controversial 
issues.103 The long list of 23 questions regarding the exercise of veto rights was 
submitted by representatives of delegations other than those of the sponsoring 
governments to the relevant subcommittee.104 The Netherlands delegate pointed out 
that in a case where one of the permanent members is involved in a conflict, the 
measure under Chapter VII cannot be triggered because one of the permanent 
members exercises its veto right. As a result, this might be seen as ‘the death knell of 
the organisation and unescapably lead to its complete break-down” and leave the 
world “open once more to power politics in their purest and most ruthless form’.105  
The four sponsoring states, namely the US, the UK, Russia and China, responded in 
a joint statement that:  
 
In view of the primary responsibilities of the permanent member they could not 
be expected … to assume the obligation to act in so serious a matter as the 
maintenance of international peace and security in consequence of a decision in 
which they had not concurred. Therefore, if a majority voting in the Security 
Council is to be made possible, the only practicable method is to provide, in 
respect of non-procedural decisions, for unanimity of the permanent members 
plus the concurring votes of at least two of the non-permanent members.’106 
 
Evatt, an Australian delegate, argued in favour of a veto, realizing this put extra 
responsibility on the permanent members: ‘We don’t mind a veto on a shooting-
match, because the big powers have to carry the burden of shooting. What we object 
to is a veto on a talking match.’107 
 
In his book written in 1945, Davies comments that a veto system ‘became suggestive 
of tyranny, of dark shadows and clouds of disaster, of an eternal curse thrust upon all 
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that it concerned’.108 Then, in 1994, Simma observed that the right to veto is rarely 
exercised and it was used in ‘a more even distributed way’; however, albeit rarely 
utilized, the veto system ‘will have an influence on the process of arriving at a 
decision’.109 Eventually, the privileges of the superpowers were sustained, but in 
exchange they must bear special responsibility,110 and this results in the current 
situation.  Nevertheless, the composition of the permanent members of the SC is 
argued by Lang as being a ‘kind of institutional balance’ within the SC. He argues 
that this structure ‘prevents any one of them from dominating the decision making of 
the Council as a whole’, 111 and ‘provide[s] a check and balance that is associative in 
that they must come to agreement through diplomatic dialogue’.112 Of course, this 
does not solve the legitimate issue of the composition and veto privileges of the 
permanent members, and it would not be much of help were permanent members of 
the SC to share the same interests. However, given the realpolitik of international 
society, this has created checks and balances between the superpowers with a clear 
procedure and made the power game open to public scrutiny.  
 
Accordingly, although the power of the SC offers greater efficiency for the 
international legal system to limit the exercise of the power of states in the 
international sphere, it has, in turn, established a new Leviathan to be tamed.113 
Thus, if the UN system is to provide a constitutionalized international legal system 
that can establish international self-governance with a mandate for peace and 
fundamental human rights, a limitation on SC power based on the nexus to 
international constituent power must be established.  
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The ICTY once clearly stated that ‘[i]n any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the 
Charter conceives of the SC as legibus solutus (unbound by law)’.114Indeed, the 
limitation on the power of the SC comes first from the Charter itself since, as 
secondary rules that allocate power to the SC, the Charter rules simultaneously set a 
limit on such power via the textual basis of Chapter VII of the Charter. 115 
Nevertheless, despite its universal state membership, the text of the UN Charter 
represents only the will of the state community, rather than the will of the 
community of humankind. Although it might be argued that the will of a state can 
represent the will of its people, this logic cannot apply to undemocratic countries. 
This results in a shortcoming in the nexus of international constituent and 
international constituted power. However, based on the cosmopolitan paradigm, a 
world state is too despotic a choice, and so this shortcoming has to be addressed by 
the development of domestic constitutionalism in those states. What can be done by 
an international constitutional legal system is to provide a peaceful environment for 
domestic constitutionalism to develop and set minimum standards for human rights. 
Thus, we can see that, with such intertwinement, the more that domestic 
constitutionalism develops, the more that international constitutionalism will 
progress, and vice versa. Nevertheless, the subjection of SC resolutions to jus cogens 
would also serve as a remedy to this shortcoming to some extent. As argued in the 
preceding chapter, the ascertainment of jus cogens based on the development of a 
secondary rule regarding the international community which is not limited to states 
allows international courts more flexibility to search for more genuine opinions of 
the international community of humankind through the expression of other entities, 
rather than states. Thus, both jus cogens and the UN Charter set out a legal limitation 
which the SC cannot violate, and this provides the basis for a rule-of-law element to 
limit the exercising of power of the SC. It should be noted also that the subjection of 
the exercise of the power to amend the UN Charter, which requires a two-third vote 
of UN members including all of the SC permanent members, to jus cogens can be 
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seen as a limitation on ‘international derived constituent power’ to amend the written 
constitutional rule of the Charter 116, conferred on the SC together with the GA based 
on the rule of law.117 
 
However, the heart of the rule of law lies in judicial reviews by the courts. Two 
channels that might facilitate judicial reviews of SC resolutions are the advisory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ and the contentious jurisdiction of international courts in 
general.118In the case of advisory opinions of the ICJ, the GA as well as other organs 
of the UN and specialized agencies with the authorization of the GA can request an 
advisory opinion from the ICJ, potentially serving as a channel to review the 
exercising of the power of the SC by the ICJ. However, states which are affected by 
SC resolutions cannot access this channel.119 More importantly, advisory opinions 
are not binding in their nature, and arguably this shortcoming shows a fundamental 
defect in advisory opinions as a channel for judicial review of SC resolutions.120  
Nevertheless, advisory opinions can ‘put political pressure on states to 
comply’121and would provide a very legitimate ground for states not to comply with 
SC resolutions.  
 
The second channel is the contentious jurisdiction of international courts in general.  
In Tadić, the ICTY confirmed its incidental power to examine the validity of an SC 
resolution, explaining that:  
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Obviously, the wider the discretion of the Security Council under the Charter 
of the United Nations, the narrower the scope for the International Tribunal to 
review its actions, even as a matter of incidental jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that the power disappears altogether, particularly in cases where 
there might be a manifest contradiction with the Principles and Purposes of the 
Charter. In conclusion, the Appeals Chamber finds that the International 
Tribunal has jurisdiction to examine the plea against its jurisdiction based on 
the invalidity of its establishment by the Security Council.122 
 
This channel would provide a chance for the Courts, as officials of the international 
legal system, to use their power to review the validity of SC resolutions, putting 
limitations on the exercise of the international constituted power of the SC. However, 
the problem with this channel is that no international courts have compulsory 
jurisdiction; therefore, the review the validity of an SC resolution by the ICJ via this 
channel can only be used when disputed states consent to the court’s jurisdiction. 
Franck explains that, in essence, judicial review is ‘a weapon of deterrence, the 
effectiveness of which is best demonstrated by the absence of occasions for its 
use’.123 Basing his proposition on Franck seeing judicial review as a weapon of 
deterrence, Tzanakopoulos argues that only when the ‘regular availability’ of judicial 
review exists can it effectively function as a deterrent.124 For him, even though the 
ICJ has incidental power to review SC resolutions, it can deny the binding force of 
unlawful SC resolutions only in a specific case that is incidentally presented to the 
court, and therefore, ‘any such ‘review’ by ICJ cannot be – at present at least – 
systematic’. Accordingly, he argues that compulsory jurisdiction is indispensable for 
systematic judicial review. 125  Henceforth, although they provide a possible 
mechanism for reviewing the legality of SC resolutions, the non-compulsory 
jurisdiction of international courts and the non-binding character of advisory 
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opinions of the ICJ undermine the judicial review mechanism to control the exercise 
of power by the SC. 
 
Pertaining to separation-of-power mechanisms, as found in Charter rules and the ICJ 
Statute, the GA, the SC and the ICJ provide a structure similar to the separation of 
powers between parliament, government and courts in the domestic system.126 
However, unlike domestic parliaments, the GA cannot enact binding resolutions 
although GA resolutions can serve as evidence of opinio juris on the creation of 
customary international law and the view of the international community on the non-
derogable character of certain rules which will develop into jus cogens. With respect 
to the checks and balances among them, at the San Francisco Conference, small 
countries attempted to empower the GA when the SC cannot function properly. For 
example, Venezuela commented:  ‘it [the power of the SC] appears practically 
inacceptable … nevertheless … such a delegation of powers can be admitted if there 
are attributed to the central organization, that is, the General Assembly, the necessary 
powers of control’. There were a number of amendments proposed by small 
countries with regard to this issue, e.g. the insertion of a new clause by Chile which 
reads:  
 
Decisions of the Council tending to impose, with respect to determined cases, 
specific obligations upon members of the Organization, or upon certain, of 
them, likewise require the approval of the majority in which, in addition to the 
votes of States that are members of the Council… .127  
 
Their attempts, however, did not pay off.128  Nevertheless, the GA adopted the 
resolution on Uniting Peace which set up a procedure for the GA to recommend 
collective measures in cases where the SC, ‘because of lack of unanimity of the 
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permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security’.129  Accordingly, this suggests that the struggle 
for the creation of checks and balances continues by giving the GA a complementary 
role130 to that of the SC regarding peace and international security. However, the GA 
cannot force the SC or a UN member to comply with its decisions, as unlike the SC, 
the GA can only make non-binding recommendations regarding peace and security 
maintenance. Another checks-and-balances mechanism between the three main UN 
organs can be seen in a scenario where the GA can ask the ICJ to provide an 
advisory opinion on the validity of an SC decision under the Charter and jus cogens, 
thus allowing the ICJ to check the constitutionality of SC measures.131 However, as 
discussed before, advisory opinions have no legally binding effect although they 
produce political pressure and persuasive authority. Added to this, an interpretation 
of the power of the SC as not including legislative power would be preferable in 
terms of the separation of powers as it would prevent the SC from gaining despotic 
power. Should any of the three main UN organs be granted global legal legislative 
power, the GA, which in terms of composition has far greater representativeness vis-
à-vis the international community, should be the one.  
 
With respect to democratic legitimacy, direct democracy is virtually impossible at 
the international level and genuine representative democracy cannot be found in the 
UN Charter since, as explained before, not all members of the UN are democratic 
countries.  Further, even in a democratic country, the officials of such a country are 
more likely to pursue the interests of its own people than those of humankind,132 
which is the source of international constituent power. The room for the participation 
of individuals to build a discursive or deliberative democratic legitimacy is very 
limited.  The composition of the permanent members is very undemocratic and 
creates privileges for a handful of powerful minorities, although this situation reflects 
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realpolitik in the international sphere. Amendments to and alternations of such a 
structure are possible; however, the acceptance of all permanent members of the SC 
is required, thus making changes to the structure of the SC to deprive the permanent 
members of their special status seems impractical.   
 
The shortcoming of democratic legitimacy is deeply rooted in the cosmopolitan 
international constitutional structure, as it does not opt for creation of a world state in 
which global democracy can be fully constructed. Instead, it aims for world 
governance without world government, leaving room for states to determine their 
own rules.133  Brown explains that cosmopolitan democracy denies ‘the idea of 
coercive global institutions’ but countenances ‘a system of democratic institutions 
based on consent and a dedication to self-regulating normative principles’. 
According to him, this requires states to engage in ‘additional democratic principles 
in order to create global institutions’ and ‘additional procedures of global 
interdependence’, as well as ‘the final outcomes of a mutually agreed governance 
process’.134   
 
The protection of the fundamental rights of the constituent power-holder as another 
legal mechanism to limit international constituted power is quite patent, as 
fundamental human rights are protected by both the Charter and jus cogens, which 
are two sets of norms that set the scope of the power of the SC. However, the non-
bindingness of ICJ advisory opinions and the lack of compulsory jurisdiction of 
international courts in general undermine the protection of such rights. However, the 
courts, international, regional and domestic, to the extent possible, should exercise 
their power to review the validity of SC resolutions wherever possible, and this 
seems to be a scenario where limitations on SC power can be curtailed by the 
international constituent power. Nonetheless, the role of domestic courts will be 
discussed later in the vertical checks and balances between states and the SC. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 See general discussions e.g. in Garrett Wallace Brown, Grounding Cosmopolitanism 
from Kant to the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution (Edinburgh University Press 2009) 
110–116. 
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3.2.2. Vertical Checks and Balances in Multi-level Pluralist International 
Governance 
 
After examining the limitations on the SC’s international constituted power by 
considering the elements of rule of law, separation of powers, democratic legitimacy 
and the protection of the basic rights of the constituent power-holder, there exist 
certain mechanisms that might be used to limit the exercise of international 
constituted power.  However, their systematic quality and effectiveness are highly 
questionable mainly due to the lack of any compulsory and binding judicial review 
of SC resolutions. Nevertheless, it should be noted here that although the SC has the 
power to authorize the use of force, the SC needs to rely on the authorization of the 
use of force by states or international organizations but cannot direct the use of force 
by itself due to the lack of military force stipulated in Article 43 of the Charter.135  
Thus, tangible actions depend on the decisions by state members as to whether or not 
to implement measures stipulated by the SC136 which, according to Paulus, ‘can only 
withhold legality but cannot use military force by itself’.137 Hence, although the UN 
Charter as a constitution allocates international constituted power to the SC, it does 
not possess as centralized power as that of governments in the domestic sphere. 
Accordingly, this shows a weak form of the vertical checks and balances via which 
states might refuse to offer the SC their military forces to implement its missions. 
Further, this also suggests that in the pluralist structure of the international legal 
system, at present, the limitation on the international constituted power granted to the 
SC might be effectively delivered by states in case of need. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Niels Blokker, ‘Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security 
Council to Authorize the Use of Force by “Coalitions of the Able and Willing”’ (2000) 11 
EJIL 541, 567. 






	   	  
265	  
As Romana and Chinkin express metaphorically: ‘any international organization 
needs a "life supporting" system which resides in the national administrations’.138 
This is particularly true in the case of the SC implementing Chapter VII measures. 
Therefore, as judicial review of SC resolutions is ‘limited at best, and for the time 
being rather hypothetical’,139 it is argued that disobedience or non-compliance by 
states with SC resolutions, which is illegal according to the UN Charter and jus 
cogens rules, might serve as ‘the last resort, the ultimum refugium of States’.140 
Indeed with limited access to judicial reviews of SC resolutions, states will rely on 
auto-determination to determine whether SC resolutions are lawful or not.141 The SC 
is not attributed with the power to authoritatively interpret the Charter; therefore, the 
interpretation of the Charter by the SC is still ‘susceptible of constituting a breach of 
the Organization’s obligations under that law’.142 However, in Certain Expenses, 
whilst admitting that the powers of the SC are not unlimited, 143  the court 
countenances the presumption of intra vires for UN acts, ruling that ‘it was 
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the 
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization’.144 Similarly, in 
Namibia, the court also asserts the presumption of the validity of UN acts, in that: 
‘[a] resolution of a properly constituted organ of the United Nations which is passed 
in accordance with that organ's rules of procedure, and is declared by its President to 
have been so passed, must be presumed to have been validly adopted.’145  Based on 
presumption, a member of the UN can challenge the lawfulness of an SC resolution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Sadurska Romana and CM Chinkin, ‘The Collapse of the International Tin Council: A 
Case of State Responsibility’ (1990) 30 Virginia Journal of International Law 845, 888. 
139 Tzanakopoulos (n 120) 157. 
140 Ibid; See general discussions on states’ disobedience to SC resolutions in Ibid 157–190. 
141 See discussions over states’ power of auto-determination of legality of SC resolutions in 
Tzanakopoulos (n 120) 123–136. 
142 Ibid 115. 
143 Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, para. 2, of the Charter), Advisory 
Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, 168. 
144 Ibid 
145 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
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only in the case of it being ‘fragrantly or obviously ultra vires’146 and ‘at its own 
risk’ of potential responsibility.147 Non-compliance with SC resolutions has also 
been used by the OAU to respond to allegedly illegal SC resolutions. In 1998, the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity 
called upon the SC to suspend the sanctions imposed on Libya under Resolutions 
748 (1992) and 883 (1993) until the ICJ delivered its decision on the issue. It also 
decided not to comply with SC Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) on sanctions, 
unless the proposed condition was met, arguing that the said resolutions violated 
Article 27 paragraph 3, Article 33 and Article 36 paragraph 3 of the Charter.148 
Added to this, the UN, to which the SC’s and member states’ actions in fulfilling the 
SC measure can be attributed, 149  can have ‘legal capacity not only to take 
countermeasures against a State or another IO [International Organization], but also 
to sustain such countermeasures’.150 Tzanakopoulus proposes that states may take 
countermeasures against the UN in the case of illegal acts by the SC, such as refusal 
to pay an assessed contribution and providing assistance to targeted subject of the SC 
sanctions.151 
 
Apart from non-compliance with SC resolutions and countermeasures, one actor that 
might offer a promising way to check the exercising of international constituted 
power by the SC is domestic courts. Although they are regarded as a domestic entity, 
as discussed in Chapter III152 domestic courts are also regarded as a law-ascertaining 
official in the international legal system. This allows domestic courts to strengthen 
the limitation on the SC’s international constituted power. Indeed, the 
implementation of SC resolutions relies on domestic measures which might violate 
the rights of individuals. Individuals, then, are likely to have access to domestic 
courts and in such cases domestic courts may have opportunities to determine not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Tzanakopoulos (n 120) 120. 
147 Ibid 116. 
148 AHG/Dec.127 (XXXIV) 
149 Tzanakopoulos (n 120) 17–52. 
150 Ibid 55–56. 
151 See Ibid 191–197. 
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only the lawfulness of domestic measures but also that of SC resolutions.153 In the 
latter case, the issue of the validity of SC resolutions according to the UN Charter 
and jus cogens rules might arise. In such a case, domestic courts might find that 
disputed resolutions are unlawful.  This approach has been taken in domestic courts. 
In the Yossuf and Kadi cases,154 the CFI ruled that it was empowered to check 
indirectly the lawfulness of disputed resolutions in light of jus cogens.155In the same 
vein, in the Nada case, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court also reviewed the 
compliance of a contested SC resolution with jus cogens rules.156 Of course, this 
does not mean that domestic courts have the power of judicial review over SC 
resolutions as their decisions are not binding on the SC and relevant states cannot 
claim domestic decisions as a ground for refusal to meet obligations imposed by SC 
resolutions.157 However, this will, of course, generate political force to put pressure 
on the SC vertically and might be an effective measure if it occurs collectively in 
different domestic jurisdictions. Further, this creates the opportunity for domestic 
courts to play the role of a law-ascertaining official of the international legal system 
and to clarify the rules within the Charter and also jus cogens rules. For example, in 
the Nada case, the court decided that:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153  See further discussions in Tzanakopoulos (n 120) 131–136; and also Antonios 
Tzanakopoulos, ‘United Nations Sanctions in Domestic Courts From Interpretation to 
Defiance in Abdelrazik v. Canada’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 249. 
154 As argued earlier, the EU system has a sui generis character which it is not proper to take 
as a sub-system of international law as it has developed into a more comprehensive system, 
similar to a municipal legal system. Therefore, the EU courts are perceived as domestic 
courts in this context. 
155 Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) of 21 
September 2005 in Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities, para. 337 and Judgment of The Court of First Instance (Second Chamber, 
Extended Composition) of 21 September 2005 in Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council And 
Commission, para. 226 
156 Youssef Nada v. State Secretariat for Economic Affairs and Federal Department of 
Economic Affairs, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, (CH 2007) ILDC 461, para. 7.3 
available with English translation at <http://www.oxfordlawreports.com> accessed 10 July 
2015. 
157 Article 3 of Draft Article on State Responsibility provides: ‘The characterization of an 
act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such 
characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal 
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But even the procedural guarantees asserted by the petitioner (right a to legal 
hearing and a fair trial pursuant to Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 14(1) 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; right 
to an effective appeal pursuant to Article 13 of the ECHR and Article 2(3) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) do not belong to the 
inalienable core of the international conventions on human rights … and thus 
do not belong categorically to jus cogens.158 
 
This illustrates a situation whereby domestic courts which, despite being a state 
official, have a tendency to reach their determinations with a lower political motive, 
and to participate in the ascertainment of jus cogens rules. Indeed, international 
courts are not bound by what has been decided by domestic courts. However, they 
are both entitled and encouraged to consult domestic decisions when ascertaining the 
content of international rules according to Article 38 of the Statute of ICJ, which is 
argued here as reflecting part of the rule of recognition of the international legal 
system. It should be note that although at the domestic level states are compelled to 
follow domestic courts not to implement SC resolutions, at international level, states 
might bear a risk of international responsibility being incumbent upon them since 
domestic courts do not provide authoritative rulings in the eyes of international 
courts. However, domestic courts’ decisions have a highly persuasive authority that 
international courts have to take in consideration in deciding relevant issues.   
 
Accordingly, states and their domestic courts have certain measures available to 
them to respond to the abuse of international constituted power to some extent. 
Nevertheless, the benefits of these vertical checks and balances do depend on the 
development of a sense of citizens of the world. Otherwise, this might gravely 
undermine the international legal system if vertical checks and balances are 
employed solely for the sake of national interests. Nevertheless, the notion of states 
‘as an end in itself’ results in patriotism, which naturally hinders the development of 
the sense of citizens of the world to some extent.159 Brown suggests that the sense of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Youssef Nada v. State Secretariat for Economic Affairs and Federal Department of 
Economic Affairs, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, (CH 2007) ILDC 461, para. 7.3. 
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citizens of the world will be strengthened ‘only through the beliefs of individuals and 
their non-coerced willingness to broaden their identity formation so as to incorporate 
humanity itself’. 160  Habermas explains that the experience of the increasing 
independence in world society results in a change in the “self-image” of states and 
their citizens as well as in the decision-making of relevant actors to fit with a new 
structure of the world.161  He further argues that: 
 
Through participation in controversies over the application of new laws, norms 
that are merely verbally acknowledged by officials and citizens gradually 
become internalized. In this way, nation states learn to regard themselves at the 
same time as members of larger political communities.162 
 
Accordingly, the limitations of the international constituted power via vertical checks 
and balances lie in the realization of people and other relevant actors that they are 
also part of a larger and perhaps the largest and most inclusive society, which is the 
international community of humanity.   
 
IV: Conclusion: The Development of the Institutionalization of International 
Constituted Power in the International legal System 
 
As shown, the jus cogens regime does not contribute greatly to the 
institutionalization of international constituted power as it does not specifically 
allocate power that can be exercised against state wills to any international actors. 
However, jus cogens rules play a vital role in the limitation of international 
constituted power allocated to the SC based on the nexus to the international 
constituent power-holder. Based on the development of a secondary rule regarding 
the international community which is not limited to states, views of individuals will 
count in the forming of the collective will of the international community which 
determines what the fundamental shared values of the international community are. 
Of course, a survey of all individuals’ views would be nothing if not impossible. 
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Nonetheless, this gives the legitimacy for international courts to look for, in non-state 
avenues, information which can be used in determining and applying jus cogens 
rules, especially in the opinion of academia, regarded as a rule-ascertaining official 
in the international legal system. As SC resolutions are subject to jus cogens rules, 
this provides a limitation on the exercise of international constituted power by the SC 
based on rules articulated based on the will of humanity, which is the source of 
international constituent power-holder. Further, the use of jus cogens as a limit on 
the international constituted power of the SC is accessible to both international and 
domestic courts. 
 
Within the UN system, the only organ that is empowered with a power superior to 
state wills is the SC, based on Chapter VII of the Charter.  The GA and ECOSOC 
play a vital role in identifying and shaping fundamental shared values and other 
shared values. However, they function as more like an avenue where states as the 
representatives of constituent power-holders and other non-state actors, such as 
NGOs or relevant experts, participate in the creation of the collective will of the 
international community, which might lead to the emergence or ascertainment of 
international constitutional rules. In this sense, the GA and ECOSOC are relevant to 
the exercise of constituent power or constitution-making power. Likewise, although 
the ICJ’s decisions are binding on state parties to cases, as the jurisdiction of the ICJ 
depends on the consent of such states, the bindingness of ICJ verdicts derives from 
state consent rather than the power of the court over state wills. Thus, the allocation 
of international constituted power in the sense of power superior to state wills is 
currently only found in the SC.  Thus, this power of the SC needs to be limited based 
on its nexus to the international constituent power so that international self-
governance with a mandate for peace and fundamental human rights will emerge. 
 
With respect to legal mechanisms that impose limitations on the international 
constituted power allocated to the SC, the SC’s Chapter VII powers are limited by 
the text of the Charter as well as by jus cogens rules. This basically inserts a rule-of-
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mechanism hinges on the independent judicial reviews of international courts. Now, 
only incidental judicial reviews via non-compulsory contentious jurisdictions and 
non-binding advisory opinions are available in the international legal system. With 
respect to the separation of powers, the GA can seek advisory opinions of the ICJ to 
determine the lawfulness of SC resolutions. Nonetheless, again, advisory opinions 
are not binding on the SC. Added to this, although when the SC malfunctions the GA 
can step in to take responsibility for peace and fundamental human rights, the GA 
cannot issue binding resolutions. As the UN Charter and jus cogens rules both entail 
rules protecting fundamental human rights, there exists a limitation on international 
constituted power based on protection of the fundamental rights of the constituent 
power-holder. Nevertheless, the limited capability of international courts to deal with 
this issue again undermines the effectiveness of this mechanism. Regarding 
democratic legitimacy, the structure of state-centred international law disables the 
development of global demos and the creation of a robust democratic link between 
international constituted power and the international constituent power-holder. 
However, democratic legitimacy might be further developed by states adopting 
additional democratic principles on the international stage. Nonetheless, this depends 
on the development of domestic constitutionalism for which international 
constitutionalism aims to provide a supporting environment, reflecting the 
complementing interactions between two levels of governance. 
 
Thus, the mechanisms that are used to limit constituted power in domestic systems 
are also available in the international legal system. However, largely because of the 
lack of compulsory jurisdiction of international courts, such mechanisms are lacking 
in efficiency. Nevertheless, although the lack of compulsory jurisdiction is the 
negative side of the largely decentralized character of state-centred international law, 
looking on the bright side, the power of the SC is less centralized and more limited in 
scope than domestic government. Further, state-centred international law offers 
vertical checks and balances between states as a representative of the international 
constituent power-holder and the international constituted power holder. States can 
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countermeasures to create checks and balances between SC and states, especially 
smaller countries. Domestic courts which are typically less influenced by political 
motives also have a chance to review the lawfulness of the SC resolutions if cases 
relevant to the domestic implementations of such resolutions are presented to the 
court. Although, domestic courts’ decisions are not binding on the SC and do not 
provide legitimacy for non-compliance with SC resolutions, they do generate 
political pressure and have persuasive authority.  In addition, this provides a chance 
for domestic courts also to play the role of a rule-ascertaining official in the 
international legal system in terms of clarifying the content of jus cogens rules, or 
even the UN Charter, which international courts are eligible and encouraged to use in 
their cases. 
 
All in all, there exists an allocation of international constituted power to the SC, 
though not one as strong as that in domestic system. This reflects the 
institutionalization of the international constituted power in terms of the allocation of 
power being less developed compared to domestic constitutional legal systems. 
However, that is compatible with Kant’s idea of a federation of free states which 
shall have a limited mandate as a loosened, tied and collective entity. The 
concentrated allocation of constituted power to an international actor would carry the 
risk of despotism. There are also elements of the limitation of the international 
constituted power of the SC via the rule of law, the separation of powers and the 
protection of fundamental human rights. However, the lack of compulsory 
jurisdiction of international law, which is key to the successful limitation of power, is 
missing.  Although the vertical checks and balances the SC’s power by states and 
their actors might kick in and provide help, this kind of mechanism is largely 
dependent on the development of a sense of citizens of the world which will drive 
states as representatives of their peoples and other relevant actors to act for the 
benefit of humanity as whole. 
 
Accordingly, until the sense of citizens of the world is sufficiently developed through 
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race, a change in the composition of the SC and/or its veto rights or the emergence of 
a compulsory jurisdiction is still needed to provide more legitimacy for the exercise 
of power by the SC.  Hence, certainly, the institutionalization of international 
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Chapter VI:  Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the constitutional quality of international 
law. In doing so, two tasks have been undertaken — firstly, an articulation of the 
conditions which are individually necessary and cumulatively sufficient for the 
emergence of a constitutionalized international legal system and secondly an 
assessment of the current structure of international law based on the proposed 
conditions. It is proposed here that the international constitutional legal system has 
developed robustly; however, there exist certain shortcomings in the current structure 
of international law. Thus, the thesis also includes suggestions for how further to 
constitutionalize international law.   
 
At the heart of this thesis is the mindset that the largely decentralized and state-
centred character of international law should never be automatically labelled as an 
underdeveloped legal structure, just because it is not as centralized as domestic 
constitutional legal systems.  To prevent international constitutionalism being 
overshadowed by statist constitutionalism, making us blind to the differences 
between international and domestic society, it is necessary to figure out the 
underlying rationale of the international, largely decentralized, legal system. Then, if 
the largely decentralized structure has been constructed based on some underlying 
rationale rather than just because of the lack of normative development, articulation 
of the necessary conditions for and a determination of the constitutional quality of 
international law must be achieved by taking such underlying rationales into 
consideration. Of course, the thesis does not deny that some form of centralized legal 
structure is required for the emergence of an international constitutional legal 
structure. However, the real question concerns the extent to which international law 
should be centralized. The answer to this question depends on how much 
centralisation is needed to achieve the creation of self-governance of the free and 
equal. Again, this should be modelled in light of the pluralist character of state-
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international and domestic – which can and should complement each other and 
compensate for each other’s weaknesses. 
 
The main difficulty in completing these two tasks lies in the semantic issue of the 
contours and content of international constitutionalism, which is a consequence of 
the transfer of the already-highly contested concept originating in the domestic 
sphere to the international setting. To tackle this semantic issue, firstly the thesis has 
discussed three intertwined key terms: ‘international constitutionalism’, ‘the 
constitutionalization of international society and its law’ and ‘a constitution of the 
international community’. The thesis proposes the interrelationship between these 
three terms – international constitutionalism as an idea, the constitutionalization of 
international law as a process and a constitution of the international community as a 
product.  Accordingly, no matter how one defines international constitutionalism, 
one logical way to determine whether international law qualifies as a 
constitutionalized legal system is to determine whether the international legal 
structure, which has been structured by constitutional rules as a product of the 
constitutionalizing process of the idea of constitutionalism, can fulfil the ideas 
entailed in international constitutionalism.  
 
Based on this interrelationship, it is also proposed here that, in the weakest and most 
inclusive sense, the constitutionalization of international law can be understood as 
the systematization of international law. However, people who have specific content 
of constitutionalism in mind will demand that international law be systematized in a 
specific direction or possess specific legal mechanisms. Thus, constitutionalization 
of international law starts from the basic systematization but might need to develop 
further in order to achieve a particular variation of international constitutionalism 
chosen to set a goal of the constitutionalization process. Based on such a basic 
understanding of constitutionalization of international law, three models for an 
international legal constitutional structure can be found in the current literature on 
the various propositions for international constitutionalism: secondary-rule 
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constitutional legal structure, which are candidates for a model for an international 
constitutional legal system. 
 
Then, it was proposed here that the keys to the transfer of the concept of 
constitutionalism into the international sphere are the viability and the capacity to 
fulfil the underlying aim of international constitutionalism. These criteria serve as a 
basic for the assessment of these three models in the current literature and the 
articulation of the conditions necessary and sufficient for an international 
constitutionalized legal system.  
 
With respect to viability, the cosmopolitan paradigm offers a proper cognitive 
framework for the current character of international law on which the constitutional 
model can be grounded. Different from the statist model of international 
constitutionalism which sees the state-centred character of international law as a lack 
of development, a cosmopolitan paradigm explains the reasons behind this character.  
According to the cosmopolitan paradigm, the creation of a legal structure to support 
a world state is rejected, as the world-state path carries a high risk of despotism. 
Also, it might be used as a way to legitimize a claim by one state or international 
organization to use its coercive power to make other states subject to it. The 
cosmopolitan paradigm insists that states and their constitutions should not be 
subject to external coercive rights, except for the matters of peace and fundamental 
human rights. Even states with a despotic constitution cannot be told to change their 
constitution by external powers as this would undermine the peace-creation 
condition.  Thus, international cosmopolitan constitutionalism rejects the viability of 
a world state-structure with a single demos, whilst supporting the current pluralist 
structure of world governance. Pluralist state-centred international law has been 
developed to serve peace creation and respect for states and their peoples, taking into 
consideration the potential development of domestic constitutionalism through self-
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The underlying aim of constitutionalism also depends on how one defines the 
concept. However, the increase in constitutional discussion at the international level 
is, to a large extent, due to its potential to address the deficiencies of both domestic 
and international law. On the one hand, domestic constitutions built on the idea of 
territoriality lack the capacity to deal with deterritorialized activities and have a 
problem regarding legitimacy of the scope of constituent power holders with respect 
to outsiders affected by the constitution and domestic law. The construction of an 
international legal system can cure the defects of domestic constitutional legal 
systems as it can subject deterritorialized problems to law and it has no inherent 
problems regarding the exclusion of outsiders based on territories or nationalities. 
However, international law has its own problem of a fragmented nature, thus 
triggering a need for the creation of more unity at the international level; and due to 
the proliferation of international rules and organizations with political power, 
international law needs to be legitimatized. Thus, the international legal structure 
built to fight with the new challenges of the world have its own issues that need to be 
legitimatized by via the process of constitutionalization. This reflects the on-going 
attempt of humanity to further develop the legal structure of human society to cope 
with the new emerging social phenomena via law as well as with the legitimacy 
problems generated by the development or modification of the legal structure. 
 
Then, looking at the original context of constitutionalism, the underlying aim of 
domestic constitutionalism is to create self-governance for the people of a state. If 
this purpose of the creation of self-governance is also transferred and achieved in the 
international sphere, then international self-governance can cure the legal defects 
discussed at both levels. This strongly suggests that the constituionalization process 
of the international law and domestic law should be seen as an ongoing human 
attempt to legitimatize the legal structure of human society at both domestic and 
international levels by the creation of self-governance of human beings. The 
fundamental connecting point of this process is the primacy of the human beings 
who are the ultimate stakeholders of any kind of society over any form of entities 
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the international level, every human being can be included as a constituent power-
holder, excluding no one based on nationality, territory or citizenship, taking the 
constituionalization of international law as a part of ongoing project of the 
constitutionalization of human society allows the creation of self-governance to be 
truly achieved. Thus, it is argued that the creation of self-governance is the 
underlying aim of the idea of constitutionalism; this aim should not vary, regardless 
of the type of society in which the idea of constitutionalism is actualized. This aim 
must not be compromised during the transfer of concept into the international setting, 
and it should be taken as the underlying aim of international constitutionalism. The 
shared purpose to create self-governance will serve as an underlying connecting 
point between domestic constitutionalism and international constitutionalism. 
 
However, this does not mean that a constitutionalized international legal system must 
achieve this underlying aim on its own. The reality is that there exist two levels of 
world governance, each of which has its own weaknesses hindering the creation of 
self-governance in different aspects. As both domestic constitutionalism and 
international constitutionalism have the same underlying purpose, a constitutional 
legal system at both levels should be structured from the view that each of them can 
and should complement and compensate for the other. On this point, the 
cosmopolitan paradigm proposes three cosmopolitan conditions for the creation of 
self-governance of the free and equal based on the reality of multilevel governance 
of the world. First, ‘the civil constitution of every state shall be republican’; 
secondly, ‘the rights of nations shall be based on a federation of free states’; and 
thirdly, ‘cosmopolitan rights shall be limited to conditions of universality 
hospitality’.1 The first condition is to be fulfilled by domestic constitutionalism, 
whilst the international right, which is the right of states not to be subjected to 
external coercive power, and cosmopolitan rights, which take the form of human 
rights in the contemporary context, are to be fulfilled in the international sphere.  
Based on the idea of the complementarity of two levels of governance, on the one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’ in HS Reiss and HB Nisbet (eds), Kant: Political 
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hand, the international constitutional legal system provides a peaceful condition and 
a minimum standard of human rights that humans will enjoy everywhere. Under such 
conditions, without the difficulties caused by external intervention, domestic 
constitutionalism will grow.  On the other hand, when states become more 
democratically legitimate, a federation of free states in which states act as 
representatives of their people who are part of international constituent power-
holders will earn more legitimacy based on a stronger link between international 
constituted power and international constituent power through states. It is also 
expected that when domestic constitutionalism grows strong, the representatives of 
states will support democratic principles at the international level. Accordingly, 
based on the complementary relationship between an international constitutional 
legal system and domestic constitutional legal systems, the mandate of international 
self-governance in the form of a federation of free states should be limited to 
securing international peace and fundamental human rights. Other matters, apart 
from peace and fundamental human rights, should be left to the discretion of states, 
in which democratic legitimacy can be fully developed to design the content of law 
in the form of a state constitution, domestic law and state-consent-based international 
law.  
 
Applying the viability and capacity to fulfil the underlying purpose criterion, this 
thesis rejects each of the three models available in the current literature, as none 
succeeds in giving a fully plausible account of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of an international constitutional structure.  
  
Systematic quality is one of the necessary conditions for the establishment of an 
international constitutionalized legal system, as it provides basic efficacy of the 
system. This is a prerequisite for any legal system, not matter whether 
constitutionalized or not, in order to fulfil its underlying purpose. However, focusing 
only on the systemic element of international law, the secondary-rule constitutional 
legal structure does not necessitate pursuit of peace or the protection of fundamental 
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structure can serve as a sufficient model for an international constitutionalized legal 
system since a system with a hierarchical structure of primary rules does not 
necessarily prioritize peace and fundamental human rights.  Further, this model does 
not require that the higher rules of the hierarchy be constituted by the international 
constituent power-holders, aka humankind, which is necessary to create international 
self-governance. However, a hierarchy of primary rules which can provide the 
supremacy and universality of primary rules, creating an obligation to protect 
international peace and fundamental human rights, is one of the necessary conditions 
for the emergence of an international constitutionalized system to fulfil the aims 
described above.   
 
In contrast, a statist model for an international constitutional legal structure has a 
condition that is too attached to the particularity of domestic legal structure. The 
statist legal structure model requires both a comprehensive legal structure that 
juridifies all the political power within the relevant territoriality, and legal 
mechanisms that impose a limitation on the exercise of the constituted power based 
on the nexus between constituted power and constituent power. If a comprehensively 
centralized legal structure needs to be achieved at the international level, then a 
world sovereign or world statehood has to be in place. This path is not desirable due 
to the risk of despotism of a world government. Nevertheless, the purposes of an 
international constitutional legal system will never be achieved unless centralized 
power that can be used to enforce constitutional primary rules against state wills, as 
far as peace and fundamental human rights are concerned emerges within 
international law. When international constituted power that can force states to act 
against will has been allocated to certain actors, this in turn necessitates limitations 
on such power. That is to say, the institutionalization of international constituted 
power on the matter of peace and fundamental human rights is the final condition for 
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Based on this analysis, this thesis has proposed the following conditions – 
individually necessary and cumulatively sufficient – for the emergence of an 
international constitutional legal system:  
  
1. International law must be sufficiently equipped with secondary rules which will 
provide basic efficacy for international law to exist as a legal system. 
 
2. There must exist a hierarchy of international primary rules providing supremacy 
for primary rules that protect peace and fundamental human rights.   
 
3. The institutionalization (allocation and limitation) of international constituted 
power must be achieved in order to establish international self-governance with a 
mandate for the protection of international peace and fundamental human rights.  
 
Based on these conditions, this thesis argues that a constitutional legal system has 
emerged at the international level, despite certain shortcomings with respect to the 
institutionalization of international constituted power that can force states to act 
against their wills.  
 
With respect to the systematic element, based on Hart’s theory of a legal system as a 
union of primary rules and secondary rules, it is proposed here that international law 
exists as a legal system. Two Hartian minimum conditions for the existence of a 
legal system are met by international law. First, the international primary rules of 
obligation are generally obeyed. Secondly, international law is sufficiently equipped 
with secondary rules to deal with the problems of legal uncertainty, legal stagnation 
and legal ineffectiveness. Considering the content of international secondary rules, 
the rule of recognition of international law recognizes state wills as one of the 
sources of validity of the primary rules of the system, and other secondary rules also 
respect the autonomy of states, which are the representatives of their respective 
peoples. This contributes to the largely decentralized and state-centred international 
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a peace-creating condition for the world. In the case of democratic states, this also 
allows states as representatives of their constituent power-holders at the international 
level to exercise the power conferred on them by their peoples to freely designate 
international law, as long as it does not undermine the protection of peace and 
fundamental human rights domain. Although the largely decentralized character of 
international law creates another problem of legal uncertainty caused by normative 
conflicts, international law is also equipped with adequate conflict rules to deal with 
this issue.  
 
In light of the hierarchical structure of international primary rules with the 
supremacy of peace and fundamental human rights, it is argued here that there exists 
a unifying rule of recognition which embraces both state wills and the fundamental 
shared values of the international community as a source of validity international 
primary rules whilst recognizing the latter as a superior source of validity. The 
hierarchical structure of international primary rules is established by the secondary 
rules of non-derogability of jus cogens and the primacy of the UN Charter, both of 
which protect the higher status of community-value-based international primary 
rules. Both jus cogens rules and the substantive rules of the UN Charter, as a higher 
rule of the international legal system, generate obligations protecting of peace and 
fundamental human rights. Accordingly, the existence of a hierarchical structure of 
international primary rules providing the supremacy for rules protecting peace and 
fundamental human rights have been established in the international legal system.   
The revelation of the content of the unifying rule of recognition that recognizes the 
fundamental shared values of the international community as a source of validity of 
international constitutional primary rules simultaneously identifies all human beings 
in the international community as a constituent power-holders. The recognition of the 
constitution-making power of the international community of mankind by the 
unifying rule of recognition of the international legal system can provide the 
foundation for the creation of international self-governance of the free and equal as it 
includes every human being as a part of constituent power-holder.  However, it is 
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values or community-value-based rules. Nonetheless, in current international law, 
international dialogues or forums are still dominated by state actors and the views of 
state agents at the international stages are readily accessible for international courts 
as rule-applying officials. Thus, the ascertainment of international constitutional 
rules is still mainly based on states’ views. Hence, certain groups of people such as 
stateless persons and minorities in states tend to be under-represented. More open 
international forums for non-state actors such as NGOs and experts are encouraged 
in order to remedy this deficiency in the current international legal system. Likewise, 
legal opinions regarding the content of community-value-based rules of academics 
and domestic courts which serve as rule-ascertaining officials of the international 
legal system should be given more attentions by international courts. These two 
actors are typically less politically influenced and both can create an epistemic 
community of legal experts where information sharing regarding community-value-
based rules and discussion of them can be made possible. This would provide a 
venue where international courts can gather information about the fundamental 
values of the international community as well as community-value-based rules 
beyond the opinions of states and their strictly-under-state-control officials. 
 
Pertaining to the third condition — the institutionalization of international 
constituted power superior to state wills — the UN Charter creates an institutional 
structure to identify, clarify and protect the fundamental shared values of the 
international community. Whilst the GA, the SC, the ICJ and ECOSOC have been 
assigned vital functions in the UN value system and attributed the necessary power 
to achieve assigned tasks, it is argued that currently only the SC has been empowered 
with international constituted power which can be exercised against state wills.  
However, the composition of the UN Charter with five fixed permanent members 
possessing veto privileges generates a serious legitimacy problem for the exercise of 
the international constituted power of the SC. Added to this, the limitation of the 
constituted power allocated to the SC is a weakness of the international legal system, 
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Whilst democratic legitimacy is extremely difficult to establish in state-centred 
pluralist international law due to the lack of a global single demos, the mechanisms 
of the rule of law, vertical separation of powers and the protection of fundamental 
rights of constituent power-holders can be found. Nevertheless, the absence of the 
compulsory jurisdiction with respect to peace and fundamental human rights of 
international courts is a key reason for relative inefficiency of these mechanisms.  
However, the constituted power allocated to the SC is not as centralized as in 
domestic government, as the SC does not have its own military force and other 
resources necessary for enforcing its sanctions. Added to this, the multilevel 
governance of the world offers vertical checks and balances on the SC’s power by 
states. Nonetheless, the efficiency of these vertical checks and balances depends on 
the development of a sense of citizens of the world. Otherwise, this is nothing more 
than a patriotic tool to protect individual states’ interests. Domestically established 
but recognized as rule-ascertaining officials of the international legal system, 
domestic courts can, however, play a vital role when deciding issues relevant to the 
domestic implementation of SC measures. Domestic courts have opportunities to 
check the lawfulness of SC sanctions in light of the UN Charter and jus cogens when 
domestic implementation of such SC sanctions results in disputes before them. This 
also provides a chance for domestic courts to ascertain the content of international 
constitutional rules, drawn from either the Charter or jus cogens rules, and to make 
them more reflective of the shared opinion of humankind rather than merely that of 
the community of states. 
 
To conclude, international law exists as a legal system with a hierarchical structure 
protecting peace and fundamental human rights.  However, the process of 
constitutionalization is still incomplete. In order to better achieve the aims of the 
international constitutionalism, further institutionalization of international constituted 
power on the matter of peace and fundamental human rights is needed. The 
allocation of international constituted power superior to states’ power can be 
identified in the case of the SC, albeit not as centralized as in the case of domestic 
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on the nexus to the international community of mankind lacks efficiency, mainly due 
to the lack of compulsory jurisdiction of international courts. This, together with the 
issues of the representativeness and veto rights of the SC, poses a serious problem 
regarding the legitimacy of the international constituted power conferred on the SC. 
The vertical checks and balances on states and the SC can offer some assistance but 
the results depend on the development of a sense of citizens of the world amongst 
relevant actors.  Accordingly, a robust international constitutional legal system has 
emerged with some deficiencies that need further constitutionalization processes if 
they are to be rectified. Reforms of the international legal structure and composition 
of the SC and veto rights, as well as the establishment of compulsory jurisdiction for 
international courts on matters of peace and fundamental human rights, are obviously 
needed. Nevertheless, given the current international political landscape, such a 
process seems unlikely to occur in the near future. However, hope may lie in 
strengthening the sense of cosmopolitan citizenship that can inspire people to 
perceive themselves as part of both their own national states and the larger 
community of mankind, both of which exist for the benefit of humankind as a whole. 
When a strong sense of world citizenship is deeply instilled in the minds of people, 
this should enable reform of the international legal structure to take place. Until then, 
the role of academics and domestic courts, which are typically less politically 
influenced and regarded as officials of the international legal system, should be 
emphasized to make the best out of the currently imperfect, but with potential to 
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